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
Safely and effectively increase your knowledge of all current major-league managers by 183%

by the authors of Baseball Prospectus 2012:: Edited by Dave Pease



# Baseball Prospectus Clutch Performer 2012

THE ESSENTIAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE WORLD'S GREATEST SPORTS ANNUAL Featuring in-depth coverage of dozens of players and every major league manager



version 1.0 r2 (March 26, 2012) multiple minor updates from comments at http://bbp.cx/a/16285

by the authors of Baseball Prospectus 2012

with additional never-before-published material by

Derek Carty • Ken Funck • Kevin Goldstein • Jay Jaffe

Ben Lindbergh • Rob McQuown • Sam Miller • Jason Parks • Colin Wyers


Edited by **Dave Pease** 

This document is dedicated to the memory of

# Greg Spira 1967-2011

Sarcasm is a Way of Life

www.gregspira.com



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Visit http://www.bbp.cx/bp2012 to check formats and prices or to learn more about the book.

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## **Preface**

Each time we lock another version of the *Baseball Prospectus* annual in to be printed, it's always a happy day. Due to the inconsiderate scheduling of the MLB season, dozens of people work long hours on the book through the holidays, when most people are spending quality time with their families and friends. Now, all 1500 player comments, 30 team and manager profiles, and thousands of projections and stat lines are all set, and the book's staff can take a brief breather. Throughout the years, the bigger a role I played in the annual, the better I felt immediately after I heard the book was at the printers.

That feeling never lasts long, unfortunately, because the world doesn't stop after *Baseball Prospectus 2012* hits the market. We've worked hard with our publisher to cut their production timeline to the bone so we can update the annual as trades, player signings, injuries, and other important events occur. Once the annual is at the printer, we lose the ability to do that. Inevitably, days after it was the greatest thing ever that we'd submitted the annual, something important will happen in the baseball world that we'd love to have covered—the signings of Yu Darvish, Yoenis Cespedes, and Jamie Moyer all being prime examples so far this year—and we can no longer update the annual to include them.

Thanks to the efforts of our publisher, we were able to take a large leap into the e-book realm with *Baseball Prospectus* 2012. We've gotten plenty of experience publishing outside of book format with our long-standing <u>Baseball Prospectus</u> Premium subscription service, and we've also gotten some internal experience with layout and production of printed material, most recently in the *Best of Baseball Prospectus* books we published in December. This got us to thinking—always a dangerous proposition—and we decided to take the material we had that didn't make the book, add new content and revisions to make the document as up-to-date as possible, and publish it all as a PDF.

Three weeks later, here's some of the good stuff you'll find in *Clutch Performer 2012*, our first-ever official update to the *New York Times* bestselling *Baseball Prospectus* annual series:

- The debut of our PECOTA projections for foreign league imports, and full historical stat entries and player comments for Cespedes, Darvish, and all the rest of the new arrivals from foreign leagues
- Player comments and stats for players who missed the book, such as Coco Crisp, Kendrys Morales, and a clown car full of 2011 draftees
- The most complete treatment of managers we've ever published, with manager stats going back to the 1970s and the last four years of manager comments from the annuals
- An extended leaderboard of PECOTA rookie players, based on the latest PECOTA data and playing time projections available

If you've already purchased *Baseball Prospectus 2012*, thank you! We've designed this PDF to function as a supplement to your wise purchase, giving you the most timely information and analysis we are capable of. If you haven't had a look at the annual, you can get more information and the latest pricing at <a href="http://bbp.cx/bp2012/">http://bbp.cx/bp2012/</a>. It's like a bigger, stronger, more powerful version of what follows, and we're confident that you're going to enjoy reading it.

We're excited to roll out this free update to the annual. Please visit us at <a href="http://www.baseballprospectus.com/">http://www.baseballprospectus.com/</a>, have a look at some of the other excellent things our tireless writers, editors, and researchers are coming up with, and let us know what you think.

Thanks again for all the support over the years, and enjoy.

Dave Pease San Diego, California March 22, 2012

## **Statistical Introduction**

Colin Wyers

They will tell you "you had to be there." They lie.

I remember being a young boy, and being in awe of all the greats: Ruth, Mays, Gehrig, Williams, Cobb, Aaron, Musial, DiMaggio. I didn't see them. I wasn't there. But I knew. Flipping through stacks of cardboard (packaged with nearly indistinguishable pieces of gum), through books the consistency of newsprint . . . and then laying one's hands on an actual newspaper to catch up on yesterday's games, to see the successes and failures. Having favorite players, reliving games I had never lived to begin with, it was, in a very real sense, magic. Teleportation. Time travel.

Now, to be fair to those who say you had to be there, looking at baseball through its numbers is like looking through a telescope not quite in focus. Every year we turn the knob a little to the left or the right and things get a little clearer.

(Of course, sometimes the game is a little—or a lot—out of focus for them as well. Their picture never gets any clearer, though.)

So we continue to turn that knob, little by little, and each year we see a little more. Last year we made a rather large twist of the knob; this year we move the knob much more subtly. We hope you find that we keep moving it in the right direction.

#### **Offense**

At the core of everything we do to measure offense is True Average, which attempts to measure everything a player does at the plate—hitting for power, taking walks, striking out, and even making "productive" outs—on the familiar scale of batting average. A player with a TAv of .260 is average, .300 is exceptional, .200 is rather awful.

True Average also accounts for the context a player performs in—the baseline for average is not what the typical player has done, but what we expect the typical player would have done given similar opportunities. That means we adjust based on the mix of parks a player plays in. Rather than use a blanket park

adjustment for every player on a team, a player who plays a disproportionate number of his games at home will see that reflected in his stats, for instance. We also adjust based upon league quality; the average player in the AL is better than the average player in the NL, and True Average accounts for this.

Because hitting runs isn't the entirety of scoring runs, we also look at a player's Baserunning Runs. BRR accounts for the value of a player's ability to steal bases, of course, but it also accounts for his ability to go first to third on a single or advance on a fly ball.

#### Defense

Defense is a much thornier issue, and one we've tried to tackle in recent years. Historically, the fielding stats we've presented have been improvements upon the concept of range factor, but sharing the same underpinnings: measuring a player's plays made in terms of his putouts and assists, and comparing those plays made to his peers at that position (with an adjustment for the tendencies of pitchers— handedness and ground ball rate primarily among them).

The general move in the sabermetric community has been toward stats based on zone data—where human stringers record the type of batted ball (grounder, liner, fly ball) and its presumed landing location, and that data is used to compile expected outs to compare a fielder's performance to. Many people abandoned metrics based on adjusted range factor for other metrics that incorporated this zone-based data. The trouble is that this zone data—unlike the sorts of data that we use in the calculation of the statistics you see in this book—was never made publicly available; the data was recorded by commercial data providers who kept the raw data privately, only disclosing it to a select few who paid large sums for it.

But as we've seen the field of zone-based defensive analysis open up—more data and more metrics based upon that data coming to light—what we've seen is that the conclusions of zone-based defensive metrics don't hold up especially well to outside scrutiny. Different data providers can come to very

different conclusions about the same events— based upon their recording practices and their observational vantage point. And two metrics based upon the same data set can come to radically different conclusions based upon their starting assumptions—assumptions that haven't been tested, using methods that can't be duplicated or verified by outside analysts.

And we've seen that the quality of the fielder can bias the data. Zone-based fielding metrics will tend to attribute more expected outs to good fielders than bad fielders, irrespective of the distribution of batted balls. Scorers who work in parks with high press boxes will tend to score more line drives than scorers who work in parks with low press boxes.

Because of the secrecy surrounding the underlying data, we've barely begun to scratch the surface of quantifying these problems and their effects. But because of this, we have abandoned our efforts to produce our own zone-based metric for inclusion in this book. Simply put, there is no evidence to show that the inclusion of zone-based data improves defensive metrics over the short run, and much evidence that incorporating the data causes severe distortions over the long run.

Instead, we've revised FRAA to incorporate play-by-play data, allowing us to study the issue of defense at a much more granular level, but without resorting to the sorts of subjective data used in some other fielding metrics. We count how many plays a player made, as well as expected plays for the average player at that position based upon a pitcher's estimated groundball tendencies and the handedness of the batter. There are also adjustments for park and the base-out situations; depending on whether there are runners on base, as well as the number of outs, the shortstop may position himself differently, and we account for that in the average baselines.

Still, measuring individual fielding is a much less precise endeavor than measuring a player's hitting. So you'll often see player comments discussing a fielder's ability or performance in ways that directly contradict the stat block printed above. This seems to stick in the craws of many readers. To which I can only respond: If everything about a player could be captured by the stat block, we wouldn't need the comments at all. And until we've advanced to a far greater point of certainty in fielding analysis than where we are now, I (as a reader myself, as well as the man behind the figures in the book) would rather have comments that told me information

that the metrics don't capture than information the metrics do capture. Sometimes those additional comments will be wrong and the metric right, and sometimes it'll be the other way around, but until we're sure which is which I find it's much more useful to have both than to behave as though we have much more certainty than we really do.

#### **Pitching**

Of course, new findings about fielding influence how we measure pitching as well.

Probably the most radical finding about either was made by Voros McCracken, who stated, "There is little if any difference among major-league pitchers in their ability to prevent hits on balls hit in the field of play."

This was an extremely controversial finding when first published, but later research has by-and-large validated it (if softened the impact of it a bit). McCracken (and others) went forth from that finding to come up with a variety of defense-independent pitching measures.

The trouble is that many efforts to separate pitching from fielding have ended up also in some respects separating pitching from pitching—looking at only a handful of variables (typically walks, strikeouts, and home runs—the "three true outcomes") in isolation from the situation in which they occurred.

What we've done with our new pitching statistic (the name, "Fair RA," may seem familiar, but it's an entirely new metric) is to take a pitcher's actual results—not just what happened, but when it happened as well—and adjust them for the quality of his defensive support, as measured by FRAA.

Now, applying FRAA to pitchers in this sense is easier than applying it to fielders. We don't have to worry about figuring out which fielder is responsible for making an out, only identifying the likelihood of an out being made. So there is far less uncertainty here than there is in fielding analysis.

That's not the same as no uncertainty, of course. And again, we're right at the beginning of a renewed effort to study the impact of batted-ball distribution on fielding, and in turn how pitchers can affect batted-ball distribution. What we are finding is that "little if any difference" does not, in fact, mean no difference, and that there may be pitchers who have the ability to prevent hits on balls in play. What we are struggling

to do now is improve our ability to figure out who those pitchers were in short time spans—a single season, or even several seasons.

The way I like to look at it is: any effort to put a single number to a player's contributions is a good place to start a discussion, but a poor place to finish it. Sabermetrics provides us with a framework for talking about baseball, not a way to silence debate.

Also, Fair RA means exactly that, a number scaled to a pitcher's runs allowed per game, not his earned runs allowed per game. The concept of an "earned" run seems less and less expressive as we come to terms with how little errors tell us about a player's fielding abilities. Looking only at earned runs tends over time to overrate three kinds of pitchers:

- 1. Pitchers who play in parks where scorers tend to hand out more errors. Looking at differences in error rates between parks tells us that scorers can in fact differ significantly in how likely they are to score any given play as an error (as opposed to an infield hit);
- 2. Groundball pitchers. A substantial proportion of errors occur on groundballs, ERA will tend to overrate groundball pitchers compared to fly-ball pitchers of equal ability; and
- 3. Pitchers who aren't very good. Good pitchers tend to allow fewer unearned runs than bad pitchers, for the simple fact that good pitchers have more ways to get out of jams than bad pitchers. They're more likely to get a strikeout to end the inning, and less likely to give up a home run.

In short, looking at ERA (or metrics scaled to ERA) provides a distorted picture of what a pitcher actually accomplished. This is something we've long preached at Baseball Prospectus—and by starting to move away from ERA and toward RA in our advanced pitching metrics, we hope to encourage more people to move in this direction.

One frequent reaction to the introduction of Fair RA last year was the desire for a second pitching stat that does not attempt to measure a pitcher's total performance, but only those aspects of pitching that seem to be strongly repeatable season to season. To that end we're now also including Fielding Independent Pitching, a metric developed independently by Tom Tango and Clay Dreslough that says what a pitcher's expected ERA would be, given his walks, strikeouts, and home runs allowed. FIP is attempting to answer

a different question than Fair RA; instead of saying how well a pitcher performed, it tells us how much of a pitcher's performance we think is due to things the pitcher has direct control over. Over time, there are pitchers who consistently over and underperform their FIPs through some skill that isn't picked up by the rather limited components; FIP may be useful in identifying pitchers who were "lucky" and "unlucky" but some caution must be exercised, lest we throw the baby out with the bathwater.

#### **Projection**

Of course, many of you aren't turning to this book just for a look at what a player has done, but a look at what a player is going to do—the "deadly accurate" PECOTA projections mentioned in bold type on the cover.

PECOTA, initially developed by Nate Silver (who has moved on to greater fame as a political analyst), consists of three parts:

- 1. Major-league equivalencies, to allow us to use minorleague stats to project how a player will perform in the majors;
- 2. Baseline forecasts, which use weighted averages and regression to the mean to produce an estimate of a player's true talent level:
- 3. A career-path adjustment, which incorporates information on how comparable players' stats changed over time.

That basic approach is still retained. We've made a series of refinements, though, to improve upon the process. PECOTA may again someday declare the end of Ichiro, for instance, but it won't be this year—he's projected for another season of more than 200 hits.

Now that we've gone over how the book has changed from previous years, let's go over what's inside the book.

#### **Position Players**

Position players are listed first, in alphabetical order, and each player is listed with the major-league team with which he was employed as of January 1, 2012, meaning that free agents who eventually change teams will be listed under their previous employer. In Clutch Performer 2012, we've updated all current team affiliations and projections through date of publication.

| 8   | Coc | o Cri | sp  |     |    | (   | F  | E. | OA | <b>IK</b> | Bor | n: <b>11/</b> | 1/19 | <b>79</b> A | ge: <b>32</b> Bats <b>: B</b> Th | rows:   | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>5'10</b> | " Weight: <b>1</b> | 85        |
|---|-----|-------|-----|-----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----------|-----|---------------|------|-------------|----------------------------------|---------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|-----------|
| YEAR                                      | TM  | LVL   | AGE | PA  | R  | Н   | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI       | ВВ  | S0            | SB   | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                      | Tav     | BABIP          | BRR            | FRAA               | WARP      |
| 2009                                      | KCA | MLB   | 29  | 215 | 30 | 41  | 8  | 5  | 3  | 14        | 29  | 23            | 13   | 2           | .228/.330/.378                   | .246    | .245           | 3.1            | 1.7                | 0.6       |
| 2010                                      | ST0 | AFA   | 30  | 7   | 2  | 5   | 0  | 1  | 1  | 3         | 1   | 0             | 0    | 0           | .833/.857/1.667                  | .911    | .800           | -0.4           | -0.1               | 0.5       |
| 2010                                      | SAC | AAA   | 30  | 24  | 7  | 13  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 5         | 2   | 3             | 2    | 1           | .591/.625/.773                   | .526    | .684           | 0.5            | -0.4               | 0.8       |
| 2010                                      | OAK | MLB   | 30  | 328 | 51 | 81  | 14 | 4  | 8  | 38        | 30  | 49            | 32   | 3           | .279/.338/.438                   | .290    | .307           | 5.7            | 2.1                | 2.8       |
| 2011                                      | OAK | MLB   | 31  | 583 | 69 | 140 | 27 | 5  | 8  | 54        | 41  | 65            | 49   | 9           | .264/.312/.379                   | .263    | .284           | 4.3            | 7.0                | 3.0       |
| 2012                                      | OAK | MLB   | 32  | 617 | 68 | 142 | 25 | 6  | 8  | 59        | 54  | 86            | 45   | 9           | .258/.319/.368                   | .255    | .287           | 4.5            | LF 0, CF 2         | 1.8       |
| Breakout: 2% Improve: 39% Collapse: 1% At |     |       |     |     |    |     |    |    |    |           | :%  | MLB:          | 89%  |             | C                                | omparab | les: Robin     | Yount,J        | ody Gerut,Ken      | ny Lofton |

The player-specific sections (see Coco Crisp's listing above) begin with biographical information before moving onto the column headers and actual data. Other than cups of coffee at the various levels—trimmed out in the interest of space and in accordance with small-sample-size theory—all relevant seasons and partial seasons will be listed. The column headers begin with more standard information like year, team, level (majors or minors, and which level of the minors), and the raw, untranslated tallies found on the back of a baseball card: PA (Plate Appearances), *H (Hits)*, R (Runs), 2B (doubles), 3B (triples), HR (home runs), RBI (runs batted in), BB (walks), SO (strikeouts), SB (stolen bases), and CS (caught stealing).

Following those are the untranslated triple-slash-rate statistics: batting average (BA), on-base percentage (OBP), and slugging percentage (SLG). Their "slash" nickname is derived from the occasional presentation of slash-delimitation, such as noting that Coco Crisp hit .264/.312/.379. Each of the three statistics is flawed on its own, but put together they describe the "shape" of a hitter's production—whether he's a slap-hitting "punch and judy" type, or an all-or-nothing power hitter, or simply an all-around amazing hitter like Albert Pujols. It's followed up by True Average, which rolls all those things and more into one easy-to-digest number.

BABIP stands for Batting Average on Balls in Play, and is meant to show how well a hitter did when he put the ball in play. An especially low or high BABIP may mean a hitter was especially lucky or unlucky—but it may not. Line-drive hitters will tend to have especially high BABIPs from season to season; so will speedy runners who beat out more grounders for base hits.

Next is Baserunning Runs (BRR), which as mentioned earlier covers all sorts of baserunning accomplishments, not just stolen bases, and Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA).

The last column is WARP, Wins Above Replacement Player, which means we've left out VORP altogether. That doesn't mean we've discarded the underpinnings of VORP—we simply determined it wasn't necessary to have two ways of measuring the same player's contributions relative to replacement. For anyone who misses the VORP scale, it's simple enough to convert; a player with a WARP of 2.0 would have a VORP roughly equal to 20.

WARP combines a player's batting runs above average (derived from a player's True Average), BRR, FRAA, an adjustment based upon position played, and a credit for plate appearances based upon the difference between the "replacement level" (derived from looking at the quality of players added to a team's roster after the start of the season) and the league average.

Why the replacement-level adjustment? Why not leave everything relative to average? The answer is playing time—if you have two players who are totally average (in terms of hitting, fielding, position, and baserunning) but one plays in a dozen games and one plays in 120 games, the latter of the two is clearly more valuable to his team. At the same time, it is easy to envision a player who plays so poorly he is less valuable the more he plays: a first baseman who bats .200 with walks and power to match is easily hurting his team more the more he plays. Replacement level gives us a way to see how a player's playing time is helping—or hurting— his team.

Some of the Baseball Prospectus advanced statistics, such as Tav, BRR, FRAA, and WARP, are not available for some leagues. If you're reading Clutch Performer on an Internet-connected device, you can find more information by clicking on for players or for teams.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Andy           | Pet | titte |               |    |    | LI      | HP              |       | N)       | /A | Во | rn: <b>6</b> / | 15/1972    | Age: <b>40</b> | Bats: I    | L Throw    | s: <b>L</b> He | ight: <b>6'</b> | <b>5</b> " We | ight: <b>2</b> : | 25   |
|--------------|----------------|-----|-------|---------------|----|----|---------|-----------------|-------|----------|----|----|----------------|------------|----------------|------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|------|
| YEAR         | TM             | LVL | AGE   | W             | L  | SV | G       | GS              | IP    | Н        | HR | ВВ | S0             | EQBB9      | EQS09          | GB%        | BABIP      | WHIP           | ERA             | FIP           | FRA              | WARP |
| 2009         | NYA            | MLB | 37    | 14            | 8  | 0  | 32      | 32              | 194.2 | 193      | 20 | 76 | 148            | 3.5        | 6.8            | 44%        | .295       | 1.40           | 4.16            | 4.19          | 4.51             | 2.8  |
| 2010         | NYA            | MLB | 38    | 11            | 3  | 0  | 21      | 21              | 129.0 | 123      | 13 | 41 | 101            | 2.9        | 7.0            | 46%        | .291       | 1.30           | 3.28            | 3.81          | 4.30             | 1.6  |
| 2012         | NYA            | MLB | 40    | 6             | 5  | 0  | 15      | 15              | 90.0  | 98       | 10 | 31 | 67             | 3.1        | 6.7            | 49%        | .312       | 1.43           | 4.45            | 4.24          | 4.84             | 0.7  |
| Breako       | ut: <b>16%</b> |     | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 5% |    | Attriti | on: <b>11</b> 9 | %     | MLB: 73% |    |    | Con            | nparables: | Chuck Fir      | nlev.David | d Wells.Ja | mie Mover      |                 |               |                  |      |

#### **Pitchers**

Now let's look at how pitchers are presented, looking at once and future Yankee Andy Pettitte.

The first line and the YEAR, TM, LVL, and AGE columns are the same as in the hitter's example above. The next set of columns—W (Wins), L (Losses), SV (Saves), G (Games pitched), GS (Games Started), IP (Innings Pitched), H (Hits), HR, BB, SO, BB9, SO9—are the actual, unadjusted cumulative stats compiled by the pitcher during each season.

Next is GB%, which is the percentage of all batted balls that were hit on the ground including both outs and hits. The average GB% for a major-league pitcher in 2007 was about 45 percent; a pitcher with a GB% anywhere north of 50 percent can be considered a good groundball pitcher. As mentioned above, this is based upon the observation of human stringers and can be skewed based upon a number of factors. We've included the number as a guide, but please approach it skeptically.

BABIP is the same statistic as for batters, but often tells you more, since most pitchers have very little control over their batting average on balls in play. A high BABIP is more likely due to a poor defense, or bad luck, than to a pitcher's own abilities, and may be a good indicator of a potential rebound. A typical league-average BABIP is around .295–.300.

WHIP and ERA are common to most fans, with the former measuring the number of walks and hits allowed on a perinning basis while the latter prorates earned runs allowed on a nine-innings basis. Neither is translated or adjusted in any way.

Fair RA has been covered in some depth above, and is the basis of WARP for pitchers. Significantly, incorporating playby- play data allows us to set different replacement levels for starting pitchers and relievers. Relief pitchers have several advantages over starters—they can give their best effort on every pitch, and hitters have fewer chances to pick up on what they're doing. That means that it's significantly easier to find

decent replacements for relief pitchers than it is for starting pitchers, and that's reflected in the replacement level for each.

We also credit starters for pitching deeper into games and "saving the pen." A starting pitcher who's able to go deep into a game (while pitching effectively) allows a manager to keep his worst relievers in the pen and bring his best relievers out to preserve a lead.

All of this means that WARP values for relief pitchers (especially closers) will seem lower than what we've seen in the past—and may conflict with how we feel about relief aces coming in and "saving" the game. But the save, while a model of how we feel about a pitcher's performance—a successful save means a win, while a failed save typically means a loss—does not describe how teams win games. In other words, saves give extra credit to the closer for what his teammates did to put him in a save spot to begin with; WARP is incapable of feeling excitement over a successful save, and judges them dispassionately.

Some of the Baseball Prospectus advanced statistics, such as FRA and WARP, are not available for some leagues. If you're reading Clutch Performer on an Internet-connected device, you can find more information by clicking on for players or for teams.

#### **PECOTA**

Both pitchers and hitters have PECOTA projections for next season, as well as a set of biographical details that describe the performance of that player's comparable players according to PECOTA.

The 2012 line is the PECOTA projection for the player in the upcoming season. Note that the player is projected into the league and park context as indicated by his team abbreviation.

All PECOTAs represent a player's projected major-league performance. The numbers beneath the player's name—
Breakout, Improve, Collapse, and Attrition—are also a part of

| Jo   | e Gi | rardi  | i      |      |      | M    | gr | B   | ∦ N' | YA     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|--------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|------|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |        | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |      | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L    | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL  | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2006 | FL0  | 78-84  | -1.5   | 94.2 | 74   | 3    | 89 | 4   | 436  | 332    | 58  | 247 | .242 | 4  | 13  | 6   | 2   | 2   | 110 | 77.3% | 50  | 3       | 363   | 105     |
| 2008 | NYA  | 89-73  | 1.4    | 90.5 | 43   | 0    | 78 | 5   | 474  | 379    | 37  | 88  | .280 | 4  | 11  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 39  | 87.2% | 32  | 0       | 432   | 134     |
| 2009 | NYA  | 103-59 | 6.4    | 96.5 | 78   | 4    | 76 | 4   | 462  | 372    | 28  | 90  | .232 | 3  | 12  | 1   | 0   | 1   | 48  | 79.2% | 35  | 0       | 323   | 108     |
| 2010 | NYA  | 95-67  | -3.1   | 97.1 | 78   | 2    | 83 | 3   | 431  | 349    | 37  | 95  | .167 | 2  | 9   | 4   | 1   | 0   | 48  | 93.8% | 39  | 0       | 362   | 110     |
| 2011 | NYA  | 97-65  | -5.9   | 95.7 | 69   | 2    | 84 | 6   | 465  | 404    | 43  | 54  | .196 | 0  | 21  | 3   | 1   | 1   | 54  | 83.3% | 38  | 0       | 357   | 94      |

PECOTA, and estimate the likelihood of changes in performance relative to a player's previously established level of production, based upon the performance of the comparable players:

- Breakout Rate is the percent chance that a player's production will improve by at least 20 percent relative to the weighted average of his performance over his most recent seasons.
- Improve Rate is the percent chance that a player's production will improve at all relative to his baseline performance. A player who is expected to perform just the same as he has in the recent past will have an Improve Rate of 50 percent.
- Collapse Rate is the percent chance that a position player's equivalent runs produced per PA will decline by at least 25 percent relative to his baseline performance over his past three seasons.
- Attrition Rate operates on playing time rather than performance. Specifically, it measures the likelihood that a player's playing time will decrease by at least 50 percent relative to his established level.

Breakout Rate and Collapse Rate can sometimes be counterintuitive for players who have already experienced a radical change in their performance levels. It's also worth noting that the projected decline in a given player's rate performances might not be indicative of an expected decline in underlying ability or skill, but rather something of an anticipated correction following a breakout season.

The final piece of information, listed just to the right of the player's Attrition Rate, are his three highest scoring comparable players as determined by PECOTA, and a similarity score from 0–100 describing how similar a player's comps are to him. Occasionally, a player's top comparables will not be representative of the larger sample that PECOTA

uses. It's also important to note that established major leaguers are compared to other major leaguers only, while minor-league players may be compared to major-league or minor-league players, with PECOTA strongly preferring the latter. All comparables represent a snapshot of how the listed player was performing at the same age as the current player, so if a 23-year-old hitter is compared to Sammy Sosa, he's actually being compared to a 23-year-old Sammy Sosa, not the decrepit Orioles version of Sosa, nor to Sosa's career as a whole.

#### **Managers**

We've included slightly revised and greatly expanded manager content in Clutch Performer 2012. Though it is often difficult to isolate a manager's contributions to a team, comparing specific data modeled after well-documented plays and styles to the league average helps determine what a manager likes to do, even if we are still precluded from translating that information into actual wins and losses.

Following the year, team, and actual record, Pythag +/- lets us know by how many games the team under- or overperformed its Pythagenpat record. Joe Girardi's Yankees have gone from overperforming their projected record by over six games in 2009 to undershooting it by nearly that amount in 2011. That isn't necessarily an endorsement or indictment of Girardi—keep in mind that Pythag +/- is a mathematical expression of team performance, not an interpretation of the manager's work, even though it has become commonplace to attribute Actual/Pythag discrepancies to the skipper.

Pitching staff usage follows, first with Avg PC reporting the average pitch count of his starting pitchers with the subsequent 100+P and 120+P offering the number of games in which the starters exceeded certain pitch thresholds. Avg PC, 100+P, and 120+P are available after 1997. QS is the total number of quality starts—a start of at least six innings and with no more than three runs allowed—a manager received from his starting

pitchers. BQS is Blown Quality Starts, a Baseball Prospectus stat that measures games in which the starter delivered a quality start through six innings before losing it in the seventh inning or later by allowing runs to give him four or more. That said, a Blown Quality Start is not necessarily an indictment of the manager's abilities or tactics. A number of factors ranging from excellent offensive support to extremely poor bullpen support can lead a manager to leave his starter in a game after he's thrown six quality innings. Conversely, the decision by a manager to "bank" quality starts by restricting his starters to only six innings can have downsides as well as it increases his bullpen's workload and the opportunity for the pen to blow a game in which a starter was cruising.

Speaking of bullpen support, the next stats in the manager table tally how many pitching changes a manager made over the course of the season (REL) and how many times the reliever called upon didn't allow any runners, his own or inherited, to score (REL w Zero R). Bequeathed runners also count against REL w Zero R, meaning that relievers who exit with runners on that subsequently score prevent a manager from "padding" his tally here. Concluding the pitching section, IBB is quite simply the number of intentional walks the manager ordered during the given season, which can definitely be a mark of managerial strategy so long as outliers like Albert Pujols are accounted for.


Managers do more than manage pitchers, however; their

usage of a bench can lead to added or lost performance. PH, PH Avg, and PH HR report the offensive statistics of pinch-hitters called upon. We then turn to the so-called "small ball" tactics, starting with the running game. The manager's aggressiveness on the bases is broken down by successful steals of second and third base (SB2, SB3) and times caught (CS2, CS3). We also provide the number of sacrifices a team attempted (SAC Att) and their success rate (SAC %). Be sure to keep in mind the differences between leagues as National League sacrifice attempts are greatly inflated by the fact that the pitchers hit. To correct for this, we list the number of times a manager got a successful sacrifice from a position player (POS SAC), which allows for comparisons between the two leagues. We finish up with Squeeze, which counts the number of successful squeeze plays the team executed over the season.

Finally, we have a couple of statistics that attempt to measure the manager's hit-and-run tactics. Swing is the number of times a hitter swung at a pitch while the runners were in motion, while In Play reflects how many times a manager's hitters swung and made contact while those runners were off to the races. Granted, swings on steal attempts do not always translate to hit-and-run attempts, but managers who greatly deviate from the average can be assumed to be staunch proponents or opponents of the strategy. Swing and In Play are available after 2002. If you're reading Clutch Performer on an Internet-connected device, you can find more information by clicking on for teams.

### **Hitters**

We're happy to debut the translations, projections, and brand-new player comments of foreign imports Yoenis Cespedes (who was covered in great detail by <u>Kevin Goldstein</u> at baseballprospectus.com), Norichika Aoki, Munenori Kawasaki, and the asyet-unsigned Jorge Soler. You'll also find full player profiles, including the most up-to-date PECOTA projections and depth chart playing time estimates, of lost-in-the-shuffle players Coco Crisp and Hideki Matsui, as well as full writeups on a raft of 2011 draftees.



