Baseball Prospectus

MLB Statistics

Statistics for All Levels

Statistics For All Levels

Plate Discipline

Preseason Long-Term Forecast (Beyond the 2019 Projections)

Comparable Players (Similarity Index 80)

Rank	Score	Name	Year	DRC+	Trend
1	87	Mike Sweeney	2009	112
2	85	Adrian Gonzalez	2017	77
3	84	Don Baylor	1984	137
4	84	Aubrey Huff	2012	93
5	84	Kevin Millar	2007	117
6	84	Kendrys Morales	2018	112
7	84	Justin Morneau	2016	87
8	84	Chris Chambliss	1984	98
9	83	Tino Martinez	2003	105
10	83	Ray Boone	1959	108
11	83	Jim Bottomley	1935	79
12	83	Ty Wigginton	2013	61
13	83	Andre Ethier	2017	88
14	83	Russ Wrightstone	1928	90
15	83	Lyle Overbay	2012	81
16	82	Carl Everett	2006	88
17	82	Hal McRae	1981	113
18	82	David DeJesus	2015	87
19	82	Harold Baines	1994	111
20	82	Jim Spencer	1982	55
21	82	Jeff King	2000	0	DNP
22	82	Rocky Nelson	1960	124
23	82	Julio Franco	1994	134
24	82	Richie Hebner	1983	94
25	82	Ted Simmons	1985	107
26	81	Nick Swisher	2016	0	DNP
27	81	Michael Young	2012	91
28	81	David Segui	2002	93
29	81	Will Clark	1999	124
30	81	Rico Carty	1975	143
31	81	Ernie Banks	1966	100
32	81	Ted Kluszewski	1960	111
33	80	Bobby Murcer	1981	118
34	80	Jose Guillen	2011	0	DNP
35	80	Al Oliver	1982	139
36	80	Joe Judge	1929	119
37	80	Ed Kranepool	1980	0	DNP
38	80	Joe Kuhel	1941	96
39	80	Eddie Robinson	1956	82
40	80	Eddie Murray	1991	107
41	80	Ryan Raburn	2016	75
42	80	Todd Zeile	2001	100
43	80	Kent Hrbek	1995	0	DNP
44	80	Wally Joyner	1997	126
45	79	Phil Cavarretta	1952	91
46	79	Juan Rivera	2014	0	DNP
47	79	Dmitri Young	2009	0	DNP
48	79	Hideki Matsui	2009	127
49	79	Dan Driessen	1987	86
50	79	Charlie Grimm	1934	96
51	79	Tony Oliva	1974	107
52	79	Mickey Vernon	1953	134
53	79	Ross Gload	2011	82
54	79	Olmedo Saenz	2006	115
55	79	Joe Collins	1958	0	DNP
56	79	Fred McGriff	1999	133
57	79	Terry Crowley	1982	118
58	78	Aaron Boone	2008	74
59	78	Gary Redus	1992	98
60	78	Don Mincher	1973	0	DNP
61	78	Rusty Staub	1979	106
62	78	Bob Watson	1981	101
63	78	Todd Walker	2008	0	DNP
64	78	Irish Meusel	1928	0	DNP
65	78	Mark Teixeira	2015	146
66	78	Rondell White	2007	71
67	78	Dale Long	1961	109
68	78	Orlando Cepeda	1973	121
69	78	Raul Ibanez	2007	116
70	77	Trot Nixon	2009	0	DNP
71	77	Roy Smalley	1988	0	DNP
72	77	Adam LaRoche	2015	87
73	77	Doug Mientkiewicz	2009	76
74	77	Rafael Palmeiro	2000	137
75	77	Travis Hafner	2012	117
76	77	Gates Brown	1974	93
77	77	Eric Hinske	2013	77
78	77	Harvey Hendrick	1933	112
79	77	Bill Buckner	1985	101
80	77	Shawn Green	2008	0	DNP
81	77	John Wockenfuss	1984	130
82	77	Ken McMullen	1977	98
83	77	Greg Dobbs	2014	77
84	77	Bruce Bochte	1986	99
85	77	David Dellucci	2009	65
86	77	Victor Martinez	2014	178
87	77	Eric Chavez	2013	113
88	77	Ryan Ludwick	2014	92
89	77	Joe Harris	1926	119
90	77	Goose Goslin	1936	123
91	77	Jeff Baker	2016	0	DNP
92	77	George Crowe	1956	98
93	77	Andre Thornton	1985	107
94	76	Norm Cash	1970	119
95	76	Dae-Ho Lee	2017	0	DNP
96	76	Bobby Veach	1923	108
97	76	Joe Mauer	2018	96
98	76	Gus Suhr	1941	0	DNP
99	76	Luke Scott	2013	95
100	76	Jim Northrup	1975	111