Three-time Japanese batting champion Norichika Aoki inked a two-year deal with the Milwaukee Brewers this winter. Three-time batting champion? Sign me up! Not so fast; the problem is that at 29 years old, Aoki is past his prime, and scouts wonder how some of his skills will translate to Major League Baseball. One of those skills is his power; despite home run totals of 20, 14, 16, and 14 from 2007 to 2010, he hit just four last season when NPB switched to a ball that more resembled those used in MLB. He's a solid defender capable of playing centerfield, but his speed is on the decline. He has good hand-eye coordination and may manage to hit a little, but the fourth outfield role he'll fill for the Brewers may ultimately be his ceiling.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Orlan | ido A | rcia |     |    | 9  | SS | B  | M  | IL  | Borr | n: <b>8/4</b> | 4/199 | <b>94</b> Ag | ge: <b>17</b> Bats: <b>R</b> Th | rows: | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>6'0</b> " | Weight: <b>1</b> | 65   |
|--------------|-------|-------|------|-----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|------|---------------|-------|--------------|---------------------------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|------|
| YEAR         | TM    | LVL   | AGE  | PA  | R  | Н  | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | ВВ   | S0            | SB    | CS           | AVG_OBP_SLG                     | Tav   | BABIP          | BRR             | FRAA             | WARP |
| 2011         | DRW   | ROK   | 16   | 254 | 47 | 64 | 16 | 1  | 6  | 36  | 30   | 20            | 13    | 4            | .294/.386/.459                  |       | .299           | 0.9             | 27.4             | 0.0  |

Arcia had a dream season for statistical prospectors, as he was one of just two qualifying position players who were 16 years old in the Dominican Summer League and posted excellent offensive numbers across the board while playing shortstop. Having signed for just \$95,000, he's extremely polished for his age, but is not considered to have top-notch tools, so expectations have to be tempered in spite of the stats. But he put himself on the radar with his "man among boys" showing.

| <u>&amp;</u> J | lavie                                 | r Bac | ez  |     |    | 3  | В  |    | СН       | IN             | Bor | n: <b>12</b> / | /1/19 | 92 A | ge: <b>19</b> Bats: <b>R</b> | Throws | : <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'0</b> ' | ' Weight:     | 180         |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----------|----------------|-----|----------------|-------|------|------------------------------|--------|-----------------|------------------|---------------|-------------|
| YEAR           | TM                                    | LVL   | AGE | PA  | R  | Н  | 2B | 3B | HR       | RBI            | ВВ  | S0             | SB    | CS   | AVG_OBP_SLG                  | Tav    | BABIP           | BRR              | FRAA          | WARP        |
| 2011           | CUB                                   | ROK   | 18  | 12  | 2  | 4  | 2  | 0  | 0        | 0              | 0   | 2              | 2     | 0    | .333/.333/.500               | .282   | .400            | 0.5              | 4.8           | 0.6         |
| 2011           | BOI                                   | ASX   | 18  | 6   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0        | 1              | 0   | 2              | 0     | 0    | .167/.167/.167               | .104   | .250            | 0.0              | -0.1          | -0.1        |
| 2012           | CHN                                   | MLB   | 19  | 250 | 20 | 44 | 8  | 1  | 2        | 17             | 12  | 73             | 8     | 3    | .188/.229/.254               | .174   | .258            | -0.1             | SS 3          | -0.9        |
| Breakou        | Breakout: 0% Improve: 63% Collapse: 3 |       |     |     |    |    |    |    | Attritio | on: <b>37%</b> |     | MLB: 1         | 100%  |      |                              | Compa  | rables: Ed K    | (ranepool, V     | Vayne Causey, | Robin Yount |

#66

BP Top 101 Prospects Baez is an exciting young talent with a quick bat who should hit and hit for power while playing above-average defense at third base. He won't draw many walks, steal a lot of bases, or stay at shortstop, but there's only been one Alex Rodriguez. The bottom line is that the Cubs should end up being glad they paid the hefty \$2.625 million signing bonus for their first-round pick. While early picks out of high school often fail, ones who get scouting raves as being "the best high school bat in the draft" have a much better success rate than athletes with other tools, and Baez shouldn't end up limited to first base or corner outfield, as so many highly

regarded hitters are.

| <u></u> | Pat B  | urre | II  |     |    |    | LF | B  | <b>7</b> S | FN  | Boı | n: <b>10</b> | /10/ | 1976 | Age: <b>35</b> Bats: <b>R</b> | Throw  | s: <b>R</b> Heig | ght: <b>6'4</b> | " Weight: <b>2</b> | !35         |
|---------|--|------|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|------------|-----|-----|--------------|------|------|-------------------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|
| YEAR    | TM   | LVL  | AGE | PA  | R  | Н  | 2B | 3B | HR         | RBI | ВВ  | S0           | SB   | CS   | AVG_OBP_SLG                   | Tav    | BABIP            | BRR             | FRAA               | WARP        |
| 2009    | PCH  | AFA  | 32  | 4   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0          | 0   | 0   | 2            | 0    | 0    | .000/.000/.000                | .008   | .000             | 0.0             | 0.0                | -0.1        |
| 2009    | MNT  | AAX  | 32  | 10  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0          | 0   | 1   | 4            | 0    | 0    | .111/.200/.111                | .128   | .200             | 0.0             | 0.0                | -0.1        |
| 2009    | TBA  | MLB  | 32  | 476 | 45 | 91 | 16 | 1  | 14         | 64  | 57  | 119          | 2    | 0    | .221/.315/.367                | .246   | .271             | 0.0             | 0.0                | -0.4        |
| 2010    | FRE  | AAA  | 33  | 22  | 4  | 5  | 1  | 0  | 1          | 6   | 3   | 4            | 0    | 0    | .312/.409/.562                | .322   | .364             | -0.2            | 0.4                | 0.1         |
| 2010    | SFN  | MLB  | 33  | 341 | 41 | 77 | 16 | 0  | 18         | 51  | 47  | 77           | 0    | 2    | .266/.364/.509                | .314   | .296             | -0.7            | -0.8               | 2.9         |
| 2010    | TBA  | MLB  | 33  | 96  | 9  | 17 | 5  | 0  | 2          | 13  | 10  | 28           | 0    | 0    | .202/.292/.333                | .228   | .273             | 1.0             | 0.0                | -0.1        |
| 2011    | SJ0  | AFA  | 34  | 8   | 0  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 0          | 2   | 0   | 1            | 0    | 0    | .375/.375/.375                | .270   | .429             | 0.0             | 0.0                | 0.6         |
| 2011    | FRE  | AAA  | 34  | 5   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0          | 0   | 0   | 2            | 0    | 0    | .000/.000/.000                | 007    | .000             | 0.0             | -0.1               | -0.1        |
| 2011    | SFN  | MLB  | 34  | 219 | 17 | 42 | 9  | 1  | 7          | 21  | 33  | 67           | 0    | 0    | .230/.352/.404                | .273   | .318             | -0.1            | -2.9               | 0.4         |
| 2012    | SFN  | MLB  | 35  | 254 | 49 | 34 | 10 | 1  | 9          | 31  | 37  | 62           | 0    | 0    | .226/.340/.404                | .278   | .273             | 0.0             | LF -4, RF 0        | 0.6         |
| Breakou | Breakout: 5% Improve: 36% Collapse: 8% Attriti |      |     |     |    |    |    |    |            |     |     |              | MLB: | 97%  | Co                            | mparab | les: Kevin M     | Mitchell,       | Sid Gordon,Dav     | /id Justice |

It's so hard to go out on top. So Burrell didn't retire after his second-half heroics in 2010. He hung around for a year of riding the bench, battling injuries, earning relative chump change and slumping as a pinch-hitter—basically, as nearly everybody leaves, eventually. On the final day of the season, he hit a line drive single in the first inning, snapping an 0-for-September, but even then he hung on for six more innings, exiting for a defensive replacement (and a long standing ovation) after a strikeout. A rare and degenerative foot ailment forced his retirement shortly after the season ended. Ladies?

| <u></u>  | asoı | ı Cas | stro |     |    |    | C  | E  | НО | U   | Bor | n: <b>6/1</b> | .8/19 | <b>87</b> A | ge: <b>25</b> Bats: <b>L</b> Th | rows:    | <b>R</b> Height | :: <b>6'3</b> " \ | Weight: <b>2</b> 0 | 05         |
|--|------|-------|------|-----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|-----|---------------|-------|-------------|---------------------------------|----------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------|
| YEAR   | TM   | LVL   | AGE  | PA  | R  | Н  | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | ВВ  | S0            | SB    | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                     | Tav      | BABIP           | BRR               | FRAA               | WARP       |
| 2009   | LNC  | AFA   | 22   | 243 | 27 | 64 | 20 | 1  | 7  | 44  | 30  | 41            | 1     | 1           | .309/.399/.517                  | .307     | .358            | -2.9              | -1.2               | 1.9        |
| 2009   | CCH  | AAX   | 22   | 268 | 38 | 70 | 11 | 1  | 3  | 29  | 25  | 35            | 2     | 1           | .293/.362/.385                  | .281     | .333            | -2.3              | -0.4               | 1.3        |
| 2010   | ROU  | AAA   | 23   | 244 | 31 | 56 | 7  | 0  | 4  | 26  | 32  | 34            | 1     | 1           | .265/.365/.355                  | .253     | .301            | -0.7              | 0.0                | 1.1        |
| 2010   | HOU  | MLB   | 23   | 217 | 26 | 40 | 8  | 1  | 2  | 8   | 22  | 41            | 0     | 0           | .205/.286/.287                  | .212     | .250            | -0.2              | -0.1               | -0.1       |
| 2011   | SUR  | WIN   | 24   | 47  | 6  | 11 | 1  | 0  | 0  | 4   | 8   | 9             | 0     | 1           | .289/.404/.316                  | .000     | .367            | 0.0               | 0.0                | 0.0        |
| 2012   | HOU  | MLB   | 25   | 306 | 32 | 65 | 13 | 1  | 4  | 26  | 30  | 58            | 0     | 0           | .240/.315/.340                  | .239     | .288            | 0.0               | C-0                | 0.3        |
| Breakout: 6% Improve: 45% Collapse: 4% Attrition |      |       |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |     | %   | MLB: 9        | 97%   |             | Compa                           | arables: | Lou Marso       | n,Jonath          | an Lucroy,Jo       | e Ginsberg |

Not to be confused with American Idol alumni Jason Castro, the Astros catcher of the future didn't release an album in 2010, nor was he in the news for celebrating the birth of his first child in 2011. Rather, the 10th overall pick in the 2008 June Amateur Draft was sitting out the season with a torn anterior cruciate ligament (ACL). Then his start in the Arizona Fall League was delayed by an unrelated rib cage injury. Assuming this litany of maladies ends, his defense and good strikeout-to-walk ratios suggest he should pass the audition for the catching job. If he rediscovers the power stroke he showed at Stanford in 2008 and again in the California League in 2009, he might even advance to the next round and become above-average.

| <u>&amp;</u> \ | <b>oen</b>                                    | is Co | espe | des |    |     | )F | E. | OA | <b>AK</b>     | Bor | n: <b>10</b> / | 18/1 | .985 | Age: <b>27</b> Bats: <b>R</b> | Throws | s: <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>5'10</b> | " Weight    | : <b>200</b> |
|----------------|---|-------|------|-----|----|-----|----|----|----|---------------|-----|----------------|------|------|-------------------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|
| YEAR           | TM  | LVL   | AGE  | PA  | R  | Н   | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI           | ВВ  | S0             | SB   | CS   | AVG_OBP_SLG                   | Tav    | BABIP            | BRR             | FRAA        | WARP         |
| 2009           | GRA   | CUB   | 23   | 371 | 83 | 106 | 19 | 0  | 24 | 76            | 43  | 40             | 4    | 4    | .323/.402/.601                | -      | .311             | -               | -           | -            |
| 2010           | GRA   | CUB   | 24   | 384 | 87 | 118 | 19 | 4  | 22 | 67            | 42  | 45             | 5    | 3    | .345/.417/.617                | -      | .349             | -               | -           | -            |
| 2011           | GRA   | CUB   | 25   | 403 | 89 | 118 | 17 | 1  | 33 | 99            | 49  | 40             | 11   | 3    | .333/.414/.667                | -      | .302             | -               | -           | -            |
| 2012           | OAK   | MLB   | 26   | 582 | 72 | 144 | 24 | 2  | 27 | 83            | 32  | 104            | 8    | 4    | .267/.308/.471                | .281   | .281             | 0.3             | CF 0        | 3.1          |
| Breako         | Breakout: 12% Improve: 58% Collapse: 5% Attri |       |      |     |    |     |    |    |    | on: <b>5%</b> |     | MLB: 9         | 99%  |      |                               | Compa  | rables: Duk      | e Snider,C      | esar Cedeno | ,Matt Kemp   |

While his 18 minute promotional video was a coming out party to many fans, scouts have been on Cespedes for years based on his performances both in Cuba and international play. He's a monster athlete who some compare to Bo Jackson for his combination of power and speed, but like Bo, Cespedes also knows strikeouts, as he's an all-or-nothing hitter who will need to make adjustments in the big leagues. A contract in Oakland gives him a good shot at never seeing the minor leagues, and he could go 20/20 as a rookie and it's all uphill from there.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Coco          | Cris | p      |     |       | (             | F  | E.      | OA             | <b>K</b> | Bor  | n: <b>11</b> / | 1/19 | <b>79</b> A | ge: <b>32</b> Bats <b>: B</b> Th | nrows:     | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>5'10</b> | " Weight: <b>1</b> | 85   |
|--------------|---------------|------|--------|-----|-------|---------------|----|---------|----------------|----------|------|----------------|------|-------------|----------------------------------|------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|------|
| YEAR         | TM            | LVL  | AGE    | PA  | R     | Н             | 2B | 3B      | HR             | RBI      | ВВ   | S0             | SB   | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                      | Tav        | BABIP          | BRR            | FRAA               | WARP |
| 2009         | KCA           | MLB  | 29     | 215 | 30    | 41            | 8  | 5       | 3              | 14       | 29   | 23             | 13   | 2           | .228/.330/.378                   | .246       | .245           | 3.1            | 1.7                | 0.6  |
| 2010         | ST0           | AFA  | 30     | 7   | 2     | 5             | 0  | 1       | 1              | 3        | 1    | 0              | 0    | 0           | .833/.857/1.667                  | .911       | .800           | -0.4           | -0.1               | 0.5  |
| 2010         | SAC           | AAA  | 30     | 24  | 7     | 13            | 2  | 1       | 0              | 5        | 2    | 3              | 2    | 1           | .591/.625/.773                   | .526       | .684           | 0.5            | -0.4               | 0.8  |
| 2010         | OAK           | MLB  | 30     | 328 | 51    | 81            | 14 | 4       | 8              | 38       | 30   | 49             | 32   | 3           | .279/.338/.438                   | .290       | .307           | 5.7            | 2.1                | 2.8  |
| 2011         | OAK           | MLB  | 31     | 583 | 69    | 140           | 27 | 5       | 8              | 54       | 41   | 65             | 49   | 9           | .264/.312/.379                   | .263       | .284           | 4.3            | 7.0                | 3.0  |
| 2012         | OAK           | MLB  | 32     | 617 | 68    | 142           | 25 | 6       | 8              | 59       | 54   | 86             | 45   | 9           | .258/.319/.368                   | .255       | .287           | 4.5            | LF 0, CF 2         | 1.8  |
| Breako       | ut: <b>2%</b> |      | Improv |     | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | .% | Attriti | ion: <b>12</b> | :%       | MLB: | 89%            |      | C           | omparat                          | les: Robin | Yount,J        | ody Gerut,Ken  | ny Lofton          |      |

Crisp's season began on an unsettling note when he was arrested in early March under suspicion of driving under the influence; he declared that the other car on the road with him was "the secret service" instead of a private security force that somehow allowed him to get behind the wheel after imbibing to excess. That idiocy aside, he did at least manage to stay healthy long enough to play more games than in any season since 2007 — somehow avoiding an infection of a bizarre and disgusting neck piercing/tattoo combination just below his left ear — and finished with his highest WARP in that span despite his lowest OBP since 2003. Though he re-upped via a two-year, \$14 million deal in January, the signing of Yoenis Cespedes puts Crisp's future in doubt, both in center field, and with the A's, who now have a glut of left field options, most of whom could outhit him if given half a chance.

| <u></u> | Briar | Goo | dwin |    |   | ( | )F |    | WA | S      | Borr     | n: <b>11</b> / | /2/19   | <b>990</b> A | ge: <b>21</b> Bats: <b>L</b> Th | hrows: | <b>L</b> Height | t: <b>6'1</b> " | Weight: <b>195</b> |      |
|---------|-------|-----|------|----|---|---|----|----|----|--------|----------|----------------|---------|--------------|---------------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|------|
| YEAR    | TM    | LVL | AGE  | PA | R | Н | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI    | ВВ       | S0             | SB      | CS           | AVG_OBP_SLG                     | Tav    | BABIP           | BRR             | FRAA               | WARP |
|         |       |     |      |    |   |   |    |    |    | no maj | or or mi | inor lea       | gue exp | erience      | !                               |        |                 |                 |                    |      |

Expensive lottery ticket, but the upside is definitely there. Goodwin was a late pick out of high school in the 2009 draft. He decided to go to college, where he busted his butt on the field to work his way up to a sandwich pick. He signed for just over \$3.5 million, considerably more than he'd have gotten as an afterthought in 2009. That improvement, combined with the very high ratings he gets from scouts for his physical tools, is what the Nats are betting on. The odds are somewhat against him—the minors are littered with the remains of toolsy prospects, but one scout points out that all Goodwin has ever done is produce, even while dealing with transition from high school to North Carolina to a JC baseball farm in Florida, so he's talented and adaptable.

| <u>&amp;</u> ( | Crist  | ian ( | Guzm | an  |    | 5   | SS | B  | / CI | LE  | Bor | n: <b>13</b> / | <b>′21</b> /1 | 1978 | Age: <b>34</b> Bats: <b>B</b> | Throws    | s: <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'0</b> | " Weight: <b>2</b> | <b>10</b>  |
|----------------|--|-------|------|-----|----|-----|----|----|------|-----|-----|----------------|---------------|------|-------------------------------|-----------|------------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|
| YEAR           | ΤM   | LVL   | AGE  | PA  | R  | Н   | 2B | 3B | HR   | RBI | ВВ  | S0             | SB            | CS   | AVG_OBP_SLG                   | Tav       | BABIP            | BRR            | FRAA               | WARP       |
| 2009           | WAS  | MLB   | 31   | 555 | 74 | 151 | 24 | 7  | 6    | 52  | 16  | 75             | 4             | 5    | .284/.303/.390                | .247      | .322             | 1.7            | 0.4                | 1.8        |
| 2010           | FRI  | AAX   | 32   | 16  | 1  | 4   | 0  | 0  | 0    | 3   | 3   | 1              | 1             | 0    | .308/.438/.308                | .323      | .333             | -0.3           | -0.1               | 0.1        |
| 2010           | TEX  | MLB   | 32   | 50  | 4  | 7   | 1  | 0  | 0    | 1   | 3   | 10             | 0             | 0    | .152/.200/.174                | .136      | .194             | -1.2           | -0.1               | -0.7       |
| 2010           | WAS  | MLB   | 32   | 346 | 44 | 90  | 11 | 4  | 2    | 25  | 17  | 53             | 4             | 2    | .282/.324/.361                | .238      | .331             | 8.0            | 7.1                | 1.0        |
| 2012           | CLE  | MLB   | 34   | 250 | 26 | 66  | 11 | 2  | 2    | 23  | 11  | 35             | 3             | 1    | .283/.318/.380                | .254      | .319             | -0.3           | SS 0, 2B 2         | 0.9        |
| Breako         | Breakout 0% Improve: 29% Collapse: 10% Attriti |       |      |     |    |     |    |    |      |     | 6   | MLB:           | 90%           |      | Compa                         | rables: I | Ronnie Bell      | iard,Dav       | id Newhan,Kaz      | zuo Matsui |


Cristian Guzman missed the entire 2011 season -- family issues, then shoulder issues -- and seemed likely to be retired before Manny Acta recruited him to try out with the Indians this spring. Guzman hit .305/.334/.423 while playing under Acta in Washington from 2007 to 2009, and while that might seem like forever ago, Guzman is still only 34 years old and Acta is still a pretty smart dude. Guzman is no competition for reserve infielder Jason Donald -- let alone starter Jason Kipnis -- but Donald gets hurt about as often as Guzman draws a walk, every few weeks or so.

| <u></u> | Rick   | Hag | ue  |     |    | 9  | SS | H  | WA | S   | Bor | n: <b>9/1</b> | 8/19 | <b>88</b> A | ge: <b>23</b> Bats: <b>R</b> T | hrows:   | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>6'2</b> " | Weight: 19   | 90          |
|---------|--|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|-----|---------------|------|-------------|--------------------------------|----------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|
| YEAR    | TM   | LVL | AGE | PA  | R  | Н  | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | ВВ  | S0            | SB   | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                    | Tav      | BABIP          | BRR             | FRAA         | WARP        |
| 2010    | NAT  | ROK | 21  | 50  | 7  | 11 | 1  | 0  | 0  | 6   | 8   | 9             | 3    | 0           | .275/.380/.300                 | .321     | .355           | 0.1             | 0.0          | 0.5         |
| 2010    | HAG  | AFX | 21  | 176 | 26 | 52 | 12 | 5  | 3  | 27  | 14  | 34            | 3    | 2           | .327/.386/.522                 | .336     | .402           | 1.1             | 2.8          | 2.4         |
| 2011    | POT  | AFA | 22  | 16  | 4  | 5  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 4   | 2   | 1             | 1    | 0           | .357/.438/.714                 | .351     | .333           | 0.0             | -0.7         | 0.2         |
| 2012    | WAS  | MLB | 23  | 250 | 24 | 51 | 9  | 1  | 4  | 22  | 16  | 60            | 1    | 0           | .223/.276/.323                 | .219     | .281           | 0.0             | SS 1         | 0.0         |
| Breako  | eakout: <b>5%</b> Improve: <b>34%</b> Collapse: <b>9%</b> Attritic |     |     |     |    |    |    |    |    |     | 6   | MLB: 9        | 94%  |             |                                | Comparal | oles: Eddie    | Leon,Sh         | awon Dunston | ,Dale Berra |

Hague's got a considerably higher ceiling than a lot of guys with similar circumstances. He's got solid speed, good strike-zone management, and before his shoulder injury last year he was regarded as a guy who might be able to stick at shortstop. But injuries happen, and Hague missed virtually all of 2011, which sapped him of crucial development time and adds to the worry about his future abilities both at the plate and in the field. Keep an eye on his early form on throws, and how well he's able to drive the ball. He's young and talented enough to put everything together, and may end up as that rare creature—the older prospect who's actually a prospect.

| <u></u> | Mune   | nori l | Kawa | saki |    | 9   | SS | B | SE | EA  | Bor | n: <b>6/3</b> | 3/198 | 8 <b>1</b> Ag | e: <b>31</b> Bats: <b>L</b> Thi | rows: <b>R</b> | Height:     | 5'11"      | Weight: <b>16</b> | 5          |
|---------|--|--------|------|------|----|-----|----|---|----|-----|-----|---------------|-------|---------------|---------------------------------|----------------|-------------|------------|-------------------|------------|
| YEAR    |  |        |      |      |    |     |    |   | HR | RBI | ВВ  | S0            | SB    | CS            | AVG_OBP_SLG                     | Tav            | BABIP       | BRR        | FRAA              | WARP       |
| 2009    | FKU  | NPB    | 28   | 640  | 73 | 140 | 26 | 8 | 4  | 34  | 47  | 90            | 44    | 17            | .259/.303/.359                  | -              | .303        | -          | -                 | -          |
| 2010    | FKU  | NPB    | 29   | 662  | 74 | 190 | 27 | 5 | 4  | 53  | 43  | 86            | 30    | 11            | .316/.363/.397                  | -              | .363        | -          | -                 | -          |
| 2011    | FKU  | NPB    | 30   | 655  | 71 | 161 | 19 | 7 | 1  | 37  | 36  | 84            | 31    | 10            | .267/.310/.327                  | -              | .309        | -          | -                 | -          |
| 2012    | SEA  | MLB    | 31   | 124  | 12 | 29  | 4  | 1 | 0  | 9   | 7   | 17            | 6     | 2             | .258/.302/.312                  | .233           | .299        | 0.4        | 2B 0, SS 0        | 0.1        |
| Breako  | eakout: <b>0%</b> Improve: <b>31%</b> Collapse: <b>10%</b> Attri |        |      |      |    |     |    |   |    |     | 6   | MLB: 9        | 94%   |               |                                 | Com            | parables: L | uis Apario | cio,Dick Groat,Ja | ack Wilson |

Kawasaki is a veteran shortstop from the Japanese leagues trying his luck on a minor-league deal with the Mariners. He's chosen the right team to sign with given the Mariners' notable past successes with NPB imports, and he's gotten some attention early in spring training. Kawasaki is a glove-first player who is very unlikely to hit at all, and the Mariners already have one of those guys to play shortstop in Brendan Ryan. He'd add some speed off the bench, but he's fragile, and he offers zero positional flexibility.



#17

BP Top 101 Prospects The team's first-round draft pick in 2011 (and the eighth overall pick in the draft), Lindor is already Cleveland's top prospect after their slew of injuries, trades, and promotions in 2011. A great defender with plus range and a plus arm, Lindor often looks more like an acrobat than a baseball player. Far from one-dimensional, he also shows a good approach at the plate, patience, and the potential to hit for a good average and moderate power. Lindor is poised to establish himself as one of the top shortstop prospects in all of baseball in 2012, though it may take him a while to reach the majors since he's fresh out of high school.

| <u>a</u> | Miki | е Ма | htoo | k  |    |    | OF | B  | / TE | BA  | Bori | n: <b>11</b> / | 30/1 | 1989 | Age: <b>22</b> Bats: <b>R</b> | Throws | : <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'1</b> ' | ' Weight: 2 | 200  |
|----------|------|------|------|----|----|----|----|----|------|-----|------|----------------|------|------|-------------------------------|--------|-----------------|------------------|-------------|------|
| YEAR     | TM   | LVL  | AGE  | PA | R  | H  | 2B | 3B | HR   | RBI | ВВ   | S0             | SB   | CS   | AVG_OBP_SLG                   | Tav    | BABIP           | BRR              | FRAA        | WARP |
| 2011     | PFS  | WIN  | 21   | 78 | 15 | 23 | 3  | 1  | 3    | 14  | 7    | 16             | 5    | 1    | 338/410/544                   | 000    | 400             | 0.0              | 0.0         | 0.0  |

After an outstanding career at LSU, Mahtook was Tampa Bay's first-round pick in 2011, and forfeited his last year of NCAA eligibility to sign with the Rays. He signed just before the deadline in mid-August, and didn't see any live action until the Arizona Fall League. Mahtook showed good power in college, and projects to be an everyday corner outfielder. Should he make it to the bigs, he would be the first completely home grown outfielder produced by the Rays since Delmon Young. Given his collegiate experience and skills, there is a good chance he will skip short-season ball and by season's end could be down I-75 from Tropicana Field at Port Charlotte.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Hide   | ki M | atsu | i                    |    | D   | Н  | ×  | NO | N   | Bor | n: <b>6/1</b> | l <b>2/1</b> 9 | <b>74</b> A | ge: <b>38</b> Bats: <b>L</b> Tl | nrows:   | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>6'2</b> " \ | Weight: <b>2</b> : | 10          |
|--------------|--|------|------|----------------------|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|-----|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------------|----------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| YEAR         | TM   | LVL  | AGE  | PA                   | R  | Н   | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | ВВ  | S0            | SB             | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                     | Tav      | BABIP          | BRR               | FRAA               | WARP        |
| 2009         | NYA  | MLB  | 35   | 526                  | 62 | 125 | 21 | 1  | 28 | 90  | 64  | 75            | 0              | 1           | .274/.367/.509                  | .301     | .273           | 0.1               | 0.0                | 2.8         |
| 2010         | ANA  | MLB  | 36   | 35 526 62 125 21 1 2 |    |     |    |    |    | 84  | 67  | 98            | 0              | 1           | .274/.361/.459                  | .299     | .302           | -4.5              | -1.9               | 2.2         |
| 2011         | OAK  | MLB  | 37   | 583                  | 58 | 130 | 28 | 0  | 12 | 72  | 56  | 84            | 1              | 1           | .251/.321/.375                  | .266     | .274           | -0.7              | 0.3                | 1.2         |
| 2012         | OAK  |      |      |                      |    |     |    |    | 15 | 62  | 60  | 85            | 1              | 1           | .256/.340/.404                  | .275     | .282           | -0.2              | LF-1               | 1.4         |
| Breako       | Breakout: <b>0%</b> Improve: <b>12%</b> Collapse: <b>10%</b> Attrition |      |      |                      |    |     |    |    |    |     | 6   | MLB: 6        | 64%            |             | Cor                             | nparable | s: Harold Ba   | aines,Geor        | ge Brett,Tom       | ımy Henrich |

Since leaving the Bronx, Godzilla has spent the past two years in some godawful hitting environments. As his True Average shows, he didn't really lose anything in productivity from 2009 to 2010, despite a drastic first half/second half split. Last year was another story, as Matsui wound up in a ballpark that according to the *Bill James Handbook* reduced lefty home runs by 41

percent in 2011, and by 27 percent over the last three years. Matsui wheezed to a .236/.323/.340 line with four homers at the Mausoleum, hit just .267/.318/.411 with eight homers elsewhere, and once again got to a miserably slow start (.209/.290/.327 in the first half) before heating up in the second (.295/.353/.425)—although really, it was just a July rampage (.369/.449/.560) propping up some less productive months. Still unemployed at this writing, he'd have been a better fit for the Yankees' DH slot than Raul Ibanez given the latter's 2011 performance and Matsui's longstanding affinity for NuYankee Stadium, where he's owned a .268/.353/.485 line with 17 homers in 343 PA.

| <u>&amp;</u> ] | lame          | s M | cCan   | n             |    |         | C             | B  | / DI    | ET             | Bor | n: <b>6/1</b> | l <b>3/1</b> 9 | <b>90</b> A | ge: <b>22</b> Bats: <b>R</b> 1 | Throws   | : <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'2</b> ' | Weight:       | 210        |
|----------------|---------------|-----|--------|---------------|----|---------|---------------|----|---------|----------------|-----|---------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------------------|----------|-----------------|------------------|---------------|------------|
| YEAR           | TM            | LVL | AGE    | PA            | R  | Н       | 2B            | 3B | HR      | RBI            | ВВ  | S0            | SB             | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                    | Tav      | BABIP           | BRR              | FRAA          | WARP       |
| 2011           | TGR           | ROK | 21     | 16            | 1  | 5       | 1             | 0  | 1       | 6              | 1   | 1             | 0              | 0           | .357/.438/.643                 | .355     | .333            | -0.9             | -0.5          | 0.1        |
| 2011           | WMI           | AFX | 21     | 38            | 0  | 2       | 1             | 0  | 0       | 1              | 2   | 12            | 0              | 0           | .059/.132/.088                 | .097     | .087            | -0.2             | -0.2          | -0.7       |
| 2012           | DET           | MLB | 22     | 250           | 21 | 45      | 8             | 1  | 3       | 19             | 11  | 68            | 2              | 1           | .194/.235/.277                 | .186     | .255            | -0.1             | C-1           | -0.8       |
| Breako         | ut: <b>9%</b> |     | Improv | e: <b>50%</b> |    | Collaps | se: <b>4%</b> |    | Attriti | on: <b>15%</b> | 6   | MLB: 8        | 38%            |             | Cor                            | mparable | s: Charlie N    | ∕loore,Jerr      | y Grote,Orlan | do Mercado |

Detroit's second round pick in the 2010 draft, McCann has an excellent defensive reputation with an accurate arm, a patient approach, and enough potential at the plate to think he could one day meet the minimal offensive requirements to catch in the big leagues. While that may not sound exciting, the Gerald Lairds of the world have to come from somewhere, and McCann's ceiling is higher than that.

| <u></u>  | Kend | irys I | Mora | les |     | 1   | lΒ | E. | AN | IA  | Bor | n: <b>6/2</b> | 20/19 | <b>83</b> A    | ge: <b>29</b> Bats: <b>B</b> | Throws      | : <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'1</b> " | Weight:      | 225         |
|--|------|--------|------|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|-----|-----|---------------|-------|----------------|------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|
| YEAR   | TM   | LVL    | AGE  | PA  | R   | Н   | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | ВВ  | S0            | SB    | CS             | AVG_OBP_SLG                  | Tav         | BABIP           | BRR              | FRAA         | WARP        |
| 2009   | ANA  | MLB    | 26   | 622 | 86  | 173 | 43 | 2  | 34 | 108 | 46  | 117           | 3     | 7              | .306/.355/.569               | .314        | .329            | -3.1             | 0.3          | 4.0         |
| 2010   | ANA  | MLB    | 27   | 211 | 29  | 56  | 5  | 0  | 11 | 39  | 12  | 31            | 0     | 1              | .290/.346/.487               | .306        | .296            | 2.1              | 0.7          | 1.6         |
| 2012   | ANA  | MLB    | 29   | 427 | 110 | 22  | 1  | 17 | 59 | 27  | 75  | 2             | 2     | .279/.328/.469 | .290                         | .305        | -0.3            | 1B -0            | 1.8          |             |
| Breakout: 4% Improve: 45% Collapse: 7% Attriti |      |        |      |     |     |     |    |    |    |     | 6   | MLB: 9        | 91%   |                | Com                          | parables: ( | Glenn Davis     | s,Orlando        | Cepeda, Mica | h Hoffpauir |

After the Angels whiffed on Carl Crawford and Adrian Beltre, the spin machine touted a healthy Kendrys (then still Kendry) as the team's big off-season addition. He was never right in spring training, though, and the realist could shift his hopes only to Morales as symbolic trade-deadline acquisition. Even those dreams died when he opted for a second ankle surgery—notably, by a non-team-affiliated surgeon of his own choosing—in May. Rather than being let down once more, the Angels went ahead and signed a real free agent before 2012, and the addition of Albert Pujols makes Morales a full-time designated hitter if he's healthy. He was back in the Angels' clubhouse for a few days in September, and he was finally walking without any hint of a limp. You really couldn't say that at any point in his first recovery.

| <u></u>  | Bran                       | don | Nimr | no |   | ( | OF | E | / NY | /N             | Bor | n: <b>3/2</b> | 27/19 | <b>93</b> A    | ge: <b>19</b> Bats: <b>L</b> | Throws:   | <b>R</b> Heigh | nt: <b>6'3</b> " | Weight: :    | 185         |
|--|----------------------------|-----|------|----|---|---|----|---|------|----------------|-----|---------------|-------|----------------|------------------------------|-----------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|
| YEAR   | AR TM LVL AGE PA R H 2B 3B |     |      |    |   |   |    |   |      | RBI            | ВВ  | S0            | SB    | CS             | AVG_OBP_SLG                  | Tav       | BABIP          | BRR              | FRAA         | WARP        |
| 2011   | KNG                        | ROK | 18   | 12 | 0 | 1 | 0  | 0 | 0    | 0              | 3   | 5             | 0     | 0              | .111/.333/.111               | .176      | .250           | -0.1             | 1.8          | 0.1         |
| 2011   | MTS                        | ROK | 18   | 32 | 5 | 7 | 0  | 0 | 2    | 4              | 3   | 9             | 0     | 0              | .241/.312/.448               | .246      | .278           | 0.2              | -0.1         | 0.0         |
| 2012   | NYN MLB 19 250 22 42 8 1 4 |     |      |    |   |   |    | 4 | 21   | 15             | 79  | 1             | 1     | .183/.233/.277 | .188                         | .250      | 0.0            | CF 1             | -1.1         |             |
| Breakout: <b>0%</b> Improve: <b>63%</b> Collapse: <b>37%</b> Attrition |                            |     |      |    |   |   |    |   |      | on: <b>379</b> | ó   | MLB: :        | 100%  |                | C                            | Comparabl | es: Ed Krar    | nepool,Wa        | yne Causey,R | łobin Yount |

After years of following MLB slot recommendations and therefore having some of the most boring drafts in recent memory, the Mets finally got aggressive in 2011, taking Nimmo with their first-round pick and giving him \$2.1 million to sign. The second he put his signature on paper he became the highest-ceiling position player in the system, as he's a big athlete with the potential to hit and hit for power, but he's going to take a while; he was a multi-sport star in his native Wyoming, a state that doesn't even feature high school baseball as an option.



#26

BP Top 101
Prospects

We've listed him at 3B, but he's likely to end up somewhere else by the time he arrives in DC. There's nothing not to like about last year's sixth-overall pick offensively; his performance numbers and scouting reports (70 hit) emphasize his bat control, power, and approach at the plate. The question with Rendon is where he'll end up defensively. He missed effectively a year on defense with shoulder problems, and he's been working on revamping his entire throwing motion. He's on a major league deal, so he'll be in Washington before long. He could be there at an infield or outfield corner, and his bat will play anywhere.

| <u></u> [ | orge | Sole | er  |    |   | ( | )F | ×  | NO | N      | Borr     | n: <b>11</b> , | /19/:   | 1992    | Age: <b>19</b> Bats: <b>R</b> | Throv | vs: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6'3</b> ' | ' Weight | : <b>225</b> |
|-----------|------|------|-----|----|---|---|----|----|----|--------|----------|----------------|---------|---------|-------------------------------|-------|-----------------|--------------------|----------|--------------|
| YEAR      | TM   | LVL  | AGE | PA | R | Н | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI    | ВВ       | S0             | SB      | CS      | AVG_OBP_SLG                   | Tav   | BABIP           | BRR                | FRAA     | WARP         |
|           |      |      |     |    |   |   |    |    |    | no mai | or or mi | inor lea       | gue exi | perienc | e                             |       |                 |                    |          |              |

Yoenis Cespedes was the best Cuban defector signed in 2012 when it came to viral videos, but Soler may prove to be the better player. We won't know for years, since Soler is only 20, but his youth gives him the luxury of additional development time that the 26-year-old Cespedes lacks. Soler is so raw that he made only 11 at-bats in the Serie Nacional, Cuba's top domestic league, with most of his notoriety stemming from his play in international competition and his impressive tools. Those tools include a quick bat with big power potential, as well as plus speed and arm strength that should make Soler a natural fit for right field and one of the last Latin American talents to cash in before the new CBA's international signing restrictions go into effect in July. Once he signs with a major-league club, he'll be one of the best 40 prospects in baseball. We still don't know which club it will be, though Soler was rumored to have agreed to a deal with the Cubs before becoming eligible for free agency.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Geor   | ge S | pring | ger |    |    | CF |     | НО | U              | Bor | n: <b>9/1</b> | 9/19        | <b>89</b> A | ge: <b>22</b> Bats: <b>R</b> | Throws  | : <b>R</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'3</b> " | Weight:        | 205        |
|--------------|--|------|-------|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|----------------|-----|---------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------------|---------|-----------------|------------------|----------------|------------|
| YEAR         | R TM LVL AGE PA R H 2B 3B H                      |      |       |     |    |    | HR | RBI | ВВ | S0             | SB  | CS            | AVG_OBP_SLG | Tav         | BABIP                        | BRR     | FRAA            | WARP             |                |            |
| 2011         | TCV  | ASX  | 21    | 33  | 8  | 5  | 3  | 0   | 1  | 3              | 2   | 2             | 4           | 0           | .179/.303/.393               | .265    | .160            | 1.2              | -0.3           | 0.2        |
| 2012         | HOU  | MLB  | 22    | 250 | 23 | 47 | 9  | 1   | 4  | 21             | 13  | 61            | 10          | 3           | .205/.255/.299               | .200    | .257            | 0.0              | CF -1          | -0.9       |
| Breako       | Breakout: 5% Improve: 63% Collapse: 6% Attrition |      |       |     |    |    |    |     |    | on: <b>19%</b> | 6   | MLB: 9        | 97%         |             |                              | Compara | bles: Luis      | Matos,Rov        | vland Office,0 | Chet Lemon |

#49

BP Top 101 Prospects Despite being drafted out of college, Springer fits the profile of a high school draftee, with scouts gushing over his power, speed, and arm strength and talking about his upside. Defensively, most think he'll be able to stay in center field, though his offensive game will play anywhere. Springer played high school and college ball in cold-weather climates, so he lacks the repetitions of most other elite players his age' its easy to be bullish about his ability to cut down on the strikeouts (his one weakness) while further developing his strengths.



#27

BP Top 101 Prospects The Royals were thinking starting pitching with the fifth pick in the 2011 draft, but when their top four targets were off the board, they turned to the best high school bat available in Starling. A local product, he grew up a half hour from Kauffman Stadium and was a three-sport star for Gardner-Edgerton High School, excelling at football, basketball, and baseball. That athleticism earned him a full-ride scholarship to play quarterback at the University of Nebraska, which he turned down to ride buses in the minors. He signed too late to play in 2011, so the Royals started his professional career in the Instructional League. With a level,

compact stroke, prodigious power, and plenty of speed, Starling projects as the Royals five-tool center fielder of the future.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Blak                         | e Sw          | ihar | t       |               |   | C       | E.             | BC | S      | Bor | n: <b>4/3</b> | /199 | <b>2</b> Ag | e: <b>20</b> Bats: <b>B</b> Th | rows:   | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>6'1</b> " | Weight: 1 | 75   |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|------|---------|---------------|---|---------|----------------|----|--------|-----|---------------|------|-------------|--------------------------------|---------|----------------|-----------------|-----------|------|
| YEAR         | YEAR TM LVL AGE PA R H 2B 3B |               |      |         |               |   |         |                |    |        | ВВ  | S0            | SB   | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                    | Tav     | BABIP          | BRR             | FRAA      | WARP |
| 2011         | RSX                          | ROK           | 19   | 6       | 0             | 0 | 0       | 0              | 0  | 0      | 0   | 2             | 0    | 0           | .000/.000/.000                 | .003    | .000           | 0.0             | 0.0       | -0.2 |
| 2012         |                              |               |      |         |               |   |         |                |    | 17     | 12  | 73            | 0    | 0           | .182/.226/.252                 | .170    | .250           | 0.0             | CO        | -2.1 |
| Breako       | ut: <b>18%</b>               | e: <b>51%</b> |      | Collaps | se: <b>7%</b> |   | Attriti | on: <b>24%</b> | 6  | MLB: 8 | 35% |               | Con  | nparables   | s: Jose Oqu                    | endo,Wa | yne Causey,Ed  | l Kranepool     |           |      |

Swihart was one of two non-sandwich Boston selections in the first round of the 2011 draft, despite the Red Sox not having a pick of their own thanks to signing Carl Crawford. Swihart's pick came from letting Adrian Beltre sign with the Rangers, and good thing for compensation, as this 19-year-old catcher comes highly-regarded. While he picked up just six plate appearances in Rookie league, the switch-hitting backstop has excellent bat speed and plenty of power potential. Given his age, his approach isn't refined yet. The expectations are that it will be, though, as his bat is considered his insurance should he be forced to move from behind the plate.

| <u></u> | loe T          | erdo | slavi         | ich |         | 1             | lΒ |         | <b>7</b> A     | TL  | Bor    | n: <b>9/9</b> | /198 | <b>8</b> Ag | e: <b>23</b> Bats: <b>B</b> Th | nrows:     | <b>R</b> Heigh | t: <b>6'1</b> " | Weight: 20  | 10   |
|---------|----------------|------|---------------|-----|---------|---------------|----|---------|----------------|-----|--------|---------------|------|-------------|--------------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL  | AGE           | PA  | R       | Н             | 2B | 3B      | HR             | RBI | ВВ     | S0            | SB   | CS          | AVG_OBP_SLG                    | Tav        | BABIP          | BRR             | FRAA        | WARP |
| 2010    | DNV            | ROK  | 21            | 205 | 27      | 56            | 10 | 2       | 2              | 24  | 15     | 27            | 3    | 3           | .296/.351/.402                 | .293       | .338           | -0.9            | -2.3        | 0.8  |
| 2010    | ROM            | AFX  | 21            | 85  | 7       | 25            | 9  | 0       | 0              | 10  | 5      | 18            | 0    | 0           | .316/.365/.430                 | .288       | .410           | -1.6            | -2.4        | 0.0  |
| 2011    | PES            | WIN  | 22            | 99  | 22      | 27            | 6  | 2       | 3              | 14  | 13     | 27            | 1    | 0           | .321/.424/.548                 | .000       | .444           | 0.0             | 0.0         | 0.0  |
| 2011    | LYN            | AFA  | 22            | 536 | 72      | 138           | 52 | 2       | 20             | 82  | 41     | 107           | 2    | 0           | .286/.341/.526                 | .295       | .324           | -1.3            | 2.7         | 3.1  |
| 2012    |                |      |               |     |         |               |    |         |                | 25  | 13     | 60            | 0    | 0           | .228/.269/.359                 | .225       | .279           | 0.0             | 1B 0, 3B -1 | -0.6 |
| Breako  | ut: <b>10%</b> |      | e: <b>59%</b> |     | Collaps | se: <b>5%</b> |    | Attriti | on: <b>129</b> | 6   | MLB: 8 | 32%           |      | Compar      | ables: Pr                      | eston Ward | Nelson S       | Simmons,Chris   | Chambliss   |      |

Following a 20-home run regular season, Terdoslavich kept momentum rolling with a strong showing in the Arizona Fall League. An optimist might view the Braves deciding to try him out at the hot corner as a sign they believe in his athleticism. A pessimist would point out that it could mean they do not buy his bat. A realist would smack both upside the head, then point out that Freeman is younger than Terdoslavich. The odds are long that Terdoslavich becomes more than a bench player.

#### Lineouts

| PLAYER             | ORG | TEAM | LVL | AGE | PA  | R  | Н  | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI     | ВВ  | S0 | SB | cs | AVG_OBP_SLG    | TAv  | BABIP | BRR  | FRAA | WARP |
|--------------------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|---------|-----|----|----|----|----------------|------|-------|------|------|------|
| OF Josh Bell       | PIT |      |     |     |     |    |    |    |    | di | d not p | lay |    |    |    |                |      |       |      |      |      |
| C J.C. Boscan      | ATL | ATL  | MLB | 31  | 9   | 0  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0       | 0   | 5  | 0  | 0  | .333/.333/.333 | .252 | .750  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
|                    |     | GWN  | AAA | 31  | 218 | 12 | 37 | 8  | 0  | 0  | 8       | 12  | 41 | 0  | 2  | .182/.234/.222 | .160 | .228  | -2.4 | 0.1  | -1.6 |
| CF Cedric Hunter   | OAK | SDN  | MLB | 23  | 5   | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0       | 1   | 0  | 0  | 1  | .250/.400/.250 | .274 | .250  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
|                    |     | TUC  | AAA | 23  | 316 | 44 | 72 | 17 | 3  | 2  | 33      | 28  | 24 | 9  | 4  | .255/.322/.358 | -    | -     | -    | -    | -    |
| UT Joe Inglett     | HOU | HOU  | MLB | 33  | 27  | 3  | 6  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1       | 0   | 7  | 0  | 0  | .222/.222/.259 | .180 | .300  | 0.1  | 0.2  | -0.1 |
|                    |     | OKL  | AAA | 33  | 37  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0       | 8   | 9  | 2  | 0  | .071/.270/.071 | .149 | .105  | 0.1  | 0.1  | -0.4 |
| OF Daryl Jones     | SLN | MEM  | AAA | 24  | 145 | 18 | 30 | 7  | 1  | 3  | 15      | 23  | 39 | 2  | 3  | .250/.379/.400 | .276 | .346  | 1.3  | 3.0  | -0.1 |
|                    |     | SFD  | AAX | 24  | 163 | 26 | 39 | 5  | 1  | 4  | 20      | 15  | 33 | 1  | 2  | .269/.344/.400 | .254 | .321  | 1.3  | -3.1 | 0.9  |
| OF Kyung-Min Na    | CHN | TEN  | AAX | 19  | 4   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0       | 0   | 3  | 0  | 0  | .000/.000/.000 | .009 | .000  | 0.0  | 0.1  | 1.3  |
|                    |     | PE0  | AFX | 19  | 100 | 10 | 23 | 4  | 0  | 0  | 3       | 9   | 23 | 5  | 1  | .258/.330/.303 | .270 | .348  | -0.5 | 2.0  | -0.1 |
|                    |     | BOI  | ASX | 19  | 88  | 10 | 13 | 1  | 0  | 0  | 4       | 9   | 15 | 6  | 3  | .171/.273/.184 | .219 | .213  | 0.8  | 0.1  | 0.7  |
|                    |     | CUB  | ROK | 19  | 119 | 21 | 36 | 5  | 1  | 0  | 15      | 15  | 15 | 9  | 6  | .360/.445/.430 | .295 | .424  | 0.8  | 5.6  | -0.1 |
| C Andrew Susac     | SFN |      |     |     |     |    |    |    |    | di | d not p | lay |    |    |    |                |      |       |      |      |      |
| 1B Angel Villalona | SFN |      |     |     |     |    |    |    |    | di | d not p | lay |    |    |    |                |      |       |      |      |      |

Josh Bell spent the time leading up to the draft informing teams that he intended to honor his commitment to the University of Texas. He eventually signed for \$5 million, and holds one of the highest ceilings in the system as a switch-hitter with power.

• J.C. Boscan was on the 40-man roster for no other reason than his ability to gun down baserunners (34 percent for his minor league career), but the Braves removed him in November.

• Cedric Hunter made the Opening Day roster in 2011 and got five plate appearances before being shipped back to Triple-A, where he managed to avoid doing anything on offense, which is

nearly impossible in Tucson. • **Joe Inglett**'s career appears to be at an end, as he wasn't even signed to play in the minors after the Astros released him on May 28. Playing everywhere and swinging a capable left-handed bat, he's been a useful 25th man. • Once the center fielder of the future and the organization's 2008 minor-league player of the year, **Daryl Jones** continues going backward. Removed from the 40-man roster after the 2010 season, Jones was demoted to Double-A in July. His best tool, his speed, has been compromised by tendinitis in his knees and hamstring problems. He'll try to resurrect his career at 25. • Slap-and-go lefty **Kyung-Min Na** poured in from the productive Asian pipeline, and he has a long way to go and limited upside, but he was very young for his level, so there's time. • Second-round pick **Andrew Susac** is an excellent defender who was having a breakthrough offensive season at Oregon State before he broke the hamate bone in his left hand. • When last we saw **Angel Villalona**, he was toolsy and muscular, raw as hell and playing against men four years older than himself. "He has plenty of time for his approach to mature," we wrote in the 2009 annual before murder charges, dropped last winter, derailed his career. He's now 21.

# **Pitchers**

We've got a lot of pitcher updates for you. As with hitters, we're deploying historical statistics, brand-new PECOTA projections, and player comments for the major-league imports from Japan and Cuba, including Yu Darvish, Hisashi Iwakuma, Wei-Yin Chen, Tsuyoshi Wada, and Cubs minor-leaguer Gerardo Concepcion—many of whom weren't signed when <u>Baseball</u> <u>Prospectus 2012</u> went to press. We've also got fresh projections and comments on spring training stories Jamie Moyer and Andy Pettitte, and writeups on seven of Kevin Goldstein's <u>Top 101 Prospects of 2012</u> that didn't make the book.

| <u></u> | Stets          | son A | Allie   |              |   |    | RI    | HP            | B    | ∦ P | IT       | Во              | rn: <b>3</b> / | /13/1991 | Age: <b>21</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6</b> | ' <b>2</b> " We | eight: <b>2</b> | 220        |
|---------|----------------|-------|---------|--------------|---|----|-------|---------------|------|-----|----------|-----------------|----------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL   | AGE     | W            | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP   | Н   | HR       | ВВ              | S0             | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA            | FIP             | FRA             | WARP       |
| 2011    | SC0            | ASX   | 20      | 0            | 2 | 0  | 15    | 7             | 26.0 | 20  | 1        | 29              | 28             | 10.0     | 9.7            | 43%   | .279           | 1.90           | 6.58           | 6.10            | 6.86            | -0.1       |
| 2012    | PIT            | MLB   | 21      | 0            | 1 | 0  | 5     | 2             | 7.2  | 9   | 1        | 5               | 4              | 5.8      | 4.9            | 44%   | .315           | 1.74           | 6.02           | 5.74            | 6.54            | -0.4       |
| Breakou | ut: <b>49%</b> |       | Improve | e: <b>73</b> | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 0%   |     | Attritio | on: <b>15</b> 9 | %              | MLB: 89% |                |       | (              | Comparable     | es: Vern L     | aw,Sand         | y Koufax,       | Jim Palmer |

Few in the game can match Allie in arm strength—his fastball has touched triple digits and he sat in the mid-90s last season. Unfortunately, Allie does not control his fastball too well, his only secondary pitch is an occasionally plus slider, and his mechanics are complicated. Put those things together and you can understand why some see Allie as a future reliever, but the Pirates are committed to developing him as a starter first.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Noel           | Arg | uelle  | S            |   |    | LI    | HP            | 叫     | KC | A        | Bor           | n: <b>1</b> , | /12/1990        | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats: | L Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ght: <b>6'</b> | <b>3"</b> We | ight: <b>2</b> | 15          |
|--------------|----------------|-----|--------|--------------|---|----|-------|---------------|-------|----|----------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|---------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| YEAR         | TM             | LVL | AGE    | W            | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP    | Н  | HR       | ВВ            | S0            | EQBB9           | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP   | WHIP            | ERA            | FIP          | FRA            | WARP        |
| 2011         | WIL            | AFA | 21     | 2            | 4 | 0  | 21    | 21            | 104.0 | 93 | 6        | 24            | 64            | 2.1             | 5.5            | 37%   | .277    | 1.10            | 3.20           | 3.57         | 4.14           | 1.5         |
| 2012         | KCA            | MLB | 22     | 1            | 2 | 0  | 5     | 5             | 23.0  | 29 | 3        | 10            | 9             | 3.9             | 3.6            | 39%   | .311    | 1.69            | 6.01           | 5.49         | 6.53           | -0.3        |
| Breako       | ut: <b>27%</b> |     | Improv | e: <b>47</b> | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 3%    |    | Attritio | on: <b>6%</b> |               | MLB: <b>84%</b> |                |       | Compa   | arables: Je     | rry Reuss,     | Ross Grir    | nsley,Dic      | k Ellsworth |

The timetable shifted on the Cuban bonus baby when he was shut down for the entire 2010 season with shoulder concerns. He underwent surgery to repair a torn labrum in August of 2010 and the Royals rightly brought him along slowly in 2011, limiting him to 21 starts and just over 100 innings for Wilmington. Arguelles has an average fastball and a solid changeup, but lacks a true out pitch. He relies on command more than power and projects as a back of the rotation starter or reliever.

| <u>\$</u> 1 | Trevo          | r Ba | uer     |                |   |    | RI    | HP              | E.   | A  | RI      | Во            | rn: <b>1</b> / | /17/1991 | Age: <b>21</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | /s: <b>R</b> He | eight: <b>6</b> | '1" W     | eight: <b>1</b> | .75       |
|-------------|----------------|------|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|-----------------|------|----|---------|---------------|----------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|
| YEAR        | TM             | LVL  | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS              | IP   | Н  | HR      | ВВ            | S0             | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP            | ERA             | FIP       | FRA             | WARP      |
| 2011        | VIS            | AFA  | 20      | 0              | 1 | 0  | 3     | 3               | 9.0  | 7  | 1       | 4             | 17             | 4.0      | 17.0           | 44%   | .353           | 1.20            | 3.00            | 2.93      | 3.58            | 0.3       |
| 2011        | MOB            | AAX  | 20      | 2              | 1 | 0  | 4     | 4               | 16.2 | 30 | 3       | 13            | 35             | 4.3      | 14.0           | 48%   | .409           | 1.70            | 7.56            | 4.14      | 5.22            | 0.2       |
| 2012        | ARI            | MLB  | 21      | 3              | 3 | 0  | 8     | 8               | 48.0 | 44 | 5       | 21            | 44             | 3.9      | 8.2            | 45%   | .310           | 1.35            | 4.20            | 3.92      | 4.56            | 0.5       |
| Breakou     | ıt: <b>34%</b> |      | Improve | e: <b>66</b> ' | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> 4 | 4%   |    | Attriti | on: <b>4%</b> |                | MLB: 94% |                |       | Con            | nparables:      | Matt Cair       | n,Gary No | lan,Felix       | Hernandez |

#11

BP Top 101 Prospects Bauer, the third overall pick in last year's amateur draft, is a thinking man's pitcher who tirelessly studies and tweaks every aspect of his exercise regimen, throwing routine, and delivery. None of that would mean much if he lacked raw talent, but Bauer can touch 97 and brings a full arsenal. He earned National Pitcher of the Year honors after leading the country in strikeouts at UCLA, then fanned over 15 batters per nine innings in his professional debut. He's not just a test case for whether it's possible for a player to "think too much"; he's also a viable 21-year-old candidate for Arizona's Opening Day rotation.



#37

BP Top 101
Prospects

High school pitchers are a risky bunch, but it's easy to be confident about Bradley, a big, hard-throwing right-hander who would be better known if Arizona hadn't had two first-round picks and taken Trevor Bauer before him. The Diamondbacks gambled by using their seventh-overall selection on Bradley, since the multisport star, who was committed to play quarterback at the University of Oklahoma, was viewed as a signability concern, and the pick—compensation for not signing Barret Loux the year before—wasn't protected. The D-Backs got it done for \$5 million, giving them another prospect with an ace-level ceiling a

couple of years behind the crest of the wave of young pitching about to arrive in the major-league rotation. Bradley's fastball has reportedly approached triple digits, and he pairs it with one of the best power curves in the draft. Once he turns his changeup into a third plus pitch, it'll be even harder to pick the team's best pitcher under 25.

| <u></u> | Jed E | 3rad | ley |   |   |    | L | HP | E   | M | IL | Во | rn: <b>6</b> / | 12/1990 | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats: I | _ Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ight: <b>6'</b> | <b>4</b> " We | ight: <b>2</b> 2 | 24   |
|---------|-------|------|-----|---|---|----|---|----|-----|---|----|----|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|---------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|------|
| YEAR    | TM    | LVL  | AGE | W | L | SV | G | GS | IP  | Н | HR | ВВ | S0             | EQBB9   | EQS09          | GB%     | BABIP   | WHIP            | ERA             | FIP           | FRA              | WARP |
| 2011    | PEJ   | WIN  | 21  | 1 | 0 | 0  | 5 | 2  | 8.1 | 9 | 2  | 4  | 8              | 4.3     | 8.6            | -       | .280    | 1.60            | 6.48            | 6.95          | 7.13             | 0.0  |


A scout's dream, Bradley didn't post collegiate results in keeping with his easy low-90s heat and good slider and changeup, and the Brewers were thrilled that he was available with the 15th pick in the 2011 draft. He's not considered to have top-of-rotation potential, but he does have the ideal pitcher's body and sufficient polish that he could be on the fast track to the middle of a rotation, though Milwaukee has enough arms that there's no need to hurry things.

| <u></u> | 3rya | n Bri | ckh | ous | se |    | RI | HP | 岬  | K | CA     | Во       | rn: <b>6</b> / | 6/1992      | Age: <b>20</b> | Bats: <b>R</b> | Throws | : <b>R</b> Heig | ght: <b>6'0</b> | " Wei | ght: <b>19</b> | 5    |
|---------|------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|---|--------|----------|----------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|--------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|----------------|------|
| YEAR    | TM   | LVL   | AGE | W   | L  | SV | G  | GS | ΙP | Н | HR     | ВВ       | S0             | EQBB9       | EQS09          | GB%            | BABIP  | WHIP            | ERA             | FIP   | FRA            | WARP |
|         |      |       |     |     |    |    |    |    |    |   | no maj | or or mi | inor lea       | gue experie | nce            |                |        |                 |                 |       |                |      |

The Royals went over slot for their third round selection out of The Woodlands HS in Texas, which also produced former first round picks Kyle Drabek and Jameson Taillon. Brickhouse has a pair of quality pitches: a fastball in the low- to mid-90s with some sinking action and a plus curve. A late signing, he began his pro career in the Instructional League and figures to open next year in Kane County once the weather warms up in mid-May.

| <u>&amp;</u> 1 | Wei-           | Yin ( | Chen    |                |    |    | RI    | HP     | Di.   | ∦ P | IT      | Воі             | n: <b>7</b> / | 21/1985  | Age: <b>26</b> | Bats: | <b>L</b> Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ght: <b>6'</b> | <b>0</b> " We | eight: <b>1</b> | 75          |
|----------------|----------------|-------|---------|----------------|----|----|-------|--------|-------|-----|---------|-----------------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| YEAR           | TM             | LVL   | L       | SV             | G  | GS | IP    | Н      | HR    | ВВ  | S0      | EQBB9           | EQS09         | GB%      | BABIP          | WHIP  | ERA            | FIP             | FRA            | WARP          |                 |             |
| 2009           | CHU            | NPB   | 23      | 8              | 4  | 0  | 24    | 23     | 164.0 | 113 | 10      | 40              | 146           | 2.2      | 8.0            | -     | .231           | 0.90            | 1.54           | 2.51          | 1.69            | -           |
| 2010           | CHU            | NPB   | 24      | 13             | 10 | 0  | 29    | 0      | 188.0 | 166 | 21      | 49              | 153           | 2.3      | 7.3            | -     | .268           | 1.10            | 2.87           | 3.73          | 3.16            | -           |
| 2011           | CHU            | NPB   | 25      | 8              | 10 | 0  | 25    | 4      | 164.2 | 138 | 9       | 31              | 93            | 1.7      | 5.1            | -     | .258           | 1.00            | 2.68           | 3.35          | -               | -           |
| 2012           | BAL            | MLB   | 26      | 9              | 9  | 0  | 26    | 26     | 156.0 | 160 | 18      | 46              | 123           | 2.7      | 7.1            | 46%   | .302           | 1.32            | 4.04           | 4.05          | 4.39            | 1.6         |
| Breako         | ut: <b>16%</b> |       | Improve | e: <b>59</b> ' | %  |    | Colla | pse: 1 | 8%    |     | Attriti | on: <b>15</b> 9 | 6             | MLB: 89% |                |       | Con            | nparables:      | Billy Piero    | e,Mike C      | uellar,Bu       | ddy Carlyle |

The Orioles took quite the dip into the proverbial crackerjack box that is the Asian pitcher market this winter, and Wei-Yin Chen may well wind up being the prize to come out of that box. He was one of the best pitchers in the league in 2009 and still quite good in 2010, but his 2011 unraveled as he suffered injuries to his groin and hamstring, and his stuff suffered as a result. He lost velocity on his fastball, and his slider was softer and without as much bite, but his stuff began to return toward the end of the season. If he can get back to where he was, Chen has the upside of a mid-rotation starter. Listen to what scouts say about him as March drags on.



#9

BP Top 101 Prospects The number one selection in last June's draft got an \$8 million signing bonus with assistance from his advisor Scott Boras. Built to last, Cole has a 6-foot-4 frame and maintains his mid- to upper-90s velocity deep into games. Toss in a pair of potentially plus-plus pitches—slider, changeup—as well as two other usable offerings—two-seamer, curveball—and Cole has ace potential. Success stories like David Price and Stephen Strasburg have exorcised some of the stigma that comes with being a pitcher and the first-overall pick, but there were other concerns about Cole entering the draft. For instance, his college statistics were not as

dominant as his stuff suggests they should have been. Add in the usual caveat about pitchers in general, and the Pirates could wind up mocked even after spending the money and making the right selection.

| <b>\(\rightarrow\)</b> | Gerar          | do C | oncep  | cio            | n  |    | LI    | НP            |       | CH  | N        | Bor             | rn: <b>2</b> , | /29/1992 | Age: <b>20</b> | Bats: | <b>L</b> Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ght: <b>6'</b> | <b>1</b> " We | ight: <b>1</b> | 76        |
|------------------------|----------------|------|--------|----------------|----|----|-------|---------------|-------|-----|----------|-----------------|----------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------|
| YEAR                   | TM             | LVL  | SV     | G              | GS | IP | Н     | HR            | ВВ    | S0  | EQBB9    | EQS09           | GB%            | BABIP    | WHIP           | ERA   | FIP            | FRA             | WARP           |               |                |           |
| 2011                   | IND            | CUB  | 19     | 10             | 3  | 0  | 21    | 16            | 101.2 | 103 | 6        | 43              | 53             | 3.8      | 4.7            | -     | .294           | 1.40            | 3.36           | 4.20          | -              | 0.0       |
| 2012                   | CHN            | MLB  | 20     | 2              | 2  | 0  | 8     | 6             | 36.2  | 36  | 4        | 15              | 27             | 3.6      | 6.6            | 46%   | .315           | 1.39            | 4.44           | 4.39          | 4.83           | 0.2       |
| Breakou                | ıt: <b>36%</b> |      | Improv | e: <b>61</b> ' | %  |    | Colla | pse: <b>2</b> | 8%    |     | Attritio | on: <b>15</b> 9 | 6              | MLB: 84% |                |       | Comparable     | es: Chris Za    | chary,Bru      | ice Robbi     | ns,Mike        | McCormick |

In March, the Cubs signed 20-year-old Cuban lefty Gerardo Concepcion to a deal worth about \$6 million, and the polished lefty--good control of his fastball, decent depth on his curve--could move quickly through Chicago's system. His upside is limited, even if he does add some heft to his slender frame and velocity to his high-80s fastball. Kevin Goldstein left Concepcion off his top 101 prospects, and thinks he'd be a second-round pick who would get less than \$1 million if he were an American. Still, Concepcion gives the Cubs something they totally lacked: A left-handed pitching prospect.

| <u>&amp;</u> 1 | Yu D           | arvis | h       |                |   |    | RI    | HP            | 4     | l TE | X       | Во              | rn: <b>8</b> / | 16/1986  | Age: <b>25</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | eight: <b>6</b> | '5" W     | eight: <b>1</b> | .85        |
|----------------|----------------|-------|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|---------------|-------|------|---------|-----------------|----------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------------|------------|
| YEAR           | TM             | LVL   | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP    | Н    | HR      | ВВ              | S0             | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA             | FIP       | FRA             | WARP       |
| 2009           | NIP            | NPB   | 22      | 15             | 5 | 0  | 23    | 23            | 182.0 | 118  | 9       | 45              | 167            | 2.2      | 8.3            | -     | .230           | 0.90           | 1.73            | 2.66      | 1.90            | -          |
| 2010           | NIP            | NPB   | 23      | 12             | 8 | 0  | 26    | 0             | 202.0 | 158  | 5       | 47              | 222            | 2.1      | 9.9            | -     | .292           | 1.00           | 1.78            | 2.07      | 1.96            | -          |
| 2011           | NIP            | NPB   | 24      | 18             | 6 | 0  | 28    | 10            | 232.0 | 156  | 5       | 36              | 276            | 1.4      | 10.7           | -     | .285           | 0.80           | 1.44            | 1.57      | -               | -          |
| 2012           | TEX            | MLB   | 25      | 14             | 6 | 0  | 28    | 28            | 176.1 | 160  | 17      | 51              | 185            | 2.6      | 9.4            | 46%   | .305           | 1.20           | 3.29            | 3.28      | 3.58            | 4.2        |
| Breakou        | ıt: <b>19%</b> |       | Improve | e: <b>52</b> ' | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 9%    |      | Attriti | on: <b>15</b> 9 | %              | MLB: 93% |                | C     | omparable      | : Roger Cl     | emens,Ka        | ırl Spoon | er,Joba Ch      | ıamberlain |

After winning the bidding rights to Yu Darvish by posting a one-time payment of ~\$51.7 million, and following it up with a six-year, \$56 million contract, the Rangers were left with one of the league's most expensive investments, one that had never thrown a pitch in a major league game. Standing 6'5'' with a solid, athletic build, Darvish is a prototypical power pitcher, capable of ratcheting his four-seam fastball up to near elite velocity. Unlike most power arms, the 25-year —old Darvish has an incredible feel for his craft, an almost preternatural relationship with the baseball. Because of this uncanny feel, Darvish can manipulate the ball like a confidence man running a scheme, turning a standard arsenal into the deepest in the game, with at least four fastballs (two-seamer, four-seamer, cut fastball, split-finger fastball), at least two variations of a curveball, a slider, and multiple types of changeups. He throws each offering from a fluid and balanced delivery that is both conducive for repeatability and command consistency, and deception created by the arm action and release. He's not without flaws, but the former Japanese ace has the stuff to become a future major league ace, and that is the most sought after commodity in the game.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Vilm           |     | RI      | HP              | E. | TE | EX    | Воі           | rn: <b>5</b> / | 24/1990 | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats:           | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He  | ight: <b>6</b> | '4" W | eight: <b>2</b> | 10          |          |           |           |              |
|--------------|----------------|-----|---------|-----------------|----|----|-------|---------------|----------------|---------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|-----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| YEAR         | TM             | LVL | AGE     | W               | L  | SV | G     | GS            | IP             | Н       | HR             | ВВ              | S0             | EQBB9           | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP           | WHIP        | ERA      | FIP       | FRA       | WARP         |
| 2009         | HIC            | AFX | 19      | 8               | 3  | 0  | 29    | 24            | 108.1          | 93      | 4              | 59              | 105            | 4.9             | 8.7            | 40%   | .293            | 1.40        | 3.49     | 3.89      | 3.97      | 2.0          |
| 2010         | HIC            | AFX | 20      | 4               | 1  | 0  | 7     | 7             | 29.2           | 32      | 2              | 10              | 31             | 3.9             | 10.0           | 50%   | .357            | 1.60        | 5.15     | 3.56      | 5.02      | 0.2          |
| 2010         | BAK            | AFA | 20      | 1               | 2  | 0  | 9     | 9             | 49.0           | 37      | 5              | 26              | 44             | 5.9             | 9.6            | 39%   | .308            | 1.40        | 3.86     | 5.06      | 4.90      | 0.4          |
| 2012         | TEX            | MLB | 22      | 0               | 0  | 0  | 1     | 1             | 5.1            | 6       | 1              | 4               | 4              | 6.4             | 6.4            | 40%   | .312            | 1.85        | 6.50     | 6.48      | 7.07      | -0.4         |
| Breakou      | ıt: <b>18%</b> |     | Improve | e: 4 <b>5</b> 9 | %  |    | Colla | pse: <b>2</b> | 9%             |         | Attritio       | on: <b>16</b> 9 | %              | MLB: <b>90%</b> |                |       | Compa           | arables: Ra | amon Mar | tinez,Pet | e Broberg | g,Dick Drott |

A big-bodied Venezuelan hurler coming off Tommy John surgery, Font has the type of raw arm strength coveted by every team in baseball. When healthy, the 21-year-old can pump a lively plus-plus fastball on a steep plane, mixing in a breaking ball and

changeup that has flashed above-average potential. Given the injury setback and the stalled development of his secondary pitches, Font best profiles as a bullpen arm—one that is capable of pitching at the major league level thanks to the quality of his fastball.

| <u>&amp;</u> ; | Sean           | Gilr | narti   | in           |   |    | LI    | HP            | E.   | A  | TL      | Воі             | rn: <b>5</b> / | /8/1990  | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats: <b>L</b> | Throws | <b>L</b> Heig | ht: <b>6'2</b> | " Wei     | ght: <b>19</b> | 5           |
|----------------|----------------|------|---------|--------------|---|----|-------|---------------|------|----|---------|-----------------|----------------|----------|----------------|----------------|--------|---------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|-------------|
| YEAR           | TM             | LVL  | AGE     | W            | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP   | Н  | HR      | ВВ              | S0             | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%            | BABIP  | WHIP          | ERA            | FIP       | FRA            | WARP        |
| 2011           | PES            | WIN  | 21      | 2            | 1 | 0  | 8     | 7             | 29.0 | 27 | 5       | 8               | 26             | 2.5      | 8.1            | -              | .278   | 1.20          | 4.34           | 5.58      | 4.78           | 0.0         |
| 2011           | BRA            | ROK  | 21      | 0            | 1 | 0  | 1     | 1             | 2.0  | 3  | 0       | 0               | 1              | 0.0      | 4.5            | 38%            | .375   | 1.50          | 9.00           | 2.42      | 4.46           | 0.0         |
| 2011           | ROM            | AFX  | 21      | 2            | 1 | 0  | 5     | 5             | 21.1 | 18 | 3       | 2               | 30             | 0.8      | 12.7           | 28%            | .300   | 0.90          | 2.53           | 2.82      | 3.75           | 0.5         |
| 2012           | ATL            | MLB  | 22      | 0            | 0 | 0  | 1     | 1             | 5.2  | 6  | 1       | 3               | 4              | 4.0      | 6.6            | 41%            | .316   | 1.45          | 4.77           | 5.66      | 5.18           | 0.0         |
| Breakou        | ıt: <b>36%</b> |      | Improve | e: <b>57</b> | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 4%   |    | Attriti | on: <b>13</b> 9 | %              | MLB: 84% |                |                | Com    | parables:     | Jaime Gai      | cia,Dontr | elle Willis    | s,Jon Niese |

Create a Venn diagram for Gilmartin and Mike Minor and there are plenty of things to put in the middle circle. Both were collegiate southpaws drafted in the first round by the Braves and considered safe picks. Gilmartin gets praise for his pinpoint fastball command, plus-changeup, clean arm action, and pitchability. His upside is limited—even with an improving slider—and that's okay. The Braves drafted him with a high floor in mind. Expect Gilmartin to fly through the system, and do not be surprised if he is the first or second pitcher from the 2011 class to reach the majors.

| <u></u> | Vlike          | Gor | ızale   | Z    |      |    | LI    | HP              | B.   | TE  | ΞX      | Boı           | n: <b>5</b> / | /22/1978 | Age: <b>34</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>L</b> He | ight: <b>6'</b> | <b>2</b> " We | eight: <b>2</b> | 15          |
|---------|----------------|-----|---------|------|------|----|-------|-----------------|------|-----|---------|---------------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL | AGE     | W    | L    | SV | G     | GS              | IP   | Н   | HR      | ВВ            | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA             | FIP           | FRA             | WARP        |
| 2009    | ATL            | MLB | 31      | 5    | 4    | 10 | 80    | 0               | 74.1 | 56  | 7       | 33            | 90            | 4.0      | 10.9           | 41%   | .275           | 1.20           | 2.42            | 3.47          | 3.16            | 1.8         |
| 2010    | ORI            | ROK | 32      | 0    | 0    | 0  | 2     | 2               | 2.0  | 1   | 0       | 0             | 3             | 0.0      | 13.5           | -     | .250           | 0.50           | 0.00            | 0.77          | 1.57            | 0.3         |
| 2010    | ABE            | ASX | 32      | 0    | 1    | 0  | 4     | 1               | 5.0  | 7   | 2       | 0             | 5             | 0.0      | 9.0            | -     | .357           | 1.40           | 5.40            | 6.67          | 7.84            | -0.1        |
| 2010    | BOW            | AAX | 32      | 1    | 0    | 0  | 4     | 0               | 4.0  | 1   | 1       | 1             | 3             | 2.2      | 9.0            | 29%   | .000           | 0.80           | 2.25            | 6.10          | 4.16            | 0.0         |
| 2010    | NOR            | AAA | 32      | 0    | 0    | 0  | 2     | 1               | 1.2  | 2   | 0       | 1             | 2             | 10.6     | 21.2           | 67%   | .667           | 2.90           | 10.59           | 2.94          | 6.42            | 0.0         |
| 2010    | BAL            | MLB | 32      | 1    | 3    | 1  | 29    | 0               | 24.2 | 18  | 1       | 14            | 31            | 5.1      | 11.3           | 36%   | .283           | 1.30           | 4.01            | 2.76          | 3.66            | 0.4         |
| 2011    | BAL            | MLB | 33      | 2    | 2    | 1  | 49    | 0               | 46.1 | 46  | 7       | 18            | 46            | 3.5      | 8.9            | 41%   | .302           | 1.40           | 4.27            | 4.33          | 4.73            | 0.1         |
| 2011    | TEX            | MLB | 33      | 0    | 0    | 0  | 7     | 0               | 7.0  | 5   | 0       | 3             | 5             | 3.9      | 6.4            | 50%   | .250           | 1.10           | 5.14            | 2.92          | 4.03            | 0.1         |
| 2012    | TEX            | 1   | 46      | 0    | 43.1 | 39 | 5     | 18              | 46   | 3.7 | 9.5     | 40%           | .297          | 1.30     | 3.92           | 3.91  | 4.26           | 0.6            |                 |               |                 |             |
| Breakou | ıt: <b>15%</b> |     | Improve | : 35 | %    |    | Colla | pse: <b>3</b> ! | 5%   |     | Attriti | on: <b>9%</b> |               | MLB: 92% |                |       | Com            | parables:      | Kyle Farns      | sworth,Jo     | e Nelson,       | John Hiller |

Mike Gonzalez didn't pitch like the closer the Orioles thought they were getting when they signed him for two years and \$12 million before the 2010 season, but even in his decline he has been excellent against lefties. His FIP against lefties has been below 3.00 each of the past three seasons, with 68 strikeouts against 16 walks in that time. And despite a shoulder injury that cost him half of the 2010 season, his fastball velocity has remained steady -- almost eerily steady, at 92.6 mph in each season. That was all attractive enough for Texas, which traded for him as the final piece of its bullpen renovation late last summer. Gonzalez was still a free agent when spring training began, but there are plenty of worse LOOGYs on major league rosters.

| <u>\$</u> \$ | Sonn           | y Gr | ay     |              |   |    | R     | HP             | =    | O/ | \K       | Boı           | n: <b>1</b> 1 | L/7/1989 | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>5</b> | ' <b>11</b> " V | Veight:  | 200          |
|--------------|----------------|------|--------|--------------|---|----|-------|----------------|------|----|----------|---------------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------|--------------|
| YEAR         | ΤM             | LVL  | AGE    | W            | L | S٧ | G     | GS             | IP   | Н  | HR       | ВВ            | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA            | FIP             | FRA      | WARP         |
| 2011         | ATH            | ROK  | 21     | 0            | 1 | 0  | 1     | 1              | 2.0  | 4  | 0        | 0             | 2             | 0.0      | 9.0            | 43%   | .571           | 2.00           | 4.50           | 2.36            | 2.54     | 0.1          |
| 2011         | MID            | AAX  | 21     | 1            | 0 | 0  | 5     | 5              | 20.0 | 15 | 0        | 6             | 18            | 2.7      | 8.1            | 67%   | .278           | 1.00           | 0.45           | 2.48            | 3.40     | 0.5          |
| 2012         | OAK            | MLB  | 22     | 2            | 3 | 0  | 8     | 8              | 40.0 | 42 | 4        | 18            | 28            | 4.1      | 6.3            | 49%   | .304           | 1.51           | 4.68           | 4.47            | 5.09     | 0.0          |
| Breakou      | ıt: <b>32%</b> |      | Improv | e: <b>63</b> | % |    | Colla | apse: <b>1</b> | .5%  |    | Attritio | on: <b>7%</b> |               | MLB: 95% |                |       | Compa          | rables: Ma     | t Latos,M      | lichael B       | owden,Tr | evor C ahill |

**#72** 

BP Top 101
Prospects

With the 18th overall selection in the 2011 draft, the A's happily took the diminutive righty after he unexpectedly fell to the middle of the round. As Vanderbilt's Friday starter, Gray became one of the top college arms in the country, using a plus-plus fastball and curveball combo to overpower all who stepped into the box. After signing with the A's, Gray made six starts, including five at Double-A, allowing only one run in 20 Texas League innings. Despite his size, Gray profiles as a first-division major league starter, with two 70-grade pitches and an improving changeup in his holster.


He fell to Tampa Bay with the 24th selection of the 2011 first round after a mixture of off-the-field issues led him to switch high schools and he appeared committed to the South Carolina Gamecocks program. Guerreiri said in an interview shortly after his selection that the issue was a one-time thing and the team scouting director added there had been misinformation related to the incident. A simple Google search shows a court case related to a car accident, but the case was dismissed and the organization appears to be satisfied with its due diligence. The fact remains the prep-school star dialed it up to 97 miles per hour before the draft and showed scouts a very good curveball—the kind of stuff that is not generally available with the 24th pick of the draft.

| <u></u> | Keviı          | ı Ha | rt      |                |   |    | RI    | HP              | ×    | NO | N       | Boı           | n: <b>1</b> 2 | 2/29/198 | <b>2</b> Age: <b>2</b> | 9 Bats | : <b>R</b> Thro | ws: <b>R</b> H | leight:   | 6'4" V    | Veight:   | 230       |
|---------|----------------|------|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|-----------------|------|----|---------|---------------|---------------|----------|------------------------|--------|-----------------|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL  | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS              | IP   | Н  | HR      | ВВ            | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09                  | GB%    | BABIP           | WHIP           | ERA       | FIP       | FRA       | WARP      |
| 2009    | PE0            | AFX  | 26      | 0              | 0 | 0  | 1     | 1               | 4.0  | 3  | 1       | 1             | 3             | 2.2      | 6.8                    | 42%    | .182            | 1.00           | 4.50      | 6.12      | 7.51      | -0.1      |
| 2009    | IOW            | AAA  | 26      | 3              | 3 | 3  | 22    | 6               | 52.1 | 39 | 5       | 20            | 57            | 3.4      | 9.8                    | 44%    | .262            | 1.10           | 3.10      | 3.95      | 4.15      | 0.6       |
| 2009    | CHN            | MLB  | 26      | 3              | 1 | 0  | 8     | 4               | 27.2 | 23 | 3       | 18            | 13            | 5.9      | 4.2                    | 44%    | .238            | 1.50           | 2.60      | 5.70      | 6.16      | -0.1      |
| 2009    | PIT            | MLB  | 26      | 1              | 8 | 0  | 10    | 10              | 53.1 | 74 | 8       | 26            | 39            | 4.4      | 6.6                    | 45%    | .369            | 1.90           | 6.92      | 5.12      | 5.32      | 0.1       |
| 2010    | IND            | AAA  | 27      | 1              | 0 | 1  | 5     | 4               | 17.1 | 18 | 1       | 11            | 10            | 5.7      | 9.9                    | 46%    | .321            | 1.70           | 6.76      | 4.47      | 5.48      | 0.2       |
| 2012    | NON            | MLB  | 29      | 2              | 3 | 0  | 11    | 8               | 36.1 | 36 | 4       | 16            | 29            | 3.9      | 7.1                    | 48%    | .319            | 1.42           | 4.70      | 4.36      | 5.11      | 0.1       |
| Breakou | ıt: <b>18%</b> |      | Improve | e: <b>48</b> 9 | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> 0 | 0%   |    | Attriti | on: <b>9%</b> |               | MLB: 88% |                        |        | (               | Comparable     | es: Dan M | leyer,Joe | Gibbon,Ji | m Lonborg |

Hart shares a name with a comedian, but any laughing during his Pirates career has come at his expense. Part of the John Grabow trade, Hart threw 50 replacement-level innings in 2009, then tore his labrum early in 2010 and has not pitched since. Hart needs to get back onto a mound before anyone can forecast what the next step will be. Still, the Pirates had intentions of transitioning him to the bullpen. Such a move makes sense, as Hart is blessed with mid-90s heat and a ferocious slider but lacks a worthwhile third offering.


| <u>&amp;</u> ] | lerei          | ny H | efne    | r              |   |    | RI    | HP            | =     | NY  | 'N      | Воі             | n: <b>3</b> / | 11/1986         | Age: <b>26</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | /s: <b>R</b> He | eight: <b>6</b> | '4" W    | eight: <b>2</b> | <b>15</b> |
|----------------|----------------|------|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|---------------|-------|-----|---------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|-----------------|-----------|
| YEAR           | TM             | LVL  | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP    | Н   | HR      | ВВ              | S0            | EQBB9           | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP            | ERA             | FIP      | FRA             | WARP      |
| 2009           | LEL            | AFA  | 23      | 14             | 9 | 0  | 27    | 27            | 150.2 | 165 | 13      | 37              | 142           | 2.3             | 8.5            | 41%   | .353           | 1.30            | 4.12            | 3.95     | 4.01            | 2.0       |
| 2009           | POR            | AAA  | 23      | 0              | 0 | 0  | 1     | 1             | 5.1   | 7   | 0       | 2               | 5             | 3.4             | 8.5            | 41%   | .412           | 1.70            | 3.40            | 2.70     | 4.36            | 0.1       |
| 2010           | SAN            | AAX  | 24      | 11             | 8 | 0  | 28    | 28            | 167.2 | 117 | 7       | 34              | 81            | 2.7             | 6.2            | 44%   | .297           | 1.20            | 2.95            | 3.55     | 4.22            | 1.4       |
| 2012           | NYN            | MLB  | 26      | 3              | 4 | 0  | 10    | 10            | 60.0  | 64  | 7       | 22              | 37            | 3.3             | 5.5            | 41%   | .313           | 1.44            | 4.85            | 4.45     | 5.27            | -0.2      |
| Breakou        | ıt: <b>30%</b> |      | Improve | e: <b>51</b> ' | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>2</b> | 9%    |     | Attriti | on: <b>29</b> 9 | 6             | MLB: <b>92%</b> |                |       | Compara        | bles: Hayd      | len Penn,       | Marco Es | trada,Phil      | ip Humber |

The Mets drafted Hefner twice as an amateur, yet never signed him, but he's finally a Met after being claimed from the Pirates, who took him off their 40-man just days after claiming him from the Padres. He has just average velocity at 88-92 mph and he's flipped back and forth between throwing a curve and a slider in search of a dependable breaking ball, but he's aggressive in the zone and generally throws strikes. He'll likely begin the year in the rotation at Triple-A Buffalo as a potential emergency starter.



#42

BP Top 101 Prospects Heredia is best at making everyone feel old. He was born after O.J. Simpson's Bronco chase. The precocious righty looked green during his first professional season, but the results do not matter for him right now. His frame can hold more weight, and adding oomph to a fastball that can hit 93-mph already is a tantalizing proposition. Add in a promising curveball and feel for the changeup, as well as unusually smooth mechanics for a teenager without expertise tutoring, and Heredia could be something special—or he could be another casualty of attrition. You never know.



#35

BP Top 101 Prospects Hultzen's college pitching coach described the second overall pick as "a Greg Maddux demeanor with a Randy Johnson arm," which is the sort of quote you file away to deploy mockingly should he turn out to actually have nothing better than Greg Maddux's eyesight and Randy Johnson's beard-dye-commercial acting chops. Not that there's any reason to doubt the pitching coach yet, as Hultzen's low-three-quarters arm slot, 93-mph fastball and plus changeup played well in the Arizona Fall League. Bright and professorial, he wanted to take classes and work toward his diploma this fall. The Mariners convinced him to go to Arizona,

instead, and prepare for the 2012 season, when they will give him the chance to skip the minors and start on the big league roster out of spring training. Safe picks have their upside, too.

| <u></u> | Hisa           | shi I | wakı  | ım            | a  |    | RI      | ΗP            |       | SE              | Α  | Во | rn: <b>4</b> / | 12/1981     | Age: <b>31</b> | . Bats:  | <b>R</b> Throw | /s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6</b> | '3" W | eight: 1 | L <b>70</b> |
|---------|----------------|-------|-------|---------------|----|----|---------|---------------|-------|-----------------|----|----|----------------|-------------|----------------|----------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|----------|-------------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL   | AGE   | W             | L  | SV | G       | GS            | IP    | Н               | HR | ВВ | S0             | EQBB9       | EQS09          | GB%      | BABIP          | WHIP            | ERA            | FIP   | FRA      | WARP        |
| 2009    | RAK            | NPB   | 28    | 13            | 6  | 0  | 24      | 24            | 169.0 | 179             | 15 | 43 | 121            | 2.3         | 6.4            | -        | .312           | 1.30            | 3.25           | 3.61  | 3.57     | -           |
| 2010    | RAK            | NPB   | 29    | 10            | 9  | 0  | 28      | 0             | 201.0 | 184             | 11 | 36 | 153            | 1.6         | 6.9            | -        | .284           | 1.10            | 2.82           | 3.05  | 3.10     | -           |
| 2011    | RAK            | NPB   | 30    | 6             | 7  | 0  | 17      | 2             | 119.0 | 106             | 6  | 19 | 90             | 1.4         | 6.8            | -        | .289           | 1.10            | 2.42           | 2.82  | -        | -           |
| 2012    | SEA            | MLB   | 31    | 10            | 10 | 0  | 29      | 29            | 174.0 | 176             | 15 | 45 | 136            | 2.4         | 7.0            | 46%      | .303           | 1.27            | 3.61           | 3.57  | 3.93     | 1.9         |
| Breakou | ut: <b>12%</b> |       | Colla | pse: <b>3</b> | 7% |    | Attriti | on: <b>6%</b> |       | MLB: <b>87%</b> |    |    | Com            | parables: F | Roger Nels     | son,Matt | Belisle,W      | ilbur Wood      |                |       |          |             |

There are always question marks when a player makes the jump across the Pacific—new culture, new language, new food, new workload, new ball, etc—but there may be more with Hisashi Iwakuma than most. While the A's won his posting bid last off-season for a hefty \$16 million, the team was reportedly 'lukewarm' on him this off-season, and he signed with the Mariners on just a one-year, \$1.5 million deal. Iwakuma suffered a shoulder injury this past year, losing several mph off his fastball, and some scouts questioned whether his best days are behind him. At his best, he's a number-four starter who gets by more on smarts, control, and keeping the ball on the ground than stuff. Seattle's park and defense should help his numbers play up, and but keep an eye on reports out of spring training.

| <u></u> | [aylo | r Jur | ngma | anı | 1 |    | RI | HP | E  | M | IIL    | Во       | rn: <b>12</b> | 2/18/198     | <b>39</b> Age: <b>2</b> | 2 Bats | : <b>R</b> Thro | ws: <b>R</b> H | eight: ( | 6'6" V | Veight: | 220  |
|---------|-------|-------|------|-----|---|----|----|----|----|---|--------|----------|---------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------|-----------------|----------------|----------|--------|---------|------|
| YEAR    | TM    | LVL   | AGE  | W   | L | SV | G  | GS | IP | Н | HR     | ВВ       | S0            | EQBB9        | EQS09                   | GB%    | BABIP           | WHIP           | ERA      | FIP    | FRA     | WARP |
|         |       |       |      |     |   |    |    |    |    |   | no mai | or or mi | nor lea       | gue experier | nce                     |        |                 |                |          |        |         |      |

Jungmann is a polished fastball/slider pitcher who is considered by most to have the upside of a mid-rotation starter, despite touching 95-mph at times. He'll need to add consistency to his changeup to reach that level, but his huge frame and collegiate track record suggest he'll soon be a workhorse.

| <u>&amp;</u> ] | lorge          | Lop | ez     |              |   |    | RI    | HP            | E    | M  | IL      | Во              | n: <b>2</b> / | /10/1993 | Age: <b>19</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | /s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6</b> | ' <b>4</b> " We | eight: 1  | 165        |
|----------------|----------------|-----|--------|--------------|---|----|-------|---------------|------|----|---------|-----------------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------|------------|
| YEAR           | TM             | LVL | AGE    | W            | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP   | Н  | HR      | ВВ              | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP            | ERA            | FIP             | FRA       | WARP       |
| 2011           | MAY            | WIN | 18     | 0            | 0 | 0  | 1     | 1             | 1.1  | 2  | 0       | 4               | 1             | 27.0     | 6.8            | -     | .400           | 4.50            | 6.75           | 10.05           | 7.43      | 0.0        |
| 2011           | BRR            | ROK | 18     | 0            | 0 | 0  | 4     | 4             | 12.0 | 13 | 0       | 3               | 10            | 2.2      | 7.5            | 43%   | .325           | 1.30            | 2.25           | 3.44            | 4.12      | 0.2        |
| 2012           | MIL            | MLB | 19     | 0            | 0 | 0  | 1     | 1             | 3.0  | 4  | 0       | 2               | 1             | 5.8      | 3.0            | 44%   | .322           | 1.89            | 7.14           | 4.30            | 7.76      | -0.6       |
| Breakou        | ut: <b>18%</b> |     | Improv | e: <b>65</b> | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>3</b> | 5%   |    | Attriti | on: <b>35</b> 9 | 6             | MLB: 45% |                |       | Co             | mparables       | : Von Mc       | Daniel,Ric      | k Wise,Le | ew Krausse |

Improbably, here's the second pitcher in the supplement with a name very similar to a prominent comedian. His build is pretty much on the opposite end of the scale from the former late night host--Jorge Lopez is long and lanky, and screams "projection" to scouts. He also has an advanced ability to throw two different curves along with a fastball that can touch 93 mph. The organization tries to teach all its pitching prospects a changeup, and Lopez will be no exception. If he grows into some more velocity, tunes up his curves, and learns an average changeup, the sky's the limit. Stay tuned.



Meyer is a tall right-hander out of Kentucky with two plus pitches coming off of a big frame—a fastball and slider. He's a good example of where the Nats have been able to make some investments other clubs have passed on—Scott Boras clients. Given the current market for established talent, it's a good place to go in terms of what the incremental cost is. It doesn't take many successes to offset the costs of the busts. Will the new CBA make it more difficult to fill a talent pipeline that way? Probably. Meyer will have to get past the injury nexus, but there are going to be opportunities for someone with his stuff. He could blow through the system quickly, and there's space in both the rotation and the bullpen.

| <u>&amp;</u> J | lami          | е Ма | yer     |              |    |    | LI    | HP            | E     | CC  | )L      | Bor           | n: <b>1</b> 1 | L/18/196 | <b>2</b> Age: <b>4</b> | <b>9</b> Bats | : <b>L</b> Thro | ws: <b>L</b> H | eight: <b>6</b> | 6'0" W    | /eight:  | 185         |
|----------------|---------------|------|---------|--------------|----|----|-------|---------------|-------|-----|---------|---------------|---------------|----------|------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|-------------|
| YEAR           | TM            | LVL  | AGE     | W            | L  | SV | G     | GS            | IP    | Н   | HR      | ВВ            | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09                  | GB%           | BABIP           | WHIP           | ERA             | FIP       | FRA      | WARP        |
| 2009           | PHI           | MLB  | 46      | 12           | 10 | 0  | 30    | 25            | 162.0 | 177 | 27      | 43            | 94            | 2.4      | 5.2                    | 42%           | .286            | 1.40           | 4.94            | 5.04      | 5.36     | 0.5         |
| 2010           | ESC           | WIN  | 47      | 0            | 0  | 0  | 3     | 3             | 5.1   | 4   | 0       | 0             | 5             | 0.0      | 8.5                    | -             | .250            | 0.80           | 1.70            | 1.20      | 1.87     | 0.0         |
| 2010           | PHI           | MLB  | 47      | 9            | 9  | 0  | 19    | 19            | 111.2 | 103 | 20      | 20            | 63            | 1.6      | 5.1                    | 46%           | .236            | 1.10           | 4.84            | 5.00      | 4.86     | 0.6         |
| 2012           | COL           | MLB  | 49      | 2            | 2  | 0  | 6     | 6             | 36.2  | 37  | 6       | 12            | 16            | 3.0      | 3.9                    | 44%           | .271            | 1.34           | 4.75            | 5.55      | 5.16     | 0.2         |
| Breakou        | ıt: <b>0%</b> |      | Improve | e: <b>0%</b> |    |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 00%   |     | Attriti | on: <b>0%</b> |               | MLB: 38% |                        |               |                 | (              | Comparab        | les: Hoyt | Wilhelm, | Phil Niekro |

Pay no attention to his forecast—there aren't enough pitchers still going at Moyer's age for PECOTA to get a good read. That being said, is there really any reason to think Moyer can't provide the same level of modest production as he nears the big five-o as he did in his mid-forties? So long as he remains the Aikido Master of the mound, using a hitter's aggression against him to reach for Moyer's pitch, he can get by with a fastball that barely touches 80 and a changeup that would hardly get ticketed in a school zone. Coors Field isn't a perfect fit for his flyball tendencies, and perhaps the Rockies would be wiser to use his roster spot on a player with an actual future, but until Moyer goes out and proves he can no longer retire major league hitters, we should assume he can.

| <u></u> [ | ake           | <b>O</b> do | rizzi   |                |   |    | LI    | HP              | Ħ     | KC | A        | Воі           | n: <b>3</b> / | 27/1990         | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats: | R Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6</b> | ' <b>2</b> " W | eight: <b>1</b> | 175        |
|-----------|---------------|-------------|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|-----------------|-------|----|----------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|---------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|------------|
| YEAR      | TM            | LVL         | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS              | IP    | Н  | HR       | ВВ            | S0            | EQBB9           | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP   | WHIP           | ERA            | FIP            | FRA             | WARP       |
| 2009      | HEL           | ROK         | 19      | 1              | 4 | 0  | 12    | 10              | 47.0  | 55 | 3        | 9             | 43            | 1.7             | 8.2            | 50%   | .356    | 1.40           | 4.40           | 3.63           | 4.85            | 1.1        |
| 2010      | WIS           | AFX         | 20      | 7              | 3 | 1  | 23    | 20              | 120.2 | 58 | 0        | 26            | 95            | 3.0             | 10.1           | 51%   | .314    | 1.20           | 3.43           | 2.99           | 4.06            | 2.0        |
| 2011      | WIL           | AFA         | 21      | 3              | 1 | 0  | 15    | 15              | 78.1  | 68 | 4        | 22            | 103           | 2.5             | 11.8           | 41%   | .344    | 1.10           | 2.87           | 2.17           | 3.55            | 1.8        |
| 2011      | NWA           | AAX         | 21      | 4              | 2 | 0  | 12    | 12              | 68.2  | 67 | 13       | 25            | 57            | 2.9             | 7.1            | 32%   | .258    | 1.30           | 4.72           | 5.32           | 4.94            | 0.7        |
| 2012      | KCA           | MLB         | 22      | 2              | 3 | 0  | 8     | 8               | 43.2  | 49 | 6        | 20            | 32            | 4.1             | 6.5            | 41%   | .313    | 1.57           | 5.29           | 5.00           | 5.75            | -0.2       |
| Breakou   | t: <b>25%</b> |             | Improve | e: <b>62</b> ' | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> . | 5%    |    | Attritio | on: <b>7%</b> |               | MLB: <b>94%</b> |                |       | Con     | nparables:     | Chris Tilli    | man,Stev       | e Karsay,       | Jake Peavy |

#47


BP Top 101 Prospects The former 32nd overall draft choice in the 2008 amateur draft had a tale of two seasons in 2011. As a 21 year old in the Carolina League, Odorizzi struck out one-third of his opponents while limiting the opposition to a 636 OPS. Upon his promotion to the Texas League, his fortunes changed as his strikeout rate fell to below league average and his flyball tendencies were enjoyed by hitters who took him deep 13 times in just 68 innings of work. Kevin Goldstein believes he has a second-starter ceiling but that hinges upon further development of his changeup as a third pitch. Despite the fact his changeup is behind his fastball and

curveball, Odorizzi was equally effective against righties and lefties after having issues with lefties at the lower levels in the minors.

| <u></u> | Andy           | Pet | titte   |               |   |    | LI    | ΗP            | Ħ     | NY  | Ά        | Boı             | n: <b>6</b> / | 15/1972  | Age: <b>40</b> | Bats: L | . Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ght: <b>6'</b> | <b>5</b> " We | ight: <b>2</b> : | 25        |
|---------|----------------|-----|---------|---------------|---|----|-------|---------------|-------|-----|----------|-----------------|---------------|----------|----------------|---------|---------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|-----------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL | AGE     | W             | L | SV | G     | GS            | IP    | Н   | HR       | BB              | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%     | BABIP   | WHIP            | ERA            | FIP           | FRA              | WARP      |
| 2009    | NYA            | MLB | 37      | 14            | 8 | 0  | 32    | 32            | 194.2 | 193 | 20       | 76              | 148           | 3.5      | 6.8            | 44%     | .295    | 1.40            | 4.16           | 4.19          | 4.51             | 2.8       |
| 2010    | NYA            | MLB | 38      | 11            | 3 | 0  | 21    | 21            | 129.0 | 123 | 13       | 41              | 101           | 2.9      | 7.0            | 46%     | .291    | 1.30            | 3.28           | 3.81          | 4.30             | 1.6       |
| 2012    | NYA            | MLB | 40      | 6             | 5 | 0  | 15    | 15            | 90.0  | 98  | 10       | 31              | 67            | 3.1      | 6.7            | 49%     | .312    | 1.43            | 4.45           | 4.24          | 4.84             | 0.7       |
| Breakou | ıt: <b>16%</b> |     | Improve | : <b>53</b> 9 | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>1</b> | 5%    |     | Attritio | on: <b>11</b> 9 | 6             | MLB: 73% |                |         | Con     | nparables:      | Chuck Fir      | nley,David    | d Wells,Ja       | mie Moyer |

The decision to walk away while one can still excel at the major league level is so rare that it's not hard to understand the pull to rise from the retirement couch and see if one still has It a year and a winter later. With every bit as much stealth but far less

bombast than buddy Roger Clemens' return to pinstripes in 2007—and, for the Yankees, less obvious need—Pettitte morphed from spring instructor to rotation candidate in mid-March. The history of similarly-aged pitchers giving it one last go after time off is not an illustrious one—David Cone's five-start stint with the Mets in 2003 is the obvious parallel—but PECOTA sees Pettitte as likely to outperform both Ivan Nova (5.07 ERA) and Freddy Garcia (4.82 ERA) by significant margins even given the circumstances. Pettitte will get a chance to work his way into game shape at his own pace, and even if he should stumble, Yankee fans won't feel slighted should it mean another chance to shower affection upon a pitcher who was a vital cog in the rotations of seven Bronx pennant winners and five world champions.



#91

BP Top 101
Prospects

A lanky left-hander with virtually identical releases of his fastball and slider out of a relatively low arm slot, Purke improved his velocity to about MLB average during the fall instructional league, and he's been consistent with his delivery. He's already on the 40-man roster, so there's clearly an expectation that he'll be arriving in Washington fairly shortly. His injury history is a concern, particularly because it's not just one issue. His various ailments probably cost him a few hundred thousand bucks in 2011. The question of if and when his shoulder and back issues will recur is the biggie.

| <u>&amp;</u> | Chris          | Ree | ed      |                |   |    | LI    | HP      |     | LA | N        | Boı             | n: <b>5</b> / | /20/1990 | Age: <b>22</b> | Bats: | <b>L</b> Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ight: <b>6'</b> | <b>4</b> " We | ight: <b>1</b> | 95          |
|--------------|----------------|-----|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|---------|-----|----|----------|-----------------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|
| YEAR         | TM             | LVL | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS      | IP  | Н  | HR       | BB              | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP            | ERA             | FIP           | FRA            | WARP        |
| 2011         | RCU            | AFA | 21      | 0              | 1 | 0  | 3     | 3       | 7.0 | 13 | 1        | 5               | 16            | 5.1      | 11.6           | 55%   | .400           | 1.90            | 7.71            | 3.79          | 4.66           | 0.2         |
| 2012         | LAN            | MLB | 22      | 0              | 0 | 0  | 1     | 1       | 3.1 | 3  | 0        | 2               | 2             | 4.0      | 6.4            | 46%   | .306           | 1.41            | 4.48            | 3.61          | 4.87           | 0.2         |
| Breakou      | ıt: <b>39%</b> |     | Improve | e: <b>57</b> ° | % |    | Colla | nse: 12 | 2%  |    | Attritio | on: <b>21</b> 9 | 6             | MLB: 81% |                |       | Com            | parables:       | Dontrelle       | Willis.Jai    | me Garcia      | a.Jon Niese |

A year after the Dodgers made a laudably aggressive move in drafting and signing two-sport star Zach Lee in the first round, they took a more conservative route by drafting Reed as the overall number 16 pick. A closer at Stanford, Reed was seen by many as a signability pick, a supplemental or second-round talent, though others view him as a Logan White stealth maneuver to pluck a pitcher undervalued in college. Reed is a long-armed lefty whose 92-94 mph fastball will probably lose a bit in the transition to starting; his sharp slider and changeup are both considered above average as well. At best he'll develop into a second or third starter, at worst he winds up back in the bullpen, though the comparisons to Drew Storen and Huston Street may be a stretch.

| <u></u> | Robe | ert St | teph | ens | SOI | n  | RI | HP | Ħ  | C | IN     | Во       | rn: <b>2</b> / | 24/1993      | Age: <b>19</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6</b> ' | <b>2</b> " W | eight: <b>1</b> | .90  |
|---------|------|--------|------|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|---|--------|----------|----------------|--------------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|------|
| YEAR    | TM   | LVL    | AGE  | W   | L   | SV | G  | GS | IP | Н | HR     | ВВ       | S0             | EQBB9        | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA              | FIP          | FRA             | WARP |
|         |      |        |      |     |     |    |    |    |    |   | no mai | or or mi | nor lea        | gue experien | ce             |       |                |                |                  |              |                 |      |

The Reds' first-round pick in 2011, Stephenson was a classic high-upside, high-projection pick out of high school, and it took a \$2 million bonus to keep him from going to the University of Washington. The stuff is there to merit the investment: He reaches the mid-90s with his fastball and his power breaking ball is already a quality second pitch. His next pitch as a pro will be his first, but as a high-upside gamble with front-end potential as a starter, selecting him says quite a bit about the Reds' commitment to investing in player development.

| 8       | Pedr           | o Vil | larre   | al           |   |    | RI    | HP              | E.   | C  | IN       | Bor            | n: <b>12</b> | 2/9/1987 | Age: <b>24</b> | Bats: | <b>R</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6</b> | '1" W     | eight: <b>2</b> | 15           |
|---------|----------------|-------|---------|--------------|---|----|-------|-----------------|------|----|----------|----------------|--------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------|-----------------|--------------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL   | AGE     | W            | L | SV | G     | GS              | IP   | Н  | HR       | BB             | S0           | EQBB9    | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA            | FIP       | FRA             | WARP         |
| 2011    | BAK            | AFA   | 23      | 3            | 2 | 0  | 10    | 10              | 58.0 | 68 | 9        | 8              | 41           | 1.2      | 6.4            | 39%   | .324           | 1.30           | 4.34           | 5.05      | 4.96            | 0.4          |
| 2011    | CAR            | AAX   | 23      | 7            | 4 | 0  | 17    | 17              | 91.2 | 92 | 11       | 20             | 68           | 2.0      | 6.7            | 33%   | .284           | 1.20           | 4.42           | 4.26      | 5.01            | 0.8          |
| 2012    | CIN            | MLB   | 24      | 2            | 3 | 0  | 9     | 9               | 45.1 | 52 | 8        | 18             | 18           | 3.5      | 3.6            | 38%   | .300           | 1.53           | 5.88           | 5.87      | 6.39            | -0.5         |
| Breakou | ıt: <b>15%</b> |       | Improve | e: <b>44</b> | % |    | Colla | pse: <b>2</b> 9 | 9%   |    | Attritio | on: <b>279</b> | 6            | MLB: 86% |                |       | Comp           | arables: Jo    | ey Hamil       | on,Kirk S | aarloos,B       | Bill Parsons |

On the Reds' long list of surprise additions to their 40-man this winter, Villarreal might have rated as the most surprising. A seventh-round selection in the 2008 draft with nice control, a willingness to work inside, and a successful 2011 jump to Double-A, the stocky Texan didn't have a whole lot else going for him—except for that other skill that can get overlooked among pitchers: health. That's something that was hard to find among upper-level pitchers in the organization.

| <u></u> | <b>Tsuy</b>    | oshi | Wad     | a              |   |    | LI    | HP     |       | BA  | <b>AL</b> | Воі             | rn: <b>2</b> / | ′ <b>21/1981</b> | Age: <b>31</b> | Bats: | <b>L</b> Throw | s: <b>L</b> Hei | ght: <b>5'</b> | <b>11</b> " W | eight:    | 170         |
|---------|----------------|------|---------|----------------|---|----|-------|--------|-------|-----|-----------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|
| YEAR    | TM             | LVL  | AGE     | W              | L | SV | G     | GS     | IP    | Н   | HR        | ВВ              | S0             | EQBB9            | EQS09          | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP            | ERA            | FIP           | FRA       | WARP        |
| 2009    | FKU            | NPB  | 28      | 4              | 5 | 0  | 15    | 13     | 84.1  | 72  | 13        | 24              | 87             | 2.6              | 9.3            | -     | .278           | 1.10            | 4.06           | 3.84          | 4.46      | -           |
| 2010    | FKU            | NPB  | 29      | 17             | 8 | 0  | 26    | 0      | 169.1 | 145 | 11        | 55              | 169            | 2.9              | 9.0            | -     | .291           | 1.20            | 3.14           | 2.99          | 3.45      | -           |
| 2011    | FKU            | NPB  | 30      | 16             | 5 | 0  | 26    | 4      | 184.2 | 145 | 7         | 40              | 168            | 1.9              | 8.2            | -     | .282           | 1.00            | 1.51           | 2.52          | -         | -           |
| 2012    | BAL            | MLB  | 31      | 6              | 6 | 0  | 18    | 18     | 95.1  | 96  | 11        | 30              | 82             | 2.8              | 7.7            | 46%   | .304           | 1.32            | 3.98           | 3.94          | 4.33      | 1.2         |
| Breakou | ıt: <b>16%</b> |      | Improve | e: <b>59</b> ' | % |    | Colla | pse: 1 | 8%    |     | Attriti   | on: <b>15</b> 9 | %              | MLB: 89%         |                |       | Com            | parables:       | Billy Piero    | e,Mike C      | uellar,Bu | ddy Carlyle |

The Orioles showed quite an interest in Asian imports this winter, ultimately resulting in the signing of Tsuyoshi Wada in the hope that he can give the back end of their rotation some stability after starters came and went like women from Barney Stinson's bachelor pad in 2011. Fitting the crafty lefty mold, Wada's fastball sits at an unremarkable 85-88 mph, but his command is a legitimate plus tool that should help him get by as a fifth starter or, at the very least, a decent swingman.

| <u>&amp;</u> [ | Matt                                 | hew | Wes | t |   |    | RI | łР | P.   | T  | EX      | Boı             | n: <b>11</b> | l/ <b>21/19</b> 8 | <b>8</b> Age: <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> Bats | : <b>R</b> Thro | ws: <b>R</b> H | leight:  | 6'1" V    | /eight:    | 215       |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|---|---|----|----|----|------|----|---------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| YEAR           | TM                                   | LVL | AGE | W | L | SV | G  | GS | IP   | Н  | HR      | BB              | S0           | EQBB9             | EQS09                  | GB%           | BABIP           | WHIP           | ERA      | FIP       | FRA        | WARP      |
| 2011           | SP0                                  | ASX | 22  | 1 | 2 | 9  | 23 | 0  | 26.0 | 23 | 3       | 1               | 35           | 0.3               | 12.1                   | 59%           | .345            | 0.90           | 3.12     | 2.87      | 3.96       | 0.3       |
| 2011           | MYR                                  | AFA | 22  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1.0  | 1  | 0       | 0               | 1            | 0.0               | 0.0                    | 50%           | .167            | 1.00           | 0.00     | 1.21      | 2.96       | 0.0       |
| 2012           | TEX                                  | MLB | 23  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 5  | 0  | 6.0  | 7  | 1       | 3               | 4            | 4.7               | 6.2                    | 47%           | .317            | 1.68           | 6.02     | 5.48      | 6.55       | -0.3      |
| Breakou        | eakout: 38% Improve: 58% Collapse: 2 |     |     |   |   |    |    |    | 7%   |    | Attriti | on: <b>28</b> 9 | 6            | MLB: 73%          |                        |               | Compar          | ables: Don     | Demola,J | Johnny Ri | uffin,Dave | Patterson |

Originally drafted as a third baseman in the second round of the 2007 amateur draft, West struggled to find a home for his raw tools as a position player. Converted to the mound during spring training of 2011, the Texas native immediately flashed his promise, sitting in the mid-90s with his fastball and touching 99 out of the chute. After a dominating performance in the short-season Northwest League, the 23-year-old reliever (nee third baseman) was added to the 40-man roster and expected to move fast in his current role. With an explosive plus-plus fastball, a wipeout slider, sharp command, and a late-innings demeanor, West profiles as a closer at the highest level.

| & A     | Alex                                 | Wim | mers | 3 |   |    | RI | HP | 叫    | M  | IN       | Воі             | n: <b>1</b> 1 | L/1/1988 | 8 Age: <b>23</b> | Bats: | <b>L</b> Throw | s: <b>R</b> He | ight: <b>6'</b> | <b>2</b> " We | eight: <b>1</b> | .95         |
|---------|--------------------------------------|-----|------|---|---|----|----|----|------|----|----------|-----------------|---------------|----------|------------------|-------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
| YEAR    | ΤM                                   | LVL | AGE  | W | L | S٧ | G  | GS | IP   | Н  | HR       | ВВ              | S0            | EQBB9    | EQS09            | GB%   | BABIP          | WHIP           | ERA             | FIP           | FRA             | WARP        |
| 2010    | FTM                                  | AFA | 21   | 2 | 0 | 0  | 4  | 4  | 15.2 | 5  | 0        | 4               | 18            | 2.9      | 13.2             | 50%   | .227           | 0.70           | 0.57            | 2.00          | 2.45            | 0.5         |
| 2011    | TWI                                  | ROK | 22   | 0 | 0 | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1.0  | 0  | 0        | 1               | 1             | 9.0      | 9.0              | 50%   | .000           | 1.00           | 0.00            | 4.42          | 4.53            | 0.0         |
| 2011    | FTM                                  | AFA | 22   | 2 | 1 | 1  | 12 | 4  | 40.2 | 28 | 5        | 22              | 39            | 4.9      | 8.6              | 33%   | .219           | 1.20           | 4.20            | 4.84          | 5.39            | 0.1         |
| 2012    | MIN                                  | MLB | 23   | 0 | 1 | 0  | 3  | 2  | 10.2 | 11 | 1        | 6               | 9             | 4.7      | 7.5              | 42%   | .307           | 1.55           | 4.90            | 4.42          | 5.32            | 0.0         |
| Breakou | Breakout: 21% Improve: 55% Collapse: |     |      |   |   |    |    |    |      |    | Attritio | on: <b>17</b> 9 | %             | MLB: 93% |                  |       | Со             | mparables      | s: Tom Ha       | all,Fabio     | Castro,P        | ete Richert |

Who among us hasn't had the nightmare where we're out on the mound, helplessly walking hitter after hitter in an endless succession? In Wimmers's 2011 debut, he threw 28 balls out of 32 pitches, issuing six straight walks and three wild pitches before spending the next two and a half months ironing out his mechanics. The 2010 first-rounder out of Ohio State awoke from that bad dream to piece together a decent second half, drawing raves from the Twins for his work ethic, and ending the season on a high note with a seven-inning no-hitter. Straight from the Twins' mold, Wimmers has a 89 to 93-mph fastball, an excellent changeup that projects as a major league-level out pitch, and an average curveball. He is probably bound for a High-A refresher course to start 2012, but should reach Double-A at some point.

#### **Lineouts**

| PLAYER        | ORG | TEAM | LVL | AGE | W | L | SV | G  | GS | IP   | Н  | HR  | ВВ      | S0  | EqBB9 | EqS09 | GB% | BABIP | WHIP | ERA  | FIP  | FRA  | WARP |
|---------------|-----|------|-----|-----|---|---|----|----|----|------|----|-----|---------|-----|-------|-------|-----|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Dylan Bundy   | BAL |      |     |     |   |   |    |    |    |      |    | di  | d not p | lay |       |       |     |       |      |      |      |      |      |
| Jose Campos   | SEA | EVE  | ASX | 18  | 4 | 5 | 0  | 14 | 14 | 81.1 | 66 | 4   | 13      | 85  | 1.4   | 9.4   | 53% | .276  | 0.97 | 2.32 | 2.77 | 3.74 | 1.8  |
| Kevin Comer   | TOR |      |     |     |   |   |    |    |    |      |    | die | d not p | lay |       |       |     |       |      |      |      |      |      |
| Paolo Espino  | CLE | COH  | AAA | 24  | 2 | 1 | 0  | 12 | 5  | 39.1 | 39 | 4   | 8       | 46  | 1.6   | 9.4   | 41% | .273  | 1.10 | 3.43 | 2.91 | 3.20 | 1.4  |
|               |     | AKR  | AAX | 24  | 3 | 0 | 1  | 22 | 5  | 81.0 | 66 | 8   | 18      | 78  | 2.0   | 8.7   | 37% | .270  | 1.00 | 2.44 | 3.55 | 4.04 | 1.3  |
|               |     | LAG  | WIN | 24  | 2 | 2 | 0  | 7  | 6  | 23.1 | 31 | 4   | 5       | 17  | 1.9   | 6.6   | -   | .360  | 1.50 | 7.71 | 4.60 | 8.49 | 0.0  |
| Dillon Howard | CLE |      |     |     |   |   |    |    |    |      |    | die | d not p | lay |       |       |     |       |      |      |      |      |      |
| Michael Kelly | SDN |      |     |     |   |   |    |    |    |      |    | die | d not p | lay |       |       |     |       |      |      |      |      |      |

Remarkably polished for a high school pick, fourth overall selection in the 2011 amateur draft **Dylan Bundy** sits at 95-mph (and touches 100) with a power curve, a sharp cutter, and a solid change. Given his plus command and clean mechanics, Bundy will advance quickly and has ace potential. • **Jose Campos** dominated in his first season in the States, leading the short-season Northwest League in strikeouts and strikeout-to-walk ratio, despite being one of the youngest pitchers in the league. He doesn't throw his curve much, and, like every 19-year-old, his changeup needs refinement, but he's a very good prospect on the cusp of becoming a great one. • Another 2011 supplemental first-round pick, **Kevin Comer** is a righty with a fastball that sits in the low-90s and a decent curveball. • **Paolo Espino** enjoyed the best season of his career in 2011, but his ceiling is limited with below-average velocity for a righty reliever. He has a plus curve and good command, however, so he could become a low-to-mid-leverage reliever. • A first-round talent, **Dillon Howard** fell to the Indians in the second round of the 2011 draft thanks to a surplus of projectable prep arms and Scott Boras-induced signability concerns. Big, athletic, and capable of throwing in the mid-90s, Howard projects as a front-of-the-rotation starter. • The Padres signed lanky right-hander **Michael Kelly** out of a Florida high school in 2011 as compensation for losing free agent Jon Garland. Kelly throws hard but his secondary pitches are in development.

# **Teams**

We've gotten a ton of data integrated into our system over the past few months, and during one of the imports, we hit a team code mismatch with the Tucson Padres that we didn't catch until the book had gone out without AAA statistics for the San Diego Padres organization. Here are all of the Tucson stats we have for 2011, which you can combine with the rest of the San Diego section of <u>Baseball Prospectus 2012</u> to properly enjoy what we, along with everyone else, <u>ranked as the best farm system in baseball this year</u>.

#### **2011 Tucson Hitters**

| PLAYER             | POS | AGE | PA  | R  | Н   | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | ВВ | S0  | SB | cs | AVG_OBP_SLG     | TAv  | BABIP | BRR  | FRAA | WARP |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|-----|----|----|-----------------|------|-------|------|------|------|
| Kyle Blanks        | 1B  | 24  | 152 | 36 | 47  | 12 | 2  | 11 | 35  | 16 | 37  | 0  | 1  | .351/.421/.716  | .416 | .414  | 0.5  | -1.8 | 1.2  |
| Everth Cabrera     | SS  | 24  | 278 | 52 | 73  | 12 | 4  | 2  | 15  | 29 | 40  | 29 | 8  | .297/.367/.402  | .271 | .346  | 2.6  | 6.0  | 1.6  |
| A lex C intron     | SS  | 32  | 66  | 9  | 21  | 4  | 1  | 1  | 6   | 5  | 9   | 0  | 0  | .350/.394/.500  | .262 | .392  | 0.1  | -0.4 | 0.2  |
| Matt Clark         | LF  | 24  | 535 | 71 | 135 | 24 | 1  | 23 | 83  | 58 | 116 | 0  | 2  | .292/.363/.498  | .264 | .333  | -2.0 | -3.4 | -0.4 |
| Anthony Contreras  | 2B  | 27  | 122 | 12 | 25  | 4  | 1  | 1  | 11  | 9  | 17  | 1  | 1  | .223/.279/.304  | .161 | .253  | -1.5 | -1.8 | -0.9 |
| Aaron Cunningham   | RF  | 25  | 384 | 65 | 112 | 34 | 4  | 9  | 63  | 38 | 54  | 4  | 4  | .329/.398/.532  | .264 | .368  | -0.7 | 1.0  | 0.3  |
| Rodney Daal        | PH  | 18  | 1   | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0  | 1   | 0  | 0  | .000/.000/.000  | .000 | .000  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| James Darnell      | 3B  | 24  | 155 | 20 | 35  | 4  | 0  | 6  | 17  | 16 | 30  | 0  | 0  | .261/.342/.425  | .254 | .290  | -1.3 | -3.0 | -0.3 |
| Chris Denorfia     | RF  | 30  | 20  | 0  | 2   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 3  | 4   | 0  | 0  | .118/.250/.176  | .170 | .154  | 0.2  | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| Luis Durango       | CF  | 25  | 207 | 36 | 43  | 3  | 3  | 0  | 15  | 19 | 31  | 10 | 5  | .243/.319/.294  | .212 | .293  | 0.7  | -1.9 | -0.5 |
| Pedro Feliz        | 3B  | 36  | 92  | 9  | 20  | 5  | 0  | 3  | 12  | 0  | 13  | 0  | 1  | .217/.217/.370  | .185 | .224  | -0.1 | -0.8 | -0.2 |
| Logan Forsythe     | 2B  | 24  | 218 | 41 | 58  | 12 | 0  | 8  | 34  | 33 | 50  | 8  | 4  | .326/.445/.528  | .347 | .413  | 8.0  | -1.9 | 1.3  |
| Rocky Gale         | С   | 23  | 12  | 1  | 3   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2   | 0  | 1   | 0  | 0  | .250/.250/.417  | 007  | .273  | -0.1 | 0.0  | -0.1 |
| Jesus Guzman       | 3B  | 27  | 286 | 40 | 81  | 22 | 1  | 8  | 57  | 34 | 42  | 4  | 4  | .332/.420/.529  | .324 | .374  | -2.2 | -0.9 | 0.9  |
| Jarrett Hoffpauir  | 2B  | 28  | 356 | 49 | 86  | 26 | 2  | 5  | 34  | 35 | 36  | 2  | 3  | .281/.354/.428  | .271 | .297  | 2.5  | -2.4 | 0.7  |
| Orlando Hudson     | 2B  | 33  | 7   | 4  | 3   | 2  | 0  | 0  | 1   | 3  | 0   | 0  | 0  | .750/.857/1.250 | .000 | .750  | 0.2  | -0.2 | 0.0  |
| Robbie Hudson      | 2B  | 27  | 51  | 2  | 11  | 3  | 1  | 0  | 7   | 1  | 6   | 0  | 0  | .224/.235/.327  | .089 | .256  | 0.1  | 2.0  | -0.2 |
| Nick Hundley       | С   | 27  | 13  | 3  | 3   | 2  | 0  | 1  | 5   | 2  | 2   | 0  | 0  | .273/.385/.727  | .000 | .250  | 0.2  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| Cedric Hunter      | CF  | 23  | 316 | 44 | 72  | 17 | 3  | 2  | 33  | 28 | 24  | 9  | 4  | .255/.320/.358  | .231 | .270  | 3.0  | 3.6  | 0.2  |
| Bobby Kielty       | RF  | 34  | 213 | 23 | 55  | 15 | 0  | 7  | 28  | 20 | 43  | 0  | 0  | .289/.357/.479  | .212 | .338  | -1.1 | 1.5  | -0.4 |
| Drew Macias        | CF  | 28  | 68  | 6  | 14  | 3  | 1  | 1  | 6   | 7  | 10  | 0  | 0  | .241/.338/.379  | .231 | .271  | -0.9 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Alberth Martinez   | CF  | 20  | 17  | 0  | 2   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0  | 7   | 0  | 0  | .118/.118/.118  | .000 | .200  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| Luis Martinez      | С   | 26  | 219 | 24 | 64  | 17 | 1  | 1  | 28  | 17 | 46  | 2  | 0  | .323/.379/.434  | .280 | .412  | 0.2  | 0.5  | 1.0  |
| Cameron Maybin     | CF  | 24  | 11  | 1  | 2   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1   | 1  | 2   | 1  | 0  | .200/.273/.300  | .000 | .250  | 0.4  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| Pat McKenna        | SS  | 24  | 66  | 10 | 14  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 5   | 7  | 25  | 1  | 0  | .250/.318/.375  | .261 | .406  | 0.3  | 2.9  | 0.4  |
| Andy Parrino       | SS  | 25  | 178 | 26 | 50  | 13 | 1  | 3  | 24  | 16 | 25  | 2  | 1  | .327/.399/.484  | .238 | .364  | 0.4  | 0.9  | 0.1  |
| Eric Patterson     | CF  | 28  | 203 | 31 | 48  | 12 | 4  | 3  | 14  | 9  | 29  | 3  | 3  | .253/.286/.405  | .175 | .281  | 0.8  | -1.4 | -0.6 |
| Danny Payne        | CF  | 25  | 7   | 1  | 2   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2   | 0  | 2   | 0  | 0  | .286/.286/.429  | .148 | .400  | 0.0  | 0.0  | -0.1 |
| Kyle Phillips      | С   | 27  | 104 | 9  | 17  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 9   | 8  | 10  | 0  | 0  | .179/.240/.263  | .167 | .179  | -1.1 | 0.0  | -0.5 |
| Jhonaldo Pozo      | -   | 22  | 0   | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0  | -               | .000 | .000  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| Guillermo Quiroz   | С   | 29  | 278 | 33 | 60  | 18 | 2  | 5  | 44  | 20 | 67  | 0  | 1  | .240/.295/.388  | .251 | .301  | -1.0 | -1.1 | 0.0  |
| Anthony Rizzo      | 1B  | 21  | 413 | 64 | 118 | 34 | 1  | 26 | 101 | 43 | 89  | 7  | 6  | .331/.404/.652  | .330 | .369  | 1.5  | 7.3  | 3.2  |
| Eddy Rodriguez     | С   | 25  | 21  | 3  | 3   | 0  | 0  | 1  | 3   | 2  | 5   | 0  | 0  | .158/.238/.316  | .602 | .154  | 0.5  | 0.3  | 0.3  |
| Ali Solis          | С   | 23  | 39  | 3  | 8   | 2  | 0  | 0  | 3   | 1  | 14  | 0  | 0  | .211/.231/.263  | .097 | .333  | 0.8  | -0.2 | 0.0  |
| Mykal Stokes       | CF  | 21  | 14  | 1  | 5   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 5   | 1  | 3   | 1  | 0  | .385/.429/.538  | .360 | .500  | 0.4  | 0.1  | 0.2  |
| Tyler Stubblefield | 3B  | 23  | 6   | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0  | 2   | 0  | 0  | .000/.000/.000  | .000 | .000  | 0.0  | 0.1  | 0.0  |
| Steve Tolleson     | 3B  | 27  | 348 | 48 | 86  | 21 | 2  | 4  | 36  | 29 | 56  | 16 | 3  | .276/.339/.394  | .246 | .322  | -1.4 | 1.3  | 0.2  |
| Will Venable       | RF  | 28  | 64  | 14 | 16  | 3  | 2  | 3  | 11  | 5  | 13  | 3  | 0  | .276/.328/.552  | .079 | .302  | 1.0  | -0.1 | -0.5 |

### **2011 Tucson Pitchers**

| PLAYER              | AGE | W | L | S٧ | G  | GS | ΙP    | Н   | HR | ВВ | S0  | EqBB9 | EqS09 | GB% | BABIP | WHIP | ERA   | FIP   | FRA   | WARP |
|---------------------|-----|---|---|----|----|----|-------|-----|----|----|-----|-------|-------|-----|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Anthony Bass        | 23  | 1 | 0 | 0  | 1  | 1  | 5.0   | 6   | 0  | 0  | 3   | 0.0   | 5.4   | 76% | .353  | 1.20 | 1.80  | 3.18  | 4.59  | 0.1  |
| Brad Brach          | 25  | 0 | 2 | 11 | 25 | 0  | 27.2  | 28  | 1  | 7  | 30  | 2.3   | 9.8   | 46% | .342  | 1.30 | 3.90  | 2.84  | 3.93  | 0.6  |
| Greg Burke          | 28  | 2 | 1 | 1  | 64 | 0  | 79.0  | 97  | 8  | 39 | 75  | 4.6   | 8.7   | 48% | .368  | 1.80 | 5.70  | 4.76  | 5.93  | -0.1 |
| Matt Buschmann      | 27  | 3 | 3 | 0  | 20 | 15 | 88.2  | 128 | 11 | 33 | 60  | 3.3   | 6.1   | 46% | .387  | 1.80 | 7.31  | 5.26  | 6.33  | -0.1 |
| Simon Castro        | 23  | 1 | 2 | 0  | 6  | 6  | 25.2  | 37  | 5  | 18 | 21  | 6.3   | 7.4   | 38% | .372  | 2.10 | 10.17 | 6.78  | 6.52  | -0.1 |
| Samuel Deduno       | 27  | 3 | 3 | 0  | 40 | 12 | 105.1 | 101 | 2  | 57 | 85  | 5.0   | 7.3   | 54% | .311  | 1.50 | 3.93  | 4.24  | 5.07  | 1.0  |
| Randy Flores        | 35  | 0 | 1 | 0  | 19 | 0  | 18.2  | 15  | 1  | 4  | 18  | 2.9   | 9.2   | 54% | .286  | 1.20 | 2.89  | 3.19  | 4.34  | 0.2  |
| Ernesto Frieri      | 25  | 1 | 0 | 0  | 4  | 0  | 3.1   | 3   | 0  | 2  | 5   | 5.4   | 13.5  | 25% | .375  | 1.50 | 2.70  | 2.58  | 3.26  | 0.1  |
| Josh Geer           | 28  | 1 | 0 | 0  | 2  | 2  | 9.0   | 17  | 1  | 2  | 7   | 2.0   | 7.0   | 47% | .457  | 2.10 | 8.00  | 4.34  | 5.77  | 0.1  |
| Luke Gregerson      | 27  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 2  | 0  | 1.1   | 3   | 0  | 2  | 2   | 13.5  | 13.5  | 60% | .600  | 3.80 | 20.25 | 5.28  | 7.04  | -0.1 |
| Erik Hamren         | 24  | 0 | 0 | 1  | 2  | 0  | 3.0   | 3   | 1  | 3  | 2   | 9.0   | 6.0   | 30% | .222  | 2.00 | 3.00  | 10.78 | 8.51  | 0.0  |
| Jeremy Hefner       | 25  | 4 | 4 | 0  | 28 | 28 | 157.1 | 177 | 20 | 61 | 120 | 3.5   | 6.9   | 43% | .316  | 1.50 | 4.98  | 5.13  | 5.59  | 1.0  |
| Pedro Hernandez     | 22  | 1 | 1 | 0  | 4  | 4  | 18.0  | 28  | 3  | 6  | 7   | 3.0   | 3.5   | 42% | .362  | 1.90 | 6.00  | 6.17  | 6.14  | 0.0  |
| Zachary Herr        | 24  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1.0   | 4   | 0  | 2  | 2   | 18.0  | 18.0  | 60% | .800  | 6.00 | 27.00 | 5.78  | 8.00  | 0.0  |
| C olt Hynes         | 26  | 2 | 1 | 0  | 22 | 0  | 26.1  | 35  | 1  | 9  | 12  | 3.1   | 4.1   | 60% | .374  | 1.70 | 5.47  | 4.62  | 6.18  | 0.0  |
| Will Inman          | 24  | 4 | 6 | 0  | 42 | 17 | 117.0 | 134 | 16 | 57 | 115 | 4.4   | 9.2   | 44% | .358  | 1.70 | 6.15  | 5.11  | 5.66  | 0.6  |
| Craig Italiano      | 24  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 4  | 0  | 4.0   | 8   | 1  | 5  | 6   | 11.2  | 13.5  | 50% | .538  | 3.20 | 20.25 | 7.78  | 10.68 | -0.2 |
| Wade LeBlanc        | 26  | 7 | 1 | 0  | 17 | 17 | 106.2 | 97  | 5  | 26 | 90  | 2.4   | 7.8   | 43% | .312  | 1.30 | 4.30  | 3.46  | 4.02  | 2.1  |
| Jon Leicester       | 32  | 1 | 6 | 0  | 27 | 25 | 135.2 | 166 | 21 | 63 | 66  | 4.2   | 4.4   | 42% | .315  | 1.70 | 6.50  | 6.30  | 6.62  | -0.7 |
| Scott Munter        | 31  | 2 | 2 | 0  | 37 | 0  | 46.0  | 54  | 3  | 29 | 40  | 6.1   | 8.2   | 57% | .370  | 1.90 | 7.04  | 4.78  | 5.57  | 0.2  |
| Rob Musgrave        | 25  | 1 | 0 | 0  | 9  | 9  | 44.2  | 46  | 3  | 21 | 31  | 4.2   | 6.2   | 44% | .307  | 1.50 | 5.44  | 4.81  | 5.81  | 0.2  |
| Pat Neshek          | 30  | 0 | 1 | 3  | 24 | 0  | 26.1  | 29  | 5  | 10 | 13  | 3.4   | 4.4   | 48% | .282  | 1.50 | 4.10  | 6.40  | 6.67  | -0.2 |
| Juan Oramas         | 21  | 0 | 1 | 0  | 1  | 1  | 3.2   | 7   | 3  | 1  | 4   | 2.5   | 9.8   | 29% | .364  | 2.20 | 14.73 | 13.87 | 11.07 | -0.1 |
| Stiven Osuna        | 24  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 4  | 0  | 10.1  | 10  | 2  | 11 | 7   | 9.6   | 6.1   | 27% | .258  | 2.00 | 9.58  | 8.14  | 8.38  | -0.2 |
| Luis Perdomo        | 27  | 0 | 7 | 10 | 65 | 0  | 71.2  | 85  | 6  | 44 | 51  | 5.8   | 6.4   | 54% | .335  | 1.80 | 5.40  | 5.46  | 6.18  | -0.2 |
| Aaron Poreda        | 24  | 2 | 2 | 0  | 41 | 1  | 69.2  | 65  | 3  | 62 | 78  | 8.1   | 10.2  | 57% | .333  | 1.80 | 5.43  | 4.90  | 6.58  | -0.3 |
| Jason Ray           | 26  | 0 | 1 | 0  | 6  | 0  | 6.1   | 9   | 1  | 3  | 7   | 4.3   | 9.9   | 50% | .421  | 1.90 | 8.53  | 5.04  | 7.59  | 0.0  |
| Evan Scribner       | 25  | 2 | 3 | 10 | 28 | 0  | 28.2  | 24  | 2  | 12 | 27  | 3.8   | 8.5   | 28% | .289  | 1.40 | 4.71  | 4.06  | 5.25  | 0.2  |
| Joe Thatcher        | 29  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 8  | 0  | 7.1   | 3   | 0  | 3  | 10  | 3.7   | 12.3  | 40% | .200  | 0.80 | 1.23  | 2.69  | 2.60  | 0.2  |
| John Van Benschoten | 31  | 1 | 3 | 0  | 5  | 5  | 26.1  | 37  | 3  | 9  | 14  | 3.1   | 4.8   | 40% | .354  | 1.70 | 7.52  | 5.34  | 6.19  | 0.0  |
| Mike Watt           | 22  | 0 | 1 | 0  | 1  | 1  | 5.0   | 6   | 1  | 0  | 3   | 0.0   | 5.4   | 41% | .312  | 1.20 | 3.60  | 5.18  | 5.04  | 0.1  |

# Managers

As usual, <u>Baseball Prospectus 2012</u> presented manager stats and writeups for each major league team. Due to an SQL issue, some of the historical data printed in the book was incorrect, so we're re-printing all of our manager profiles from the book with corrected stat lines. As a bonus, we're re-running managerial stats for **all** years (not just the last three) for each major league manager, and we're also including recent departures Terry Francona and Tony La Russa. Below each manager's career statistics, we're re-printing our manager comments from the last four editions of the annual, all the way back to <u>Baseball Prospectus 2009</u>, to give you a more complete picture of how the managers—and our appraisal of the managers—have changed over the years. The manager comments are from our records, rather than the books themselves, and minor edits might have been made between what you see here and what appeared in the books. We hope that this will be a useful reference for you long after the 2012 season is a memory.

| Ma   | nny | Acta   | a      |      |      | M    | gr | B   | / C | LE     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|--------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |        | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L    | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2007 | WAS | 73-89  | 4.2    | 88.0 | 28   | 0    | 60 | 3   | 589 | 459    | 44  | 291 | .198 | 5  | 10  | 2   | 0   | 1   | 93  | 73.1% | 30  | 0       | 249   | 92      |
| 2008 | WAS | 59-102 | -1.6   | 92.7 | 53   | 0    | 67 | 3   | 518 | 379    | 44  | 288 | .237 | 7  | 7   | 7   | 0   | 0   | 104 | 68.3% | 28  | 0       | 233   | 73      |
| 2009 | WAS | 26-61  | -6.9   | 93.1 | 21   | 0    | 34 | 2   | 281 | 190    | 26  | 145 | .215 | 2  | 5   | 2   | 0   | 1   | 48  | 68.8% | 10  | 0       | 195   | 65      |
| 2010 | CLE | 69-93  | 0.2    | 96.7 | 77   | 0    | 74 | 3   | 470 | 382    | 36  | 68  | .169 | 1  | 11  | 4   | 0   | 0   | 49  | 87.8% | 41  | 3       | 319   | 108     |
| 2011 | CLE | 80-82  | 5.2    | 95.6 | 65   | 0    | 85 | 10  | 482 | 388    | 34  | 65  | .211 | 1  | 9   | 6   | 0   | 1   | 43  | 86.0% | 32  | 1       | 313   | 96      |

**2012**: Manny Acta finished fourth in the Manager of the Year voting this year (behind three managers who helmed playoff teams), but it shouldn't be long before he's taking home the real hardware. Voters love a winning manager more than kids love cake, and if the youth-infused Indians make the transition into playoff contenders Acta will look as fine as angel food. Praised for his ability to inspire players and make the most of the talent he is given, Acta is also a very sound tactician and a manager who is extremely open to taking suggestions from advanced analytics. The most widespread crime among major league managers is overmanaging, whereas one of Acta's greatest strengths as a tactician is what he *doesn't* do: he doesn't overwork his pitching staff, he doesn't attempt many sacrifices, and he doesn't offer many free passes.

2011: You have to feel for Manny Acta, still having to slum it in the second division four years into his career. Still, better to reign in Cleveland than serve in Washington; the former is at least perceptibly building, while feckless ownership—the special curse of Washington teams—may doom the latter to perennial status as an also-ran. Acta is a quiet strategist; the only notable black ink on his record results from his having led two leagues in losses, making him a kind of Anti-Sparky Anderson. The major change in his tactics upon reaching Cleveland was an embrace of the hit and run, which had been largely absent in the District. What we don't know, and may never know, is if Acta will be more of an activist once he has better tools at his disposal, or if he will remain content to sit back and let 'em play.

2009: Of Casey Stengel's early managing days with literally bankrupt Dodgers and Braves teams, one contemporary observer said, "He reminded me of a guy who has made up his mind to force a pair of deuces to beat four aces, and can't stop trying." Acta's two years in Nationals harness have been a bit like that. He's an active, thinking manager who tries his best to gain an advantage using his roster. For the second year in a row, he was the major-league runner-up in pinch-hitter usage, and he ranked third in relievers used after ranking first in 2007 (though this last may reflect the problematic pitching staff as much as his own preference). However, as the quote above suggests, the most frantic manager can't get too far if he's making moves with weak parts—Stengel's deuces are Acta's Castos and Lo Ducas. The flipside of Acta's activism is that he knows when to stay out of the way, not investing in one-run strategies. He disdains the hit and run and rarely asks his non-pitchers to bunt. Asked in January by the *Washington Post* how he had spent his winter, one of his answers was reading. "Just getting smarter," Acta said. He's smart enough now to handle a proper roster should Jim Bowden ever get around to furnishing him with one. Unfortunately, at the end of last season, the Nationals canned all of Acta's coaches except for pitching coach Randy St. Claire. Among the new crew is three-time loser/likely interim manager in waiting Jim Riggleman. If the Nats continue to struggle,

Acta could quickly be gone. It happened to Stengel too. He eventually got the team his talents deserved; perhaps one day Acta will as well.

| Du   | sty l | Bake   | r      |       |      | M    | gr  | B   | <b>7</b> C | IN     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|------|------|-----|-----|------------|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |       |        | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |     |     |            | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM    | W-L    | +/-    | PC    | P    | P    | QS  | BQS | REL        | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1993 | SFN   | 103-59 | 3.0    | -     | -    | -    | 86  | 6   | 414        | 342    | 46  | 246 | .183 | 4  | 23  | 6   | 0   | 0   | 135 | 82.2% | 61  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1994 | SFN   | 55-60  | -3.0   | -     | -    | -    | 68  | 8   | 287        | 224    | 40  | 176 | .227 | 3  | 11  | 6   | 0   | 0   | 90  | 80.0% | 43  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1995 | SFN   | 67-77  | 7.4    | -     | -    | -    | 70  | 5   | 381        | 278    | 51  | 227 | .210 | 1  | 13  | 6   | 0   | 1   | 100 | 87.0% | 51  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1996 | SFN   | 68-94  | -2.0   | -     |      | -    | 69  | 18  | 425        | 314    | 60  | 247 | .205 | 6  | 10  | 5   | 0   | 1   | 106 | 81.1% | 50  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | SFN   | 90-72  | 9.9    | -     |      |      | 81  | 4   | 481        | 370    | 57  | 210 | .268 | 1  | 16  | 4   | 0   | 5   | 86  | 82.6% | 43  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | SFN   | 89-74  | -3.4   | 84.6  | 57   | 8    | 79  | 9   | 433        | 349    | 68  | 225 | .227 | 10 | 5   | 7   | 0   | 2   | 109 | 88.1% | 49  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | SFN   | 86-76  | 1.1    | 103.5 | 106  | 27   | 79  | 7   | 450        | 356    | 41  | 231 | .218 | 4  | 10  | 6   | 0   | 0   | 116 | 80.2% | 42  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2000 | SFN   | 97-65  | -1.1   | 102.3 | 94   | 26   | 88  | 9   | 384        | 292    | 26  | 231 | .231 | 7  | 7   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 84  | 92.9% | 29  | 0       | -     |         |
| 2001 | SFN   | 90-72  | 3.7    | 99.6  | 84   | 9    | 80  | 11  | 439        | 338    | 49  | 258 | .248 | 14 | 4   | 7   | 0   | 0   | 80  | 90.0% | 35  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | SFN   | 95-67  | -5.1   | 100.9 | 86   | 21   | 91  | 5   | 416        | 352    | 44  | 201 | .197 | 1  | 4   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 87  | 89.7% | 34  | 0       | -     |         |
| 2003 | CHN   | 88-74  | 2.3    | 103.5 | 101  | 25   | 100 | 5   | 420        | 335    | 36  | 236 | .155 | 2  | 7   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 105 | 80.0% | 46  | 0       | 239   | 77      |
| 2004 | CHN   | 89-73  | -5.7   | 98.9  | 81   | 12   | 95  | 5   | 461        | 364    | 33  | 254 | .236 | 4  | 2   | 4   | 0   | 0   | 117 | 75.2% | 46  | 0       | 238   | 80      |
| 2005 | CHN   | 79-83  | -0.7   | 97.5  | 78   | 10   | 91  | 4   | 457        | 353    | 48  | 240 | .195 | 2  | 5   | 3   | 0   | 2   | 97  | 74.2% | 45  | 2       | 302   | 104     |
| 2006 | CHN   | 66-96  | -2.7   | 91.8  | 56   | 7    | 60  | 4   | 542        | 423    | 44  | 270 | .216 | 5  | 13  | 5   | 1   | 3   | 120 | 84.2% | 73  | 3       | 361   | 117     |
| 2008 | CIN   | 74-88  | 3.3    | 97.8  | 80   | 3    | 78  | 2   | 507        | 379    | 40  | 282 | .231 | 5  | 17  | 6   | 0   | 2   | 115 | 73.9% | 45  | 4       | 317   | 103     |
| 2009 | CIN   | 78-84  | 2.8    | 98.5  | 87   | 1    | 79  | 3   | 478        | 385    | 36  | 251 | .227 | 4  | 15  | 4   | 1   | 1   | 133 | 85.7% | 60  | 3       | 322   | 98      |
| 2010 | CIN   | 91-71  | -1.5   | 97.8  | 81   | 4    | 89  | 5   | 501        | 408    | 32  | 256 | .236 | 10 | 14  | 5   | 0   | 2   | 100 | 75.0% | 34  | 3       | 322   | 99      |
| 2011 | CIN   | 79-83  | -3.7   | 95.5  | 67   | 2    | 90  | 7   | 502        | 398    | 47  | 240 | .286 | 8  | 12  | 6   | 0   | 1   | 110 | 78.2% | 39  | 2       | 377   | 131     |

2012: Dusty might get a "good fundamentals" rep, but he's a fairly passive tactician on offense, not especially bunt-crazy or prone to setting his baserunners loose on the league to do much more than eliminate the double play. He struggled to find a reliable top-of-the-order combination to bat in front of Joey Votto, but he didn't have any obvious choices to make, and if the job-sharing arrangements at shortstop and left field flopped, he got good mileage out of his catching combo. On the pitching side of the slate, whatever his past rep for overworking his starters, he didn't ask too much of his current crew, rating reliably mid-pack or lower in pitch counts, blown quality starts, and the like. Maybe that's the influence of pitching coach Bryan Price, and maybe he learned from what happened in Chicago. Either way, he turned the whip to the bullpen last year, as Reds relievers ranked among the most-used crew anywhere outside of Clint Hurdle's oft-flogged pen in Pittsburgh, which contributed to a couple of late-season meltdowns.

2011: Baker may never shed his reputation as a destroyer of arms, but while confirmation bias ensures that any hint of a long outing by one of his pitchers still elicits a knowing smirk or eye roll from fans with memories long enough to encompass his days in Chicago, the veteran manager did little to justify continued reprobation last season. While he didn't coddle his young arms, he didn't endanger them, either, coming in only moderately above average in the pitch count department. On the tactical side, Baker demonstrated an admirable unwillingness to indulge in the four-ball bonanzas that stir up sabermetricians, calling for the fewest free passes among full-season NL managers, or roughly the number that Joe Girardi handed out in the ALCS alone. Although the Reds' roster was deep enough to succeed despite any sub-optimal decisions on the margins, Baker's lineup choices occasionally took on a questionable tinge. The skipper evinced a baffling fondness for starting Jonny Gomes despite possessing superior left-field options, and although the absence of a base-unclogger on the level of Corey Patterson or Willy Taveras limited his ability to hamstring an otherwise-potent lineup, he proved unable to supply a happy ending to the Reds' long-running production of *Leadoff Idol*. Only the Nats' Nyjer Morgan-depressed performance elicited a mark worse than Cincinnati's .306 OBP from the leadoff spot, and while Baker's roster lacked a true top-of-the-lineup talent, his decision to bat Orlando Cabrera first or second on 110 occasions made the worst of a bad situation. To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, those who would give up essential on-base percentage to purchase a little temporary bat control deserve neither.

2010: Baker let his starter throw 120 pitches just three times last year, and the starters who went long were veterans Arroyo (123 pitches) and Harang (123 and 120). Still, it was alarming that, in Volquez, yet another promising young arm went under the knife for major surgery on Baker's watch. Cueto survived another season, but not without a shoulder-related DL stay, which, in combination with his manager should be a red flag for 2010. If there's one thing Baker seems to love more than sending young pitchers to the DL, it's maximizing his lineup's potential for making outs; following the Corey Patterson experience with Willy Taveras shows a failure to learn. Worse, Baker batted Taveras leadoff 81 times, sabotaging his lineup. Baker's most frequent number-two hitter was Jerry Hairston Jr. (.305 OBP); once Hairston was in the Bronx and Drew Stubbs

pushed Taveras out of the lineup, Baker started batting the Belanger-ish Paul Janish second. True, the Reds didn't have many strong on-base options last year, but Baker repeatedly picked the worst of a weak group for the top of the order. Stubbs seems to have secured the leadoff spot for the coming season, but we're not about to see Baker batting base-cloggers Scott Rolen or Ryan Hanigan second despite relatively high OBPs. If there's one thing to credit Baker with, it was using Micah Owings as a pinch-hitter, but just 16 times seems like another half-step in the right direction.

2009: In contrast to earlier managerial stints, last season Dusty Baker largely let his young charges play—and in the case of Jay Bruce, struggle—without resorting to veteran substitutes. The main exception was outfielder Corey Patterson, who was rumored to be dating Baker's daughter at the same time the skipper was regularly writing the fellow former Cub's non-hitting name into the lineup. Baker was incensed over the Patterson rumor, but the idea of a manager not only *choosing* rely on an out machine like Patterson, but batting him *leadoff* impugned Baker's judgment to such an extreme degree that a more nefarious explanation seemed to be required. "Why not Joey Votto? Why not Jay Bruce or Edwin Encarnacion? They're single," Baker asked in September, suggesting that he could not distinguish among productive players, players with potential to be productive, and Corey Patterson. At least nepotism would have been a face-saving answer. Baker's management of a young pitching staff was somewhat restrained compared to his infamous work with the Cubs. Baker's judgment was called into question when he used his top two starters in an extra inning game in May, after which Aaron Harang was ineffective, and later injured; while the Reds did finish with the fourth-highest age-adjusted pitcher workload (per the Pitcher Abuse Points system) that workload was a mere fraction of what he put on the ill-fated Cubs rotation in 2003. Whether this is an indication of a lesson learned, or just the manager not going to the crop once he saw the race was lost is open to interpretation.

| Bu   | d BI | ack   |        |      |      | M    | gr | i i | SI  | ON     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2007 | SDN  | 89-74 | -1.2   | 90.0 | 47   | 0    | 90 | 4   | 485 | 404    | 48  | 272 | .188 | 3  | 5   | 7   | 0   | 1   | 93  | 78.5% | 36  | 1       | 246   | 90      |
| 2008 | SDN  | 63-99 | -3.4   | 90.9 | 49   | 3    | 76 | 4   | 490 | 348    | 61  | 285 | .198 | 3  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 76  | 78.9% | 19  | 0       | 226   | 93      |
| 2009 | SDN  | 75-87 | 9.0    | 91.0 | 46   | 1    | 77 | 3   | 528 | 412    | 58  | 263 | .248 | 9  | 10  | 5   | 0   | 1   | 111 | 77.5% | 48  | 1       | 296   | 90      |
| 2010 | SDN  | 90-72 | -1.9   | 94.8 | 54   | 0    | 87 | 2   | 499 | 431    | 51  | 278 | .206 | 9  | 10  | 1   | 0   | 2   | 111 | 80.2% | 54  | 1       | 359   | 97      |
| 2011 | SDN  | 71-91 | -7.6   | 96.7 | 65   | 1    | 91 | 4   | 489 | 416    | 56  | 283 | .160 | 2  | 21  | 2   | 2   | 0   | 86  | 72.1% | 30  | 4       | 391   | 88      |

2012: Bud Black is a methodical, process-oriented manager who will not be rushed in anything. Black attended San Diego State and understands the Southern California culture. His laid-back personality makes him a natural fit for the Padres. One of Black's strengths is his ability to listen and discuss. Watching him "argue" with umpires is fascinating. There are no histrionics; he just strolls out of the dugout and chats with them, as one might chat with old friends over tea and miniature cucumber sandwiches. He shows similar patience working with young players, whether it be sticking with Kevin Kouzmanoff through his early-season struggles in 2007 or giving Cameron Maybin a full complement of plate appearances despite periodic slumps. Black even kept running Anthony Rizzo out to first base long after it had become evident that more minor-league seasoning was needed, which is a downside of such patience. As a former pitching coach, Black is attuned to the needs of his moundsmen and tends to have a quick hook with his starters. Like most managers of his era, Black's usage of relievers borders on mechanical and he seldom deviates from the established order of things. Pitchers are given a defined role and left there, although he has adopted the Earl Weaver strategy of breaking in young arms out of the bullpen, with Tim Stauffer, Cory Luebke, and Anthony Bass being three recent examples. Black's lineup construction sometimes lacks imagination; then again, with the options at his disposal in 2011, all the imagination in the world wouldn't have helped.

2011: Black won National League Manager of the Year honors by virtue of overseeing the club whose prospects for success had been most underrated in the spring, but part of the reason for the Padres' surprising performance was his steady hand at the helm. Black employed a more aggressive approach on the bases last season, and the Friars finished second in the NL in steals after an eighth-place showing in 2009. Ensconced in Petco's low run environment, the Padres could afford to take more chances on the basepaths, which made his more frequent green lights a welcome development. Black drew upon the team's bench depth in both the infield and outfield, using more subs than he ever had previously despite wielding a more talented roster. His bullpen management was also noteworthy: not a single Padres starter reached the 120-pitch threshold, thanks to his willingness to trust a deep and talented collection of relievers in order to avoid unnecessarily taxing his young rotation. Continuing to play the injured Scott Hairston when he had superior outfield options at his disposal was a problem, but that was the lone blemish on an otherwise strong season of skippering.

**2010**: The one current skipper who's a former pitcher, Black is one of only three men to win at least 100 career games and manage in the major leagues over the last 40 years, joining Roger Craig and Larry Dierker. The Padres began a full-bore youth

movement last season, when they used 24 rookies, and Black has the perfect temperament to oversee a young team. Some veteran players tried to push Black as a rookie manager in 2007 by calling him by his given name of Harry; he politely but firmly put an end to that. In terms of game tactics, he bunts a little more than most, but between the talent on hand and the park, it's not extraordinary, but their success rate wasn't good. As a matter of happy outcomes, Black's pinch-hitters tied for the MLB lead in pinch-hit homers, but he also ranked among the pass-happy six in issuing the most intentional walks, ranking behind Joe Torre, Jerry Manuel, Ken Macha, Fredi Gonzalez. He'd tinker with his batting orders, but not so much with who started where. Black was not affected by the Padres' change of ownership from John Moores to Jeff Moorad last spring, as Moorad quickly became a big fan and extended Black's contract through this season while also adding a club option for 2011.

2009: The list of ex-pitchers who have been highly successful as managers is largely limited to Tommy Lasorda, so Black already had history against him before he had even begun to cope with the Padres roster. A deluge of injuries didn't give him much of a chance, as the team's lack of depth gave him few options. On offense, his major accomplishment was constructing a center field platoon of Gerut and Hairston that batted .304/.354/.547 after Jim Edmonds flunked out. The pitching staff, which ran through 32 arms, was more a case of day-to-day patching than an opportunity for a once well-regarded pitching coach to show his stuff. As a tactician, Black stays away from one-run strategies. Recognizing his team's lack of speed, Black didn't ask his club to run, despite which the team was better on the bases (10th in the majors in EQBRR) than many teams with faster legs. Black remains uninterested in one-run strategies and the rare times a position player sees a bunt sign, they probably look cross-eyed at the first base coach thinking someone made a mistake. Black has ability, but as he's going into the last year of his contract there have been the inevitable rumblings. If the Padres do him the favor of setting him free, a club with greater potential could do worse than giving Black a chance.

| Bru  | ıce | Boch  | ıy     |      |      | M    | gr  | B   | S   | N      |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|-------|--------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |     |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS  | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1995 | SDN | 70-74 | -1.6   | -    | -    | -    | 73  | 6   | 337 | 234    | 37  | 252 | .243 | 10 | 27  | 5   | 1   | 1   | 73  | 83.6% | 23  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1996 | SDN | 91-71 | 0.1    | -    | -    | -    | 80  | 8   | 411 | 335    | 47  | 280 | .227 | 4  | 22  | 12  | 0   | 1   | 74  | 82.4% | 19  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | SDN | 76-86 | 4.2    | -    | -    | -    | 67  | 9   | 426 | 294    | 37  | 287 | .247 | 7  | 22  | 7   | 1   | 3   | 82  | 79.3% | 24  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | SDN | 98-64 | 3.7    | 90.0 | 59   | 9    | 99  | 5   | 369 | 309    | 45  | 272 | .177 | 2  | 12  | 2   | 1   | 2   | 78  | 82.1% | 25  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | SDN | 74-88 | 0.7    | 95.8 | 67   | 5    | 81  | 5   | 402 | 304    | 48  | 289 | .204 | 7  | 28  | 9   | 5   | 2   | 63  | 71.4% | 16  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2000 | SDN | 76-86 | 1.5    | 98.5 | 78   | 16   | 75  | 7   | 443 | 334    | 50  | 275 | .225 | 7  | 10  | 3   | 2   | 2   | 52  | 84.6% | 21  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2001 | SDN | 79-83 | 0.3    | 93.8 | 61   | 5    | 77  | 7   | 422 | 322    | 54  | 250 | .227 | 2  | 18  | 3   | 0   | 6   | 43  | 83.7% | 13  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | SDN | 66-96 | 1.6    | 91.5 | 47   | 2    | 74  | 5   | 459 | 355    | 61  | 235 | .190 | 6  | 11  | 3   | 1   | 1   | 57  | 87.7% | 27  | 1       | -     |         |
| 2003 | SDN | 64-98 | -0.7   | 93.6 | 67   | 2    | 74  | 3   | 473 | 339    | 52  | 288 | .222 | 4  | 10  | 2   | 0   | 1   | 85  | 64.7% | 26  | 1       | 251   | 73      |
| 2004 | SDN | 87-75 | -0.9   | 92.2 | 43   | 2    | 79  | 5   | 437 | 342    | 39  | 248 | .204 | 5  | 7   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 86  | 73.3% | 30  | 0       | 251   | 90      |
| 2005 | SDN | 82-80 | 5.8    | 94.3 | 59   | 2    | 78  | 5   | 456 | 367    | 45  | 271 | .211 | 4  | 4   | 6   | 1   | 2   | 108 | 77.8% | 47  | 0       | 316   | 118     |
| 2006 | SDN | 88-74 | 1.0    | 95.7 | 64   | 5    | 90  | 8   | 475 | 376    | 63  | 258 | .260 | 8  | 12  | 4   | 0   | 1   | 86  | 73.3% | 23  | 0       | 358   | 114     |
| 2007 | SFN | 71-91 | -5.7   | 98.7 | 78   | 8    | 86  | 3   | 497 | 380    | 41  | 261 | .268 | 5  | 13  | 2   | 0   | 2   | 96  | 78.1% | 38  | 3       | 361   | 115     |
| 2008 | SFN | 72-90 | 4.7    | 99.7 | 90   | 8    | 86  | 7   | 479 | 366    | 59  | 273 | .239 | 3  | 6   | 1   | 3   | 4   | 91  | 75.8% | 36  | 3       | 367   | 132     |
| 2009 | SFN | 88-74 | 1.1    | 97.4 | 74   | 5    | 84  | 4   | 457 | 370    | 49  | 230 | .251 | 2  | 8   | 0   | 1   | 1   | 97  | 78.4% | 27  | 0       | 302   | 99      |
| 2010 | SFN | 92-70 | -3.3   | 99.4 | 77   | 7    | 95  | 4   | 476 | 402    | 58  | 219 | .262 | 6  | 6   | 3   | 0   | 1   | 106 | 77.4% | 29  | 0       | 264   | 85      |
| 2011 | SFN | 86-76 | 6.1    | 99.8 | 90   | 7    | 103 | 3   | 480 | 411    | 46  | 244 | .212 | 4  | 7   | 6   | 2   | 3   | 86  | 79.1% | 35  | 2       | 395   | 118     |

2012: The most important thing a manager can do is make sure his players' shirts are tucked in when he takes them to meet the president. Bruce Bochy totally did that, because Bochy is a World Series-winning manager. The next most important thing a manager can do is hard to say. If it's avoiding outs by resisting the urge to smallball every strategy, Bochy did pretty well—his Giants were below the league average in sacrifice bunts, after going bunt crazy in 2010. If it's managing a bullpen, Bochy did pretty well. He got the best work of Ramon Ramirez and Santiago Casilla's careers, and when his first two choices to close were injured in August and September, his Giants still had calm ninhi ninings. He didn't do perfectly, too often leaving Javier Lopez in to face righties and pulling Sergio Romo at the threat of a lefty, but pretty well. If it's finding the right balance between youth and veterans, Bochy continues to struggle, most notably in the case of Aubrey Huff vs. Brandon Belt. Huff showed up to camp out of shape, Bochy said later. He slugged .335 through the first two months and never did have an OPS over .800 in any month. Yet Bochy, with a credible prospect as leverage, never did give up on Huff, who led the team in games played by 29. Belt, meanwhile, was called up in July and started just half the Giants' games until the final week of the season. But veterans have served Bochy well in his career, and it's unlikely one bad experience at first base will change him now.

**2011**: Bochy did a bravura job in coaxing the Giants to their first West Coast championship. Yes, the pitching staff made half of his job easy and allowed him to devote a larger portion of his copious cranium to sorting out his makeshift offense, but even

there he impressed. The Giants blew just five quality starts all season and led the majors in save percentage, thanks in part to Bochy's willingness to turn to his closer for more than three outs, doing so more than any other manager in the majors last year. The skipper succeeded in extracting the maximum safe mileage from his rotation and relief horses, aware that he lacked attractive mounts in the back end of the pen. Only two Giants made 100 or more starts at a given position in 2010 as Bochy and Sabean mixed and matched, and one of those two, Pablo Sandoval, effectively lost his job in September. Bochy didn't allow his decisions to be dictated by contracts, benching Aaron Rowand in favor of Andres Torres and leaving Barry Zito not just out of the post-season rotation (an obvious call), but off the roster entirely. He also made regular use of defensive substitutions as per the Pat Burrell comment earlier in this chapter. The end result was his first World Series win and a deserved third-place finish in the NL Manager of the Year voting, more than three decades after his major-league debut.

2010: As a skipper, Bochy's lack of extremes proved commendable, particular on offense, where beyond a moderate interest with the hit-and-run, he avoided making matters worse with too much in the way of one-run gambits. Instead, he played the hand he was dealt, mixing and matching and substituting in the lineup with a frequency only exceeded by Tony La Russa. This was a tactical response to his roster, but also a symptom of a shortage of enough everyday regulars to rely on. As far as starting pitcher workloads, the freakout of '08 over Lineccum's load seems to have blown over, and was perhaps more a symptom of the increasing lack of pitcher-abuse cases to freak out over these days. Bochy's a little more fond than most of the intentional walk, but in an era where bullpen management is probably the one place where managers can express some individuality, the results he achieved with an odd assortment of talent produced a much improved pen.

2009: Bruce Bochy couldn't have done anything to make the 2008 Giants something more than a last-place team, though it's troubling that he abused the only asset he had, his best young pitchers. Under Bochy, the Giants led the majors in pitching starts lasting 100, 110, and 120 or more pitches and finished second only to the Mets in average pitches per start. Of the eight Giants starts that lasted more than 120 pitches, five of them were by 24-year-old franchise arm Tim Lincecum. Two of the other three were by 23-year-old Matt Cain. If the Giants have any hope for the future, it's riding on those two arms, making those long outings about the worst thing Bochy could have done in 2008. The only other particularly notable thing about Bochy's management in 2008 was that his team ranked second to Lou Piniella's Cubs in swings with the runners in motion, our stat that approximates hit-and-run plays. The hit-and-run, while effective at reducing double plays, also reduces batting average and slugging percentage by forcing the hitter to swing at a potentially bad pitch and try to avoid hitting it in the air. That makes it a play that reduces both risk and reward, not terribly unlike the sacrifice bunt, a strategy Bochy was far less inclined to employ. Such strategies make little sense for a high-scoring team loaded with power hitters like the Cubs, but aren't a bad way for a team with strong starting pitching that's far less likely to be rewarded by letting its hitters swing away to try to scratch out the extra run or two that could cash in a strong performance by one of those young starters. Intriguingly, the tactic worked well for the Cubs, but the Giants were one of the teams in baseball most likely to bounce into a twin-killing, suggesting that there's no avoiding the damage done by weak hitters.

| Ter  | ry C | ollin | S      |      |      | M    | gr | E.  | / N | /N     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1994 | HOU  | 66-49 | -1.7   | -    | -    | -    | 64 | 6   | 268 | 218    | 34  | 185 | .270 | 6  | 18  | 2   | 0   | 1   | 92  | 85.9% | 38  | 4       | -     | -       |
| 1995 | HOU  | 76-68 | -3.4   | -    | -    | -    | 80 | 4   | 394 | 299    | 52  | 299 | .294 | 9  | 26  | 13  | 0   | 3   | 90  | 94.4% | 41  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1996 | HOU  | 82-80 | 5.1    | -    | -    | -    | 84 | 11  | 370 | 254    | 60  | 248 | .192 | 6  | 38  | 9   | 0   | 0   | 95  | 80.0% | 27  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | ANA  | 84-78 | -0.5   | -    | -    | -    | 76 | 8   | 400 | 309    | 34  | 66  | .207 | 0  | 16  | 7   | 1   | 1   | 57  | 84.2% | 47  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | ANA  | 85-77 | 3.6    | 93.1 | 79   | 24   | 77 | 8   | 415 | 333    | 23  | 89  | .179 | 0  | 9   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 72  | 84.7% | 58  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 2011 | NYN  | 77-85 | -1.3   | 95.7 | 63   | 6    | 84 | 7   | 514 | 398    | 48  | 306 | .203 | 8  | 16  | 4   | 1   | 0   | 102 | 72.5% | 35  | 2       | 347   | 114     |

2012: Collins served a nearly decade-long sentence for his previous stints as a manager, or rather mis-manager, in the 1990s, with his late-decade Angels tenure ending with a team revolt. Always a good baseball mind but more than a little bit intense, Collins stayed in baseball, working in the minor-league system of the Dodgers, managing in Japan, leading the China national team in the 2009 World Baseball Classic, and even taking an independent-league stint. What we've seen over the last two years is a kinder, gentler Collins. He's still tense, but hardly a hothead, and players seem to genuinely like playing for him. Back-to-back 77-win seasons don't look so bad considering the cards he's been dealt in terms of talent and injuries, and his option to manage the team in 2013 has already been picked up. Lessons are learned, and people can change.

| Joh  | ın F | arrel | I      |      |      | M    | gr | B   | / TC | OR     |     |    |     |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|------|--------|-----|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |      | REL w  |     |    | PH  | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL  | Zero R | IBB | PH | Avg | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2011 | TOR  | 81-81 | 19     | 97 7 | 81   | 4    | 81 | 3   | 474  | 383    | 28  | 58 | 185 | 0  | 32  | 6   | 1   | 3   | 54  | 81.5% | 44  | 2       | 372   | 103     |

2012: John Farrell gets it. Perhaps because of his five-year stint as Director of Player Development with the Indians under Mark Shapiro, or his time as the pitching coach of the Boston Red Sox, Farrell issued the third fewest intentional walks and called for the fourth fewest sacrifices in the American League in 2011. In an interview at the Winter Meetings this offseason, when asked about newly acquired closer Sergio Santos, Farrell repeatedly emphasized his strikeout rates and downplayed his relative inexperience. Farrell understands so well how to implement a complex analytic plan for a team that when the Red Sox asked the Blue Jays for permission to interview Farrell for their vacant manager job, the Blue Jays reportedly demanded Clay Buchholz in return. The only real knock on him is his relative lack of managing experience, but that's the kind of deficiency that time is uniquely qualified to remedy. He finessed a rough and injured bullpen until they cohered into a solid unit, balancing closers Frank Francisco and Jon Rauch and deploying other late inning options like Marc Rzepczynski (before his departure) and Jason Frasor so they had their best possible seasons. His use of his bench accurately reflected the fact that, for most of the season, the bench wasn't very good. If given the right weapons, John Farrell will use them judiciously, and that's all a team can ask for.

| Ter  | ry F | ranc  | ona           |           |           | M         | gr | ×   | NC  | N               |     |     |           |          |     |     |     |     |            |          |            |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|----------|------------|---------|-------|---------|
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | Pythag<br>+/- | Avg<br>PC | 100+<br>P | 120+<br>P | QS | BQS | REL | REL w<br>Zero R | IBB | PH  | PH<br>Avg | PH<br>HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | SAC<br>Att | Sac<br>% | POS<br>SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1997 | PHI  | 68-94 | 5.2           | -         | -         | -         | 80 | 5   | 409 | 285             | 42  | 285 | .184      | 3        | 11  | 6   | 2   | 2   | 98         | 87.8%    | 38         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | PHI  | 75-87 | 4.1           | 95.8      | 74        | 20        | 77 | 9   | 386 | 273             | 27  | 255 | .232      | 5        | 10  | 4   | 0   | 0   | 86         | 80.2%    | 31         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | PHI  | 77-85 | -3.5          | 96.9      | 79        | 14        | 73 | 10  | 441 | 333             | 24  | 237 | .255      | 5        | 12  | 2   | 0   | 1   | 82         | 90.2%    | 26         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2000 | PHI  | 65-97 | -3.2          | 102.6     | 106       | 23        | 87 | 10  | 413 | 273             | 32  | 271 | .197      | 2        | 11  | 3   | 0   | 2   | 86         | 87.2%    | 33         | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2004 | BOS  | 98-64 | 0.1           | 98.9      | 88        | 3         | 86 | 9   | 437 | 335             | 28  | 99  | .264      | 2        | 4   | 2   | 0   | 1   | 24         | 66.7%    | 14         | 0       | 263   | 78      |
| 2005 | BOS  | 95-67 | 4.1           | 99.6      | 93        | 3         | 81 | 6   | 442 | 337             | 28  | 98  | .221      | 1        | 3   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 25         | 80.0%    | 18         | 0       | 252   | 98      |
| 2006 | BOS  | 86-76 | 5.5           | 95.3      | 63        | 2         | 70 | 7   | 455 | 332             | 25  | 87  | .222      | 0        | 5   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 38         | 68.4%    | 26         | 0       | 273   | 106     |
| 2007 | BOS  | 96-66 | -6.9          | 97.6      | 66        | 3         | 84 | 10  | 451 | 379             | 20  | 73  | .217      | 0        | 13  | 4   | 0   | 0   | 52         | 76.9%    | 40         | 2       | 333   | 100     |
| 2008 | BOS  | 95-67 | -1.7          | 95.9      | 69        | 1         | 82 | 9   | 466 | 359             | 17  | 49  | .250      | 2        | 21  | 2   | 0   | 1   | 47         | 87.2%    | 40         | 0       | 310   | 90      |
| 2009 | BOS  | 95-67 | 0.4           | 99.0      | 81        | 3         | 82 | 3   | 463 | 369             | 24  | 79  | .221      | 0        | 19  | 4   | 1   | 0   | 32         | 84.4%    | 25         | 0       | 309   | 97      |
| 2010 | BOS  | 89-73 | 0.3           | 102.8     | 112       | 3         | 89 | 5   | 443 | 348             | 30  | 117 | .260      | 2        | 11  | 2   | 1   | 1   | 38         | 86.8%    | 28         | 0       | 340   | 108     |
| 2011 | BOS  | 90-72 | -4.8          | 96.8      | 78        | 4         | 71 | 5   | 443 | 359             | 11  | 83  | .176      | 2        | 9   | 1   | 0   | 1   | 33         | 72.7%    | 24         | 0       | 366   | 122     |

2012: Whereas during the injury-plagued 2010 season it was difficult to find fault with much that Terry Francona did, 2011 had its moments. There was his refusal to use Dan Wheeler in higher leverage situations, even when the bullpen was thinning out. The obvious and constant push to earn Tim Wakefield career win 200 over the summer—even when it was clear holding the lead should be left to... well... pitchers like Wheeler—was a source of agony. Francona's strength was never in-game decisions, but in his ability to run an often tumultuous clubhouse. By his own admission that was becoming too difficult, even without Manny Ramirez around. Hence the divorce of Francona and the Red Sox and the hiring of Bobby Valentine. Valentine has a background as a stats-oriented manager, and from an era when Sox fans still felt cursed, even. Valentine is always willing to try out new things if the result could be more winning baseball; when those nuggets of learning are presented by a front office as statistically-inclined as Boston's, it's easy to see why his introductory press conference caused a collective swoon for even Red Sox Nation's toughest critics. Valentine might one day outstay his welcome—as every manager does—but for now, the Red Sox likely found the best man for the job.

2011: Francona's strength is his ability to stay engaged as a manager without simultaneously disrupting his players' performance. Boston's injury tsunami placed unaccustomed demands on the Red Sox skipper, and Francona found himself playing offensive and defensive matchups more often than he'd had to in the past; an elevated substitutions total reveals that he didn't stop pulling strings once the games had begun. A Sox club that should have been devastated by injuries won 89 games thanks to Francona's willingness to utilize a large number of players he had never seen outside of spring training—not that his depleted roster left him much of a choice—and though there were situations in which he should have stuck with Darnell McDonald over Daniel Nava, or let Jed Lowrie pick up more at-bats rather than give them to Yamaico Navarro, it's hard to find a fault worth getting worked up over. There isn't a manager in today's game—or history—that could have made Boston's bullpen any more effective than it was, though he could have eased up on the Daniel Bard pedal a little earlier than he did.

2010: Francona is as inoffensive as managers come. He doesn't impose his will on the game, generally letting his players play to their strengths, but he isn't asleep at the wheel either. He has had a great run of success for a franchise desperate for such a stretch and is always respectful of both his players and his opponents, putting himself almost beyond reproach. The back half of his rotation collapsed on him last year, but he still eked out the team's usual allotment of quality starts, let his better starters go longer into games than in recent years without abusing them, and still managed to greatly reduce his staff's number of blown quality starts and keep his bullpen's workload at the same level as 2008, almost to the inning. Burdened with a brutal team defense, he didn't overreact by making constant defensive replacements, preferring instead to keep his best bats in close games rather than make the modest defensive upgrades his bench would allow. As we noted last year, his only real weakness seems to be a soft spot for Jason Varitek; Tek made 28 starts after the acquisition of Victor Martinez despite hitting .134/.220/.216 in those games. Those starts came largely at the expense of Mike Lowell (via Martinez moving to first base and Youkilis moving to third), who hit .280/.344/.455 over the same span. Having picked up his player option, Varitek is supposed to be a bench player this year, but one wonders if a small hot streak by the captain might convince Francona to increase his playing time against the skipper's better judgment.

2009: The idea that Tito is the most successful manager in Red Sox history continues to build up a head of steam. He handled the bullpen very well, considering it lacked depth, but the poorer pitchers were used in the lowest of low-leverage situations, while his better relievers were utilized to good effect, and he's not afraid to have former starters like Papelbon or Masterson work longer than most manager lean on their key relievers. As far as offensive tactics, Francona's sabermetrically sensible, not bunting much or getting too cute; the three speedsters (Ellsbury, Crisp, and Lugo) get the green light, along with Pedroia, but everyone else sits still. If there's a cause for complaint, it's that Varitek was not lifted for a pinch-hitter once during the regular season, although he was pulled three times in October. This will may not be an issue in 2009 (depending on where Tek winds up), but it points to Francona's over-committed loyalty to certain players. Given the weight of the pros versus that single con, it's difficult to complain about his performance, let alone the results.

| Ro   | n Ga | ardei | nhire         |           |           | M         | gr | F.  | M   | IN              |     |     |           |          |     |     |     |     |            |          |            |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|----------|------------|---------|-------|---------|
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | Pythag<br>+/- | Avg<br>PC | 100+<br>P | 120+<br>P | QS | BQS | REL | REL w<br>Zero R | IBB | PH  | PH<br>Avg | PH<br>HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | SAC<br>Att | Sac<br>% | POS<br>SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2002 | MIN  | 94-67 | 7.4           | 90.1      | 47        | 3         | 77 | 2   | 436 | 352             | 24  | 103 | .283      | 3        | 12  | 12  | 1   | 0   | 45         | 95.6%    | 42         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2003 | MIN  | 90-72 | 4.5           | 92.2      | 54        | 2         | 80 | 7   | 399 | 311             | 35  | 102 | .318      | 5        | 15  | 7   | 0   | 2   | 67         | 74.6%    | 45         | 1       | 275   | 82      |
| 2004 | MIN  | 92-70 | 4.0           | 93.8      | 61        | 1         | 83 | 7   | 436 | 333             | 27  | 112 | .269      | 6        | 19  | 6   | 0   | 1   | 73         | 76.7%    | 54         | 1       | 335   | 108     |
| 2005 | MIN  | 83-79 | -1.1          | 91.9      | 43        | 0         | 90 | 10  | 396 | 312             | 38  | 92  | .300      | 2        | 17  | 4   | 0   | 1   | 67         | 82.1%    | 53         | 1       | 352   | 116     |
| 2006 | MIN  | 96-66 | 2.2           | 90.1      | 42        | 0         | 73 | 4   | 421 | 343             | 25  | 77  | .145      | 1        | 13  | 6   | 0   | 0   | 55         | 78.2%    | 40         | 0       | 369   | 146     |
| 2007 | MIN  | 79-83 | -1.2          | 93.5      | 46        | 0         | 80 | 3   | 438 | 352             | 33  | 82  | .253      | 1        | 18  | 1   | 0   | 0   | 52         | 80.8%    | 37         | 1       | 362   | 133     |
| 2008 | MIN  | 88-75 | -2.2          | 91.7      | 47        | 1         | 86 | 4   | 485 | 379             | 38  | 80  | .224      | 3        | 16  | 5   | 0   | 0   | 88         | 88.6%    | 73         | 3       | 340   | 117     |
| 2009 | MIN  | 87-76 | 0.1           | 92.0      | 56        | 1         | 79 | 6   | 480 | 372             | 20  | 73  | .333      | 4        | 11  | 2   | 0   | 2   | 77         | 79.2%    | 56         | 1       | 368   | 127     |
| 2010 | MIN  | 94-68 | 0.8           | 93.5      | 56        | 1         | 86 | 6   | 465 | 377             | 19  | 75  | .156      | 2        | 8   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 50         | 86.0%    | 38         | 1       | 272   | 101     |
| 2011 | MIN  | 63-99 | 2.7           | 95.2      | 66        | 2         | 80 | 9   | 457 | 340             | 37  | 87  | .175      | 0        | 6   | 4   | 0   | 2   | 52         | 86.5%    | 45         | 1       | 361   | 135     |

2012: In his first nine seasons on the job, Gardy finished below .500 just once, had finished as low as third only twice, and had missed the playoffs a mere three times, an impressive run that may have owed more to the team's player development system—as well as the Johan Santana Rule 5 pick and the A.J. Pierzynski haul—than to his managerial acumen. For better or worse, he had never managed his way through a season where his team was buried so early, or dealt with so many catastrophic injuries. Though the team was hamstrung by bad planning (particularly regarding the rotation) and didn't have much effective help to offer from the minors, Gardenhire didn't cover himself in glory, either. While the Twins showed some life in June and July, going 33-22 after a 17-36 start, they limped home 13-41 over the final two months, 8 1/2 games worse than any other AL team, which didn't reflect well on Gardenhire's ability to keep his team motivated during bad times. (Compare: with a slightly worse record through July and plenty of structural problems with his own roster, Don Mattingly oversaw the Dodgers rallying to a . 500+ finish.) As usual, Gardenhire was one of the game's most cautious managers in terms of starter pitch counts. After curbing his reliance upon smallball tactics at least somewhat in 2010—curious timing given the team's move to the lower-scoring environment Target Field—he went back to using the hit-and-run far more often than the average AL team. He did lay off the sacrifice bunting a bit, which is appropriate given how often the Twins fell behind. He has two years remaining on his contract. Even as strong as his track record has been, another subpar season could put him on the hot seat.

**2011**: Ron Gardenhire was no longer the bridesmaid in 2010, at least when it came to the American League Manager of the Year award, which he finally secured after having finished second five times. Yet, despite guiding the Twins to the postseason in six of nine attempts since replacing the retired Tom Kelly, Gardenhire has yet to reach a World Series. His teams have gone

6-21 in October, and the Twins have been eliminated by the Yankees in the American League Division Series in each of their last five post-season appearances. That succession of early exits did not deter ownership from rewarding Gardenhire with a two-year extension at the end of last season that will keep him in Minnesota through 2013. One of the more interesting aspects of 2010's 94-win season was Gardenhire's tendency to spurn small ball, abandoning his former reliance on the sacrifice bunt and hit-and-run even though the Twins had moved from the Metrodome to spacious Target Field, which was better-suited for that style of play. However, that departure from the past will most likely be transient; Gardenhire was just playing to his team's strengths, and says he wants to see the Twins make drafting and signing speed players a priority in order to take advantage of their new home. On the pitching side, few managers are more protective of their players' arms than Gardenhire; the Twins had but five starts of at least 110 pitches in 2010.

2010: Like his predecessor, Tom Kelly, Gardy gets high marks for game management and getting the most out of what he's got, and like Kelly, he generally keeps his roster active instead of ignoring the last few bodies on the bench. A relative tendency towards the sac bunt isn't that surprising, given the number of slack bats in the regular lineup, so it isn't like he's Gene Mauch reborn, despite his having a designated bunter like Tolbert around; you'd hope he'll take the bat out of Denard Span's hands a bit less frequently (12 sacs, second on the team behind Punto, barely ahead of Tolbert). Despite so many weak hitters, he wasn't especially aggressive pinch-hitting for them, but he was adaptive as the season progressed, sitting Gomez and giving Young that extra chance in the outfield once Span had earned the full-time role. As a staff manager, he's not a slow hook but not notably so relative to his peers, and he's generally reluctant to order up the intentional pass. Running a pen effectively is one of his gifts, as he's willing to make space for a long reliever to keep his tactical options open in tighter games; if there's a complaint, it might be that absolute need down the stretch led to some overuse of Mijares. Like Kelly, he won't be accused of any particular genius, but outstanding competence creates its own rewards and engenders considerable respect.

2009: The Twins' unanticipated success in 2008 earned Ron Gardenhire his fourth runner-up finish in seven years of eligibility for the Manager of the Year Award, a sign of the esteem in which his work is held, even (or, perhaps, especially) outside of Minnesota. The sentiment expressed by the Joe Posnanski-coined "Gardy Axiom," which suggests that the Twins' sustained competitiveness in spite of their perennially meager payroll can be attributed to a Gardy in the machine, offers one explanation for the manager's widespread support among the writers, as well as for the team's ability to surpass its combined Pythagorean record by 18 victories since Gardenhire took the reins. However, a closer examination reveals some tactics which complicate this reputation for genius. Gardenhire's charges attempted 85 sacrifices in 2008, easily the most of any AL team, although one cannot entirely divorce his game-calling from a steady supply of worthy sacrificing lambs instead of lions in the lineup. In previous years, Gardenhire drew criticism for his reliance on experienced but mediocre bats, but he may have been simply going with the flow; this season, the Twins cut costs by more aggressively filling those vacancies with in-house alternatives. Regardless of whether he was responsible for the team's new, more efficient approach to roster construction, Gardenhire embraced the change, enhancing the team's performance in the short term without jeopardizing its future prospects.

| Kir  | k Gi | bsoı  | 1      |      |      | M    | gr | B   | ¶ A | RI     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2010 | ARI  | 34-49 | -3.1   | 94.3 | 29   | 0    | 41 | 3   | 247 | 181    | 19  | 151 | .235 | 0  | 3   | 1   | 0   | 1   | 32  | 84.4% | 12  | 0       | 153   | 31      |
| 2011 | ARI  | 94-68 | 5.0    | 96.9 | 80   | 0    | 90 | 6   | 463 | 375    | 16  | 248 | .206 | 5  | 16  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 96  | 61.5% | 26  | 3       | 306   | 79      |

2012: In steering the low-payroll Diamondbacks from worst place to first place in the span of a single season, Gibson added another "I don't believe what I just saw"-worthy accomplishment to his career record, though this one was a team effort that took even longer to complete than his painful trudge around the bases in the 1988 World Series. As is always the case when a skipper presides over a remarkable reversal in a team's fortunes, even one driven by Pythagorean overperformance, it's hard to say how much credit Gibson deserves (though the BBWAA voters didn't hesitate to make him Manager of the Year); after all, he didn't work any immediate miracles with the losing club he inherited from A.J. Hinch in 2010.

Perhaps the highest compliment that can be paid to Gibson is that he got out of the way and let his team play. The Diamondbacks recorded the fewest sacrifice hits and handed out the fewest intentional walks in the senior circuit; Gibson called for free passes just over 20 percent as often as Atlanta's IBB-happy Fredi Gonzalez. However, Gibson wasn't the perfect sabermetric manager. It's possible to find fault with Gibson's batting orders: Willie Bloomquist was the team's most frequent leadoff man, while Gerardo Parra, one of the team's best hitters, usually languished in the eighth slot (when he wasn't being pointlessly platooned with Collin Cowgill). Gibson earned plenty of praise for improving Arizona's preparation, motivation, and clubhouse culture, the sort of intangible effects that some take on faith and others cynically dismiss as byproducts of

winning instead of its cause. Now that he's righted the ship, he'll have plenty of time to make sure it stays afloat: Not long after his team's exit from the NLDS, Gibson received an extension that will keep him in Arizona through at least 2014.

2011: A controversial selection to serve as manager, Hinch's dismissal after a dismal start was far from shocking. The theory that players would respond to his tutelage given his former position in player development did not pan out, and he went 89-123 as skipper. Under his watch, relievers blew 21.4 percent of the potential quality starts they were handed, a figure that led the league by a hefty margin, but Hinch cannot be blamed for the sheer ineptitude of the bullpen—as noted elsewhere in the chapter, "reliever" was a misnomer in the vast majority of cases. Hinch was a victim of poor roster construction, as there was little he could do to prevent the batters from striking out more than any other team in history, or the bullpen from surrendering leads as though that were the goal. On the surface, the Diamondbacks did not perform much better for Gibson than they had under his predecessor, but their 34-49 record with Gibson at the helm belied an improvement in run prevention that was reflected in their Pythagorean record. In fact, only Fredi Gonzalez's tenure with the Marlins produced a larger gap between actual and expected records. Under Gibson, the team blew just 6.9 percent of potential quality starts, and the starters averaged fewer pitches per outing than they had under Hinch, ranking among the five least-worked in the senior circuit after the former bench coach's elevation to field general. Gibson took a more active role in mixing and matching relievers, and will likely pursue similar tactics during the 2011 season, since the Snakes have an ample supply of relievers with the potential to succeed, but no track record or defined roles to speak of.

| Joe  | Giı | rardi  |        |      |      | M    | gr | ď   | / N | YA     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|--------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |        | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L    | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2006 | FL0 | 78-84  | -1.5   | 94.2 | 74   | 3    | 89 | 4   | 436 | 332    | 58  | 247 | .242 | 4  | 13  | 6   | 2   | 2   | 110 | 77.3% | 50  | 3       | 363   | 105     |
| 2008 | NYA | 89-73  | 1.4    | 90.5 | 43   | 0    | 78 | 5   | 474 | 379    | 37  | 88  | .280 | 4  | 11  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 39  | 87.2% | 32  | 0       | 432   | 134     |
| 2009 | NYA | 103-59 | 6.4    | 96.5 | 78   | 4    | 76 | 4   | 462 | 372    | 28  | 90  | .232 | 3  | 12  | 1   | 0   | 1   | 48  | 79.2% | 35  | 0       | 323   | 108     |
| 2010 | NYA | 95-67  | -3.1   | 97.1 | 78   | 2    | 83 | 3   | 431 | 349    | 37  | 95  | .167 | 2  | 9   | 4   | 1   | 0   | 48  | 93.8% | 39  | 0       | 362   | 110     |
| 2011 | NYA | 97-65  | -5.9   | 95.7 | 69   | 2    | 84 | 6   | 465 | 404    | 43  | 54  | .196 | 0  | 21  | 3   | 1   | 1   | 54  | 83.3% | 38  | 0       | 357   | 94      |

2012: Joe Girardi is one of the most competent managers in baseball, but that's a double-edged compliment, for managing is a degraded profession. The problem is that rather than use the brain in his head, which is excellent, Girardi uses the one he keeps in his famous binder. That binder contains a sinister intelligence that overrides Girardi's better instincts and forces him to adopt a foolish rigidity that requires him to make moves by meaningless small samples, use pitchers inflexibly according to roles established in spring training regardless of whether they have pitched up to those roles, bat Derek Jeter leadoff prior to the shortstop's second-half surge, and keep his worst starter in the rotation despite a two-year slump. On this last point, he grew testy with reporters when asked repeatedly to explain the unexplainable—it was as if being Yankees manager requires one to take an oath saying, "I swear to protect and defend A.J. Burnett." When Rafael Soriano struggled prior to going on the disabled list, Girardi said he had to keep using him in the eighth inning, "Because he's my eighth-inning guy," as if Girardi himself hadn't conferred that role and could just as easily take it away. For a guy who is supposed to be running a team, Girardi is strangely handicapped by his own decisions. Still, he doesn't waste an inordinate number of outs, has done well constructing a bullpen once he actually gets the right people into those roles, and gets into fewer self-created controversies than Ozzie Guillen. That just might be the best the world of managers has to offer the modern game.

2011: Girardi plays things close to the vest, which makes thinking along with his strategy very difficult. Why didn't Andy Pettitte come back out for the seventh inning? Why didn't Jorge Posada pinch-hit for Francisco Cervelli one run down in the eighth? Why didn't Mariano Rivera come out to protect that lead? At these times, Girardi's seeming passivity in the face of strategic opportunities can drive one mad, but after the dust settles, he usually discloses that heretofore unrevealed injuries prevented him from making each glaringly obvious move. Fair enough, Joe, but there were still too many times you sat on your hands, most often in deference to the Great Jeter. Long after it was clear that Jeter was in an intractable slump, Girardi hesitated to remove him from the leadoff spot, perhaps not wanting to face the inevitable media frenzy. Nor did he use his glove-only bench player Ramiro Pena as a late-inning substitute for Jeter. In both instances, Girardi abdicated rather than confront his entitled shortstop. The skipper also insisted that Granderson was not a platoon player long after it was obvious that he was, stuck with Chan Ho Park beyond all reason, and issued far too many intentional walks for a team that plays in the DH league. Against those failings you have his insight that Cano was ready to blossom and therefore deserved to be batted higher in the order than he had previously; his willingness to bat a power hitter such as Swisher or Granderson second in the order; and his generally adept handling of Mariano Rivera, which kept the pitcher effective and on the roster despite nagging injuries. He also blew just four—or five percent—of his starters' quality starts by pushing them too far, as compared to such luminaries as Charlie Manuel, Ron Washington, and Ozzie Guillen, all of whom sabotaged over 10 percent, or AL Manager of the Year Ron

Gardenhire, who blew seven percent. Girardi is a unique character, an oft-confusing combination of rigidity and flexibility. He's not perfect, but suggestions that he might be fired because the Yankees made an early exit from the playoffs were ludicrous. He's among the best in the game today.

2010: If there was a positive to the disappointing year that was 2008, it was that Girardi, in many ways still a managing neophyte, got a chance to learn on the job. To his credit, he grew up a great deal. By 2009, the paranoia in dealing with the media and the reflexive dishonesty about injuries were gone, replaced by a sunnier public persona. During the regular season, Girardi was an unobtrusive strategist. With seven lefties and switch-hitters in the starting lineup, Girardi didn't have to think too hard about maintaining a platoon advantage on offense. He didn't indulge too much in one-run strategies, his one crutch being the hit-and-run. Girardi sometimes doesn't think far enough ahead, and his major league-leading use of pinch-runners sometimes came back to bite him when he found himself undermanned in late in games (a scenario played out with Freddy Guzman during the postseason). This same failure to think an inning ahead sometimes dogged his pitching moves as well, as he makes changes impulsively and ends up with unfavorable matchups. That said, he's been smart enough not to form attachments to his non-Rivera relievers, rebuilding the bullpen on the fly twice in two seasons, an impressive feat. He managed Rivera's workload carefully, going to the closer in the eighth inning more often than any other manager in baseball, yet eschewing the two-inning appearances to which Torre often resorted (though this changed in the postseason). Some of the old nervous tics returned in October as Girardi reacted to the stress of trying to win a championship, and he overmanaged the Yankees out of at least one game. Still, Girardi matured greatly from 2008 to 2009. His refusal to pick favorites and his facility in constructing pitching staffs marks him as one of the most promising young managers in the game.

2009: Girardi's inaugural season as Yankees manager can be summed up in one line: "Good at organizing a bullpen, bad at dealing with the press." Simply put, Girardi had problems with honesty, often refusing to admit that a player was injured even when the general manager or the player himself was willing to confirm it. Clearly an intelligent student of baseball, Girardi often seemed to be bending under the pressure of his job, and the pointless falsehoods seemed to emanate from that insecurity. The nervousness was understandable—Girardi was about to go down in history as the man who landed the Yankees short of the playoffs for the first time since 1993, and he was following a tough act in Joe Torre. Yet, Torre's success was in large part due to his ability to defuse the tensions that surrounded the team, whereas Girardi seemed captured by them and even exacerbated them. This was a pity, because he has the makings of an excellent manager. Right off the bat, he did something Torre was unwilling or unable to do, turning to new or relatively unknown relievers. When several relievers among the team's Opening Day slate or became injured, Girardi was able to assemble an almost effective and almost entirely new pen outside of Mariano Rivera—who, coincidentally or not, had one of his best years for the new manager. Girardi was far less assertive with his lineup, letting Cano and Cabrera slump on endlessly, and playing Jose Molina even after the acquisition of Ivan Rodriguez. As an offensive manager it's clear that he would like to have a faster team; he had the club stealing as often as the roster would allow, and called for the hit-and-run more often than any manager in the league.

| Fre  | di G | ionza | alez   |      |      | M    | gr | B   | ¶ A | TL     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2007 | FL0  | 71-91 | -0.3   | 90.8 | 48   | 2    | 49 | 7   | 560 | 456    | 60  | 284 | .213 | 7  | 22  | 7   | 0   | 2   | 101 | 79.2% | 30  | 3       | 297   | 90      |
| 2008 | FL0  | 84-77 | 3.2    | 93.4 | 45   | 2    | 74 | 3   | 511 | 398    | 66  | 247 | .212 | 7  | 7   | 2   | 0   | 1   | 76  | 71.1% | 20  | 3       | 260   | 90      |
| 2009 | FL0  | 87-75 | 5.4    | 92.3 | 43   | 1    | 74 | 3   | 530 | 418    | 60  | 277 | .280 | 8  | 9   | 6   | 0   | 1   | 101 | 74.3% | 30  | 2       | 308   | 92      |
| 2010 | FL0  | 34-36 | -4.2   | 95.8 | 29   | 1    | 42 | 1   | 193 | 141    | 18  | 101 | .211 | 1  | 3   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 34  | 76.5% | 7   | 1       | 148   | 45      |
| 2011 | ATL  | 89-73 | 3.3    | 95.9 | 56   | 0    | 86 | 3   | 510 | 435    | 73  | 257 | .175 | 8  | 6   | 1   | 0   | 3   | 115 | 70.4% | 39  | 2       | 289   | 86      |

2012: They say good things come to those who wait. For Gonzalez, that meant a comfy new managerial gig away from Jeffrey Loria's interference. The Marlins fired Gonzalez after a 34-36 start to the 2010 season, but he landed on his feet within the division. For an organization that values continuity, Gonzalez's Braves history seemed too good to pass up, so Atlanta tabbed him to replace the retiring Bobby Cox. Gonzalez quickly joined a select fraternity by leading the league in intentional walks issued. Prior to 2011, Cox and another former Braves manager, Joe Torre, had ruled the league in free passes for the better part of the past half-decade. Gonzalez took an aggressive approach to the handling of his bullpen. Whenever he got the itch, he went to Eric O'Flaherty, Jonny Venters, or Craig Kimbrel. Relief arms like that are rare, and other managers would no doubt have done the same, but Gonzalez continued to use those three even after promising to reduce their workload. Whether that usage led to erratic September performances from the bullpen will be a barstool topic for years to come, as will Gonzalez's decision to bench Jason Heyward so the hot streak-riding Jose Constanza could stick in the lineup. Benching potential franchise cornerstones for career minor leaguers is not a good way to earn respect in the community, even if Gonzalez did it just to appease his clubhouse and motivate Heyward. Gonzalez also earned ire by attempting the second-most sacrifice bunts, although

calling him a small-ball manager ignores that the Braves rarely ran, succeeding in 65 percent of their chances when they did.

2010: In February 2009, the Marlins gave manager Fredi Gonzalez a two-year contract extension. By October, the team was publicly flirting with Bobby Valentine. "As we looked at the performance at things that happened, games that went one way, games that went another way, there is no question we felt we should have been a playoff team," said club president and goodwill ambassador David Samson. In the interim, Gonzalez's team outplayed their projected winning percentage by four games, posting 87 victories on the majors' lowest payroll. Clearly expectations are set to extra-picky. That is not to say that Gonzalez lacks faults. He loves the intentional walk so much that he shakes hands with only four fingers, having called for 185 freebies in his three seasons of skippering, the second most in the majors to Bobby Cox (Cox's use of the intentional walk is a mania, not a tactic). Conversely, Gonzalez has sacrificed with his non-pitchers fewer than any single manager of the last three years, so he's 1-for-2 on opposition-enabling strategies. However, Gonzalez could have bunted twice a game and still not wasted as many outs as he did by choosing Emilio Bonifacio as his leadoff man, an act of offensive self-emasculation comparable only to Dusty Baker's embrace of Willy Taveras. Regardless of how bleeping fast Bonifacio is or how much minor-league seasoning Chris Coghlan required, Gonzalez should have acted sooner and more decisively; when Coghlan did arrive, he dropped Bonifacio all the way down in the order—to number two.

2009: The Sporting News Manager of the Year, Gonzalez was at the helm of a team that outperformed their adjusted standings by three wins, though whether or not that was the result of his management skills is up for debate. He used some of his worst relievers (Taylor Tankersley, Logan Kensing) in situations they should never have approached, while some of the team's better relief options pitched in standard situations. He did however lead his relief prospects by the hand, giving them game scenarios with lesser importance to build their experience and confidence. Ditching Amezaga as the center fielder and giving someone with potential the job in Ross was an overdue move, as was giving Baker the keys to the catcher position once he came up and succeeded. He rarely gave runners the green light, instead focusing on high-percentage basestealing with all of his regulars (with the exception of Hanley Ramirez). He handled the rotation well, making adjustments when starters returned from injury and moving failed pitchers to the pen to get some use out of them (Hendrickson in particular). Gonzalez was also careful not to follow in the footsteps of the man he replaced two years ago, making sure not to abuse his young starters. Overall, he balanced the team's long-shot run at the division title with the organization's need to sort through its young talent, and considering where they finished, he did so admirably.

| 0zz  | zie G | Guille | en     |       |      | M    | gr | D   | F   | _0     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |    |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|----|
|      |       |        | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |    |
| YEAR | TM    | W-L    | +/-    | PC    | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | li |
| 2004 | CHA   | 83-79  | -1.2   | 101.1 | 101  | 5    | 69 | 6   | 399 | 303    | 36  | 118 | .312 | 4  | 7   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 96  | 76.0% | 70  | 1       | 287   |    |
| 2005 | CHA   | 99-63  | 6.8    | 101.7 | 104  | 3    | 95 | 10  | 412 | 342    | 42  | 86  | .203 | 2  | 21  | 5   | 1   | 1   | 80  | 81.3% | 63  | 3       | 395   |    |
| 2006 | CHA   | 90-72  | 1.8    | 100.7 | 93   | 4    | 81 | 11  | 398 | 297    | 59  | 123 | .222 | 6  | 10  | 4   | 0   | 1   | 71  | 70.4% | 45  | 1       | 314   |    |
| 2007 | CHA   | 72-90  | 6.3    | 100.5 | 97   | 1    | 88 | 9   | 463 | 348    | 50  | 91  | .235 | 3  | 3   | 6   | 0   | 1   | 62  | 72.6% | 40  | 0       | 291   |    |
| 2008 | CHA   | 89-74  | -1.2   | 97.2  | 71   | 4    | 93 | 8   | 463 | 364    | 42  | 65  | .309 | 2  | 13  | 4   | 0   | 1   | 45  | 73.3% | 30  | 1       | 281   |    |
| 2009 | CHA   | 79-83  | -1.1   | 94.8  | 61   | 0    | 86 | 9   | 415 | 312    | 41  | 93  | .120 | 2  | 6   | 3   | 2   | 1   | 47  | 78.7% | 33  | 0       | 337   |    |
| 2010 | CHA   | 88-74  | 1.7    | 98.7  | 88   | 3    | 94 | 10  | 407 | 331    | 41  | 66  | .271 | 3  | 24  | 4   | 2   | 2   | 68  | 86.8% | 57  | 3       | 457   |    |
| 2011 | CHA   | 78-82  | 4.1    | 99.5  | 83   | 2    | 88 | 8   | 404 | 330    | 49  | 67  | .250 | 2  | 15  | 4   | 0   | 1   | 76  | 82.9% | 61  | 3       | 338   |    |

2012: The Marlins traded shortstop Ozzie Martinez and reliever Jhan Marinez to the White Sox for the rights to Guillen, then signed him to a four-year contract, securing the skipper's services in the dugout for the start of the franchise's new era as the Miami Marlins. Guillen's game management was not dissimilar in 2011 to what he'd been doing in Chicago for years. His baserunners attempted fewer steals than previous clubs, slipping to the middle of the pack with only 134 tries. This, however, was probably a wise decision, as Alejandro De Aza was the only runner with more than one stolen base attempt to succeed at least 70 percent of the time. As a team, the White Sox were successful in only 60.4 percent of their stolen base attempts, dead last (by a wide margin) in the American League and only slightly better than MLB-worst St. Louis. Guillen's White Sox teams were consistently at or near the top of the AL in intentional walks issued, but one of his strengths as a manager of pitchers has always been a disinclination to pigeonhole his relievers into specific roles. That acumen was on display early in the season when closer Matt Thornton got off to a rough start, blowing four saves in the first week and a half. Guillen acted quickly, removing Thornton from the closer's role and trying Chris Sale briefly before finding his long-term solution in Sergio Santos, all in the season's first month. He'll have an established (read: expensive) closer in 2012 after Heath Bell agreed to a three-year deal with Miami in the offseason, but don't be surprised if youngsters like Steve Cishek and Mike Dunn are given opportunities should Bell stumble.

2011: As skippers go, Ozzie is a throwback to the '70s and '80s, not in terms of any one legacy, but in all of them. He likes to run and likes to manufacture runs, and finally had a roster he could really do it with, but his club nevertheless also ranked seventh-highest in MLB with its "Guillen number," the percentage of runs scored on homers. In an era of well-worn tracks between the dugout and the mound, he's the least-likely manager to go to the pen or use a specific reliever on consecutive days, tends to give his starters a reasonably long leash, and seems to have escaped getting much credit for the development of Danks or Floyd. If there's a source of frustration in watching one of the game's most entertaining managers work, it's his willingness to order up intentional walks, which burns him with a regularity that would crush lesser men.

2010: Guillen is certainly an iconoclast. In an age where managers pay their dues and give boring, politically correct answers to every question, Ozzie took a different path, refusing to manage in the minor leagues and insisting on doing everything his way. After winning the first World Series title for his two-team city in nearly a century, he's pretty much untouchable. That's good, because his often-brutal honesty walks the edge of danger in a game that has become a little too corporate and milquetoast for its own good. As a tactician, he always wanted to play "Ozzieball," which involved a lot of bunting, running, and manufacturing runs, but the strategy never really matched well with what has usually been an old, slow roster. Over the years he's learned to adjust, and as far as most strategies go, he's now the middle of the road. As an individual, he's anything but.

2009: Because Guillen was a scrappy, small ball-style player, he was labeled as a kind of throwback Deadball Era (or at least the 1960s) manager upon his arrival as White Sox skipper in 2004. Though the White Sox won the World Series in Ozzie's sophomore season with pitching and power rather than speed and sac bunts, there was still some truth to the Ozzieball epithet. Throwback Guillen pushed his starters deep into games, used his relievers interchangeably, and did bunt and steal more than the average bear. Yet, the style of any manager worth his job is dictated by his players, and as the horses in his rotation have found other pastures and the Scott Podsedniks in his lineup have yielded to still more thumpers, Guillen's style has become more conventional. Consider the trends above: shorter outings for the rotation now staffed by younger arms, fewer blown quality starts thanks to those quicker hooks, more relievers used on no rest as favorites have emerged in specific roles, fewer steals as he had no viable thieves other than Orlando Cabrera, fewer bunts from a lineup with eight men in double digits in homers, even a decrease in intentional walks, a category in which Guillen led the league in 2005 and 2006. Ozzie's behavior may not have changed, but his managing has.

| Cli  | nt H | urdl  | е      |      |      | M    | gr | ı   | 7 P | IT     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2002 | COL  | 67-73 | 4.7    | 93.1 | 45   | 1    | 61 | 7   | 437 | 322    | 38  | 244 | .276 | 5  | 10  | 5   | 0   | 2   | 51  | 88.2% | 31  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2003 | COL  | 74-88 | -3.4   | 89.7 | 38   | 0    | 68 | 2   | 500 | 369    | 51  | 285 | .260 | 5  | 6   | 3   | 0   | 0   | 103 | 66.0% | 39  | 1       | 238   | 85      |
| 2004 | COL  | 68-94 | -4.7   | 95.7 | 60   | 3    | 65 | 8   | 473 | 329    | 84  | 287 | .253 | 11 | 8   | 2   | 0   | 0   | 148 | 76.4% | 68  | 0       | 258   | 87      |
| 2005 | COL  | 67-95 | -1.7   | 94.0 | 52   | 1    | 68 | 3   | 459 | 336    | 54  | 272 | .224 | 4  | 4   | 5   | 0   | 1   | 131 | 72.5% | 58  | 2       | 334   | 116     |
| 2006 | COL  | 76-86 | -5.1   | 95.6 | 55   | 2    | 81 | 7   | 499 | 392    | 81  | 258 | .215 | 6  | 4   | 3   | 1   | 3   | 167 | 77.8% | 73  | 0       | 325   | 112     |
| 2007 | COL  | 90-73 | -1.7   | 90.4 | 50   | 0    | 79 | 2   | 529 | 413    | 61  | 283 | .216 | 4  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 130 | 78.5% | 56  | 2       | 354   | 104     |
| 2008 | COL  | 74-88 | 0.7    | 92.2 | 53   | 0    | 68 | 3   | 484 | 370    | 49  | 250 | .239 | 4  | 25  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 124 | 79.0% | 48  | 0       | 354   | 82      |
| 2009 | COL  | 18-28 | -3.2   | 92.5 | 19   | 0    | 26 | 2   | 135 | 96     | 11  | 73  | .306 | 2  | 6   | 2   | 0   | 0   | 29  | 79.3% | 10  | 0       | 113   | 45      |
| 2011 | PIT  | 72-90 | 3.4    | 89.5 | 26   | 0    | 78 | 2   | 549 | 452    | 65  | 275 | .201 | 1  | 13  | 3   | 0   | 2   | 110 | 76.4% | 45  | 1       | 384   | 114     |

2012: Hurdle spent parts of eight seasons guiding the Rockies. Reaching the playoffs just once over six full seasons is grounds for termination, even if that berth did culminate in a pennant. After spending a season with the Rangers—thereby reaching the World Series again—Hurdle decided to re-enter the managerial game by taking on a historically tough gig in Pittsburgh. Thus, Hurdle became the seventh Pirates manager since their most recent winning season, back in 1992. Pittsburgh overachieved in the first half, flirting with—and seducing—first place into the summer months. During the unexpected run, Hurdle received the highest panegyric, with scribes crediting his ability to keep players loose and focused. Aside from the second-half meltdown, Hurdle shared more in common with former manager John Russell than many Yinzers would like to admit. One such similarity is a dependence on the bullpen. Like Russell the year before, Hurdle led the league in relievers used. It did not help Hurdle that he finished with fewer 100-plus pitch starts than fired managers like Bob Geren and Edwin Rodriguez, despite managing more than 90 additional games. A manager is only as good as the men he gets to manage, but Hurdle made some questionable decisions with the talent he was allowed. Start with the anecdotal—like having Andrew McCutchen bunt—then move on to the hard stuff—finishing second in the league in intentional walks issued. Blaming Hurdle for the Pirates' collapse is as silly as giving him full credit for their rise. Often the truth is found in the middle, and that seems to be the case with the job Hurdle did in 2011.

**2010**: Hurdle managed to survive five straight losing seasons at the start of his tenure, but when the Rockies regressed after their 2007 "Rocktober" playoff appearance, there was finally enough evidence for an even-handed evaluation, and Hurdle was let go after a bad start in 2009. Loyal, affable, and well-liked, Hurdle undermined his position over the years by frequently overmanaging his charges—too many bunts and intentional walks, too many pitching and lineup changes, too much of a spotlight on the oldest guys.

2009: Say this for Hurdle: in his seven seasons as Rockies manager he's evolved. After years of relentless self-victimization by the profligate issuance of intentional walks, he's cut back dramatically, as if he finally noticed not only the poor results he was getting from the practice, but the very notion that putting extra runners on base in a hitter's park might be a bad idea. Unfortunately, he's still one of the buntiest skippers in the biz. He's led the majors in sac attempts in four of the last five seasons and three years running, and it's not just the pitchers that he's asking to drop one down; from 2005 through 2008, no team has bunted its position players as often as Hurdle's Rockies have, though in fairness to the manager, it must be said that if you have Willy Taveras, Cory Sullivan, or Clint Barmes in the lineup you don't have too many other cards to play. Oddly enough, despite his interest in the bunt, Hurdle almost never pushes the squeeze button. He's all about moving the runner over to create an opportunity for a better bat, not getting a run home. That seems like an insignificant fact, but it hides a choice bit of conflicted thinking: the hitters with which Hurdle was most likely to bunt were also those he was most likely to bat first or second in the lineup. If he had so little confidence in these players as hitters, why the heck did he assign them such prominent roles in the offense?

| Da   | vey. | John   | son    |      |      | M    | gr  | Ħ   | WA  | S      |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|--------|--------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |        | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |     |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L    | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS  | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1984 | NYN  | 90-72  | 11.9   | -    | -    | -    | 89  | 8   | 278 | 211    | 43  | 277 | .255 | 2  | 18  | 2   | 1   | 2   | 62  | 95.2% | 24  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1985 | NYN  | 98-64  | 0.9    | -    | -    | -    | 105 | 10  | 243 | 170    | 36  | 249 | .192 | 4  | 11  | 3   | 1   | 4   | 97  | 95.9% | 38  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1986 | NYN  | 108-54 | 3.1    | -    | -    | -    | 101 | 8   | 252 | 190    | 29  | 229 | .210 | 2  | 13  | 3   | 0   | 1   | 106 | 77.4% | 37  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1987 | NYN  | 92-70  | -2.2   | -    | -    | -    | 83  | 10  | 308 | 226    | 51  | 251 | .284 | 7  | 6   | 5   | 0   | 1   | 102 | 78.4% | 31  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1988 | NYN  | 100-60 | -1.7   | -    | -    | -    | 108 | 10  | 241 | 204    | 33  | 202 | .239 | 1  | 6   | 3   | 0   | 1   | 99  | 73.7% | 36  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1989 | NYN  | 87-75  | -5.1   | -    | -    | -    | 106 | 3   | 274 | 223    | 45  | 230 | .256 | 5  | 10  | 5   | 0   | 2   | 77  | 77.9% | 23  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1994 | CIN  | 66-49  | -3.8   | -    | -    | -    | 65  | 3   | 261 | 198    | 23  | 189 | .229 | 2  | 19  | 4   | 3   | 1   | 73  | 80.8% | 34  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1995 | CIN  | 85-59  | 0.1    | -    | -    | -    | 70  | 5   | 329 | 230    | 32  | 250 | .272 | 5  | 44  | 15  | 1   | 1   | 90  | 73.3% | 32  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1996 | BAL  | 88-75  | 2.5    | -    | -    | -    | 71  | 5   | 379 | 283    | 35  | 72  | .279 | 1  | 8   | 4   | 1   | 0   | 50  | 80.0% | 40  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | BAL  | 98-64  | 2.9    | -    | -    | -    | 89  | 2   | 401 | 341    | 31  | 90  | .232 | 1  | 9   | 2   | 0   | 0   | 57  | 87.7% | 47  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | LAN  | 77-85  | -4.6   | 97.6 | 74   | 7    | 80  | 12  | 399 | 283    | 26  | 231 | .271 | 4  | 37  | 10  | 2   | 2   | 91  | 87.9% | 32  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2000 | LAN  | 86-76  | -2.3   | 97.2 | 75   | 9    | 87  | 2   | 372 | 264    | 22  | 243 | .233 | 12 | 11  | 4   | 0   | 0   | 76  | 86.8% | 26  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2011 | WAS  | 40-43  | 2.3    | 84.0 | 12   | 0    | 33  | 3   | 271 | 218    | 19  | 137 | .179 | 1  | 11  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 58  | 74.1% | 19  | 1       | 170   | 51      |

2012: It's hard to draw too many conclusions about Davey Johnson's comeback so far. It isn't like he came down from stathead heaven and did things that much tactically different from Jim Riggleman. He'll order a position player to bunt about as often as Dusty Baker, and put someone on first base as often as Ron Gardenhire, which is neither smart nor dumb. Remember, he inherited this team, he didn't design it. On offense, the biggest difference was his late-season willingness to move Morse to an outfield corner and explore using Werth in center to get another bat in the lineup; that bodes well for Harper's arriving in the majors sooner rather than later, and Johnson *really* likes Harper, in the same way that he likes putting together a high-powered offense, something that will be hard to initiate without a solution to the team's leadoff problem. Another notable distinction was his aggressiveness in bringing in relievers early and often; only Jim Tracy used more pen men per 162 games. While that was also a function of the talent on hand (a good pen and weak starters), his rotation will again feature a number of guys with workloads to watch, and even with all those innings, his relievers did pick up a full strikeout in the second half.

| Tor  | ıy La | a Rus  | ssa    |       |      | M    | gr | ×   | NO  | N      |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |       |        | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM    | W-L    | +/-    | PC    | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1980 | CHA   | 70-92  | 5.5    | -     | -    | -    | 77 | 13  | 236 | 183    | 44  | 177 | .256 | 3  | 8   | 4   | 0   | 1   | 78  | 89.7% | 70  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1981 | CHA   | 54-52  | -5.2   | -     | -    | -    | 58 | 4   | 173 | 135    | 17  | 93  | .182 | 0  | 4   | 4   | 0   | 2   | 58  | 87.9% | 51  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1982 | CHA   | 87-75  | -2.2   | -     | -    | -    | 78 | 17  | 258 | 205    | 30  | 147 | .217 | 2  | 5   | 3   | 0   | 2   | 65  | 90.8% | 59  | 5       | -     | -       |
| 1983 | CHA   | 99-63  | 1.4    | -     | -    | -    | 89 | 11  | 243 | 186    | 32  | 207 | .254 | 2  | 4   | 5   | 3   | 0   | 62  | 98.4% | 61  | 4       |       | -       |
| 1984 | CHA   | 74-88  | -0.5   | -     | -    | -    | 77 | 23  | 238 | 181    | 26  | 217 | .251 | 9  | 11  | 2   | 2   | 4   | 49  | 87.8% | 43  | 4       | -     | -       |
| 1985 | CHA   | 85-78  | 1.7    | -     | -    | -    | 76 | 16  | 305 | 241    | 35  | 216 | .233 | 3  | 13  | 3   | 1   | 3   | 92  | 82.6% | 76  | 6       | -     | -       |
| 1987 | OAK   | 81-81  | -1.7   | -     | -    | -    | 67 | 7   | 328 | 234    | 21  | 97  | .198 | 1  | 28  | 6   | 1   | 3   | 77  | 83.1% | 64  | 7       | -     | -       |
| 1988 | OAK   | 104-58 | 2.8    | -     | -    | -    | 91 | 5   | 290 | 247    | 27  | 131 | .208 | 1  | 17  | 7   | 0   | 0   | 76  | 77.6% | 59  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1989 | OAK   | 99-63  | 1.1    | -     | -    | -    | 84 | 10  | 317 | 279    | 24  | 114 | .219 | 1  | 35  | 7   | 1   | 1   | 59  | 78.0% | 46  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1990 | OAK   | 103-59 | 2.0    | -     | •    | -    | 92 | 5   | 303 | 276    | 19  | 142 | .246 | 2  | 27  | 7   | 0   | 3   | 76  | 85.5% | 65  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1991 | OAK   | 84-78  | 4.7    | -     | -    | -    | 79 | 8   | 397 | 310    | 30  | 148 | .248 | 3  | 31  | 10  | 3   | 1   | 64  | 85.9% | 55  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1992 | OAK   | 96-66  | 6.7    | -     | -    | -    | 77 | 9   | 400 | 339    | 46  | 103 | .286 | 0  | 27  | 10  | 2   | 3   | 106 | 88.7% | 94  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1993 | OAK   | 68-94  | 0.5    | -     | -    | -    | 63 | 5   | 424 | 317    | 59  | 98  | .235 | 3  | 21  | 7   | 0   | 1   | 62  | 79.0% | 49  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1994 | OAK   | 51-63  | -2.0   | -     | -    | -    | 46 | 1   | 308 | 221    | 30  | 87  | .143 | 3  | 18  | 2   | 0   | 2   | 32  | 90.6% | 29  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1995 | OAK   | 67-77  | -2.0   | -     | -    | -    | 56 | 6   | 358 | 267    | 26  | 105 | .268 | 4  | 29  | 5   | 0   | 2   | 49  | 85.7% | 42  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1996 | SLN   | 88-74  | 1.1    | -     | -    | -    | 91 | 11  | 413 | 331    | 43  | 243 | .278 | 1  | 23  | 7   | 0   | 4   | 121 | 86.8% | 55  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | SLN   | 73-89  | -5.8   | -     | -    | -    | 95 | 6   | 399 | 304    | 34  | 297 | .188 | 3  | 22  | 10  | 2   | 4   | 84  | 79.8% | 45  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | SLN   | 83-80  | -1.4   | 88.3  | 54   | 10   | 77 | 7   | 431 | 320    | 38  | 255 | .230 | 10 | 25  | 11  | 0   | 1   | 89  | 85.4% | 35  | 6       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | SLN   | 75-86  | -2.7   | 95.0  | 71   | 10   | 69 | 9   | 454 | 325    | 38  | 260 | .208 | 3  | 20  | 7   | 1   | 3   | 107 | 80.4% | 52  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2000 | SLN   | 95-67  | 2.7    | 101.3 | 91   | 9    | 85 | 9   | 386 | 272    | 28  | 233 | .196 | 9  | 6   | 4   | 0   | 2   | 102 | 84.3% | 45  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2001 | SLN   | 93-69  | -2.0   | 95.3  | 71   | 7    | 92 | 7   | 485 | 387    | 36  | 252 | .222 | 6  | 9   | 7   | 1   | 1   | 109 | 87.2% | 64  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | SLN   | 97-65  | 0.5    | 90.8  | 45   | 6    | 80 | 2   | 472 | 371    | 39  | 293 | .258 | 7  | 9   | 10  | 2   | 3   | 116 | 86.2% | 65  | 4       | -     | -       |
| 2003 | SLN   | 85-77  | -3.7   | 96.2  | 74   | 11   | 78 | 4   | 460 | 328    | 36  | 292 | .232 | 2  | 17  | 6   | 0   | 2   | 126 | 83.3% | 57  | 4       | 327   | 109     |
| 2004 | SLN   | 105-57 | 3.4    | 97.4  | 82   | 6    | 89 | 7   | 469 | 394    | 24  | 272 | .262 | 6  | 15  | 5   | 0   | 1   | 100 | 81.0% | 49  | 4       | 387   | 117     |
| 2005 | SLN   | 100-62 | 0.0    | 96.4  | 61   | 1    | 97 | 5   | 436 | 365    | 27  | 264 | .227 | 6  | 13  | 4   | 1   | 4   | 112 | 77.7% | 55  | 11      | 340   | 144     |
| 2006 | SLN   | 83-78  | 0.5    | 92.5  | 53   | 2    | 74 | 5   | 469 | 362    | 35  | 270 | .235 | 7  | 6   | 5   | 0   | 1   | 101 | 75.2% | 36  | 4       | 324   | 110     |
| 2007 | SLN   | 78-84  | 7.8    | 89.4  | 44   | 2    | 70 | 4   | 515 | 397    | 25  | 315 | .296 | 5  | 6   | 3   | 0   | 4   | 95  | 75.8% | 33  | 1       | 312   | 121     |
| 2008 | SLN   | 86-76  | -0.8   | 92.8  | 49   | 1    | 78 | 9   | 506 | 385    | 21  | 273 | .239 | 6  | 9   | 3   | 1   | 2   | 103 | 71.8% | 36  | 1       | 329   | 120     |
| 2009 | SLN   | 91-71  | -0.6   | 94.3  | 54   | 4    | 88 | 3   | 481 | 397    | 23  | 280 | .221 | 8  | 10  | 4   | 0   | 2   | 103 | 75.7% | 41  | 0       | 309   | 103     |
| 2010 | SLN   | 86-76  | -6.1   | 95.0  | 60   | 0    | 94 | 2   | 455 | 358    | 32  | 288 | .226 | 3  | 11  | 5   | 0   | 0   | 95  | 73.7% | 43  | 1       | 348   | 127     |
| 2011 | SLN   | 90-72  | 1.2    | 94.9  | 58   | 4    | 86 | 5   | 467 | 350    | 44  | 258 | .228 | 3  | 5   | 5   | 0   | 2   | 112 | 76.8% | 50  | 1       | 348   | 135     |

2012: This space was to be a dispassionate, reasoned analysis of Game 5 of the 2011 World Series, a managerial quagmire of such breadth and depth that it might never be fully explained or understood. That plan changed somewhat after the Cardinals rallied to win the final two games of the Series and the championship, La Russa's second title in St. Louis and the third of his career. And that plan changed again, more dramatically, when La Russa announced his retirement the day after the Cardinals celebrated their 11th title with a parade through downtown St. Louis. La Russa's legacy is unquestioned, starting with his rank of third on the all-time list of managerial victories. Former Cards catcher Mike Matheny, who has never managed at any level, faces a daunting task in living up to his predecessor.

2011: It's natural for successful people to view their successes as a justification for all of their choices, a trap that is both difficult and necessary to avoid for that success to continue. Few managers have been successful as long as La Russa, and few have been so willing to shed the managerial straitjacket and try new things, but as he nears the end of his career there is a danger that a stubbornness born of a lifetime of validated decisions will become his undoing. Last season was not one of La Russa's career highlights; his increasing testiness and impatience with players and the media have begun to erode confidence in his leadership, and running out 144 different lineups amplified whispers that the skipper's admirable flexibility has descended into compulsive tinkering. La Russa obviously doesn't care what anyone else thinks; that is not only his right, but a facet of his personality that has aided his career. However, when it leads to a preference for Jon Jay over Colby Rasmus, or Matt Pagnozzi over Bryan Anderson, it starts to hurt more than it helps. For all his flaws, La Russa remains one of the game's savviest tacticians and most subtle thinkers, and it would be a shame if the end of his distinguished career becomes notable more for bloody-mindedness than brilliance.

**2010**: La Russa is now historic, if he wasn't already before. Last season he passed John McGraw for second place in games managed, which for all practical purposes means that he's first all time. What Connie Mack did for the last several years of his career, when his mind had predeceased his body, can hardly be called managing. Moreover, unlike Mack and McGraw, La

Russa did not achieve his longevity by owning, in whole or in part, the team that he was coaching. Nor has he stayed on past the point of effectiveness, serving as a living monument to himself. After all these years, it's fun to see La Russa provide reminders that he's not just the perfunctory human game-delay with his relentless pursuit of platoon advantages with his relief matchups; yes, it's tedious, but at least it means he avoids the intentional pass. When your admirers run from the effete George Will to affected macho man Buzz Bissinger, you're clearly many things to many people at once. His constant tweaking avoided a collapse of any element of a team with plenty of potential problems, especially in the bullpen and the infield, but the team's flaws were obvious by October; repairing them more conclusively to mount a better bid in 2010 isn't entirely La Russa's department, but he's able to adapt to fluid situations with his typical alacrity and competence.

2009: La Russa's 13th year with the Cards was one take pride in, as he guided a projected second-division team into wild-card contention. The active leader in managerial victories, he needs to average 75.5 wins over the next four seasons to tie John McGraw for second on the all-time wins list (and first among all non-team owner/managers). The tendencies for which La Russa has earned fame (and infamy) were on exaggerated display last season. As is his wont, he used several relievers as extreme specialists, notably Villone, Flores, and Springer, giving the '08 Cardinals as carefully managed a tactical trio as only the '08 Mets have ever managed. Never one for the intentional walk, La Russa ordered the lowest total in the NL from the last nine seasons, and the lowest total in franchise history in the 53 years records are available for. La Russa batted the pitcher eighth in every intraleague game, ostensibly to get more runners on base for Pujols; nine-hole hitters put up an OBP around 70 points higher than the pitchers, but it's hard to say exactly how much the gambit benefited the offense. La Russa called for the hit-and-run frequently, but the Cardinals did not execute well on the basepaths: their -10.2 EqBRR ranked 22nd in baseball, and they were towards the bottom in both steal attempts (105, 23rd) and success rate (70, 21st).

| Jim  | Le  | yland  | i      |      |      | M    | gr | B   | <b>P</b> D | ET     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|--------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|------------|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |        | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |            | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L    | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL        | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1986 | PIT | 64-98  | -12.6  | -    | -    | -    | 83 | 6   | 356        | 275    | 55  | 323 | .189 | 3  | 22  | 15  | 1   | 10  | 90  | 78.9% | 38  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1987 | PIT | 80-82  | 1.3    | -    |      |      | 86 | 6   | 313        | 220    | 60  | 288 | .230 | 4  | 15  | 5   | 1   | 4   | 103 | 80.6% | 46  | 2       | -     |         |
| 1988 | PIT | 85-75  | 0.6    | -    | -    | -    | 93 | 10  | 314        | 246    | 47  | 299 | .225 | 7  | 9   | 4   | 0   | 4   | 97  | 78.4% | 41  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1989 | PIT | 74-90  | -2.7   | -    | -    | -    | 84 | 7   | 325        | 249    | 78  | 300 | .214 | 1  | 23  | 7   | 0   | 2   | 107 | 85.0% | 57  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1990 | PIT | 95-67  | 0.4    | -    | -    | -    | 89 | 6   | 363        | 292    | 48  | 258 | .203 | 3  | 23  | 7   | 0   | 1   | 128 | 80.5% | 71  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1991 | PIT | 98-64  | 1.4    | -    | -    | -    | 90 | 7   | 354        | 270    | 34  | 253 | .226 | 6  | 15  | 6   | 2   | 1   | 116 | 89.7% | 56  | 1       | -     |         |
| 1992 | PIT | 96-66  | 2.7    | -    | -    | -    | 95 | 5   | 354        | 275    | 61  | 290 | .237 | 1  | 14  | 6   | 2   | 1   | 113 | 84.1% | 56  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1993 | PIT | 75-87  | 4.6    | -    | •    |      | 74 | 8   | 384        | 281    | 