BP Annual Player Comments

Year		Comment
2019		Due to publishing agreements, the 2019 player comments and team essays are only available in the Baseball Prospectus 2019 book (available in hardcopy, and soon e-book and Kindle).
2018		To put it simply, Lind sucked in 2016. His biggest strength, the ability to mash righties, completely disappeared (as did just about everything else that could be considered a strength of his). Thankfully, he steered out of that slide in 2017—due in large part to a newfound role as a pinch-hitting god. Lind set the Nationals’ team record for pinch-hit home runs in a season with four, hitting .356/.396/.644 in his 48 plate appearances in the role. He still can’t hit lefties, he still can’t play competent defense, he’s still an injury risk and now he’s coming up on the wrong side of 35. But he still shows flashes of performance at the plate that are worth sticking around for, even if they’re just one pinch at a time.
2017		The list of things the Mariners wanted Adam Lind to do in 2016: punish right-handed pitching, knock some home runs and play a competent first base. You know, good Adam Lind things. The list of things Adam Lind actually did in 2016: posted an on-base percentage of .287...vs. right-handed pitching, knocked some home runs, wore pants that looked uncomfortably tight and had odd little wisps of hair stick out of his cap and batting helmet. You know, bad Adam Lind things.
2016		Lind isn't complicated. He bludgeons right-handed pitching, flails helplessly against southpaws, and is a health risk due to his back. When he's limber and shielded from lefties, he's an easy two-win player and someone who can provide above-average production for a contender on the cheap. He's basically Lucas Duda without the lucky 2015 season against lefties to inflate his perceived value (and before you argue, Duda had a 31.8 percent strikeout rate and .378 BABIP versus southpaws). In fact, Lind had a better OPS against righties than Adrian Gonzalez, Buster Posey, Brandon Belt, Lucas Duda, Albert Pujols, and Carlos Santana—which makes him one of the most underrated hitters in the game. Some days.
2015		Lind spent three years below replacement level, trying to recapture his breakout 2009, before the Blue Jays scrapped playing him full-time in 2013 and directed 81 percent of his plate appearances to left-on-right matchups, with tremendous success. Last year, that grew to 88 percent. Lind also added a staggering goatee, which surely contributed to the best on-base percentage and batting average of his career. He hit to the opposite field with much higher frequency, splashing more extra-base hits to left field than his pull side. He's still unusable at first base, which makes his acquisition by the Brewers a little mystifying, even accounting for his reasonable contract status: $7.5 million owed in 2015 and an $8 million club option (with just a $500,000 buyout) in 2016.
2014		Lind might say it was offseason yoga (although his back nonetheless seized up on him midseason) or "swinging 90 percent," as he described his new-age approach. His manager, however, might take credit for physical discipline of his own, and of a very different type: He had Lind assume an extreme platoon split, allowing him to face a lefty in a career-low 19 percent of his plate appearances. The result? Lind had his best year since the breakout 2009 that made him look like a future star. He may never be one, but he made his $7 million option easy to exercise, and as a year-to-year club-option player at reasonable rates through 2016 ($7.5 million and $8 million, with smallish buyouts), he's a useful asset as long as he skips games started by southpaws and goes to yoga class instead.
2013		Lind’s 2008, when he hit 35 homers with an OPS over 900, set the world afire and heralded the coming of a new star in Toronto. In the 1,508 plate appearances since, he has hit .246/.296/.428. As you can see, Lind’s problems are beautiful multifaceted gemstones, highly prized by the aristocracy for their richness and complexity. Put bluntly, dude can’t hit lefties, play defense, or get on base. Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln . . . ? His four-year, $18 million deal expires after this season. Here’s hoping he invested wisely.
2012		The chief virtue of Lind’s campaign was that it was better than his 2010. The chief vice of Lind’s campaign that it was only slightly so. Only through the magic of arbitrary endpoints is the similarity of his two seasons obscured. It looked, during a first half in which he hit .300/.349/.515, that perhaps the Adam Lind that made a four-year, $17 million contract look like a steal was back. By the All-Star break, it seemed like he was picking up where he left off after a stronger (.267/.309/.498) second half in 2010. He did suffer a back injury that sidelined him for several weeks in the first half, but he came back before the All-Star break and went on a small tear. That isn’t decisive, but it suggests the back injury was not to blame for his moribund second half (.197/.233/.356). There is no longer much reason to think that Lind will wind up any better than a league-average hitter.
2011		Just as the season began, Lind signed one of those option-laden multi-year deals that are all the rage these days. A 25-year-old who hit 35 home runs in 2009 looked like someone in whom one might invest $7 million four years down the road. After a supremely disappointing season, that’s no longer the case. Lind's plate discipline, already marginal, evaporated entirely, his power declined sharply, and at times he looked lost at the plate. He was consistently beaten to the outside part of the plate, and pitchers learned to exploit that weakness. On top of that, with the trade of Brett Wallace to Houston, Lind suddenly had newfound duties as the first baseman of the future. His favorable second-half split and the ability of even dead cats to bounce temper the pessimism to a degree.
2010		Lind was by far the Jays’ best hitter in 2009, finally delivering in full on the potential he showed in the minors and in his cup of coffee in 2006. Though he shed more than 200 points of OPS against his fellow lefties and was awful in his limited opportunities afield, Lind battered righties enough to remain valuable, and his split against lefties was hardly disastrous (.275/.318/.461). Still, it’s damning that the only two hitters under 27 that J.P. Ricciardi left the Jays to build around (Lind and Travis Snider) barely register on the defensive spectrum.
2009		Ticketed for stardom after his brief, blazing introductions to Triple-A and the majors in his age-22 season, Lind failed to seize his opportunity in 2007, but didn’t miss when the chance came again last year. Installed in left in late June, Lind hit .355/.377/.626 through the end of July to secure the job, but then cooled off over the final two months of the season. Beyond somewhat limited power potential (his ISOs aren't solid for a corner), Lind’s plate approach in the bigs seems to be an issue; his K/UIBB was 2.1 at Triple-A last year and is a similar 2.2 over his minor league career, but in the majors his career rate swells to 4.0, and during his poor August and September last year it was up to an even six strikeouts for every unintentional walk.
2008		Lind didn't have an argument for holding onto his playing time after Johnson's return. He was batting .230/.274/.383 as Johnson's replacement in left. The obvious solution-a platoon-was problematic within the parameters of a 12-man pitching staff, the lack of an everyday shortstop, and the need to spot Troy Glaus a day or two a week. All that, and Matt Stairs, too! Lind should be the regular left fielder this year, but both Johnson and Stairs are still around, so he's not going to be handed the job. His lousy September (.273/.298/.473) didn't help his case
2007		Adam Lind is as low-risk a prospect as you`ll find. He has nothing left to prove after demolishing his way through two minor league levels last season and has the sort of natural left-handed swing that scouts love. He`s an instinct hitter who doesn`t get cute at the plate, but he knows how to distinguish balls from strikes and his walk rate should improve. The question is whether he`ll be great or merely good. His secondary traits such as speed and defense aren`t particularly impressive, which may be what leads PECOTA to conclude that he`ll have an early peak.
2006		The rare player on the organizational depth chart who might turn into that elusive "impact bat," Lind had a nice season in the Florida State League, hitting for power and showing just enough patience. The Jays think he made a significant jump last year, and he`ll start the season in Double-A. There are significant defensive concerns, but even if he ends up at DH, by 2007 he might be the homegrown source of the lefty power that Koskie and Hinske have failed to provide.

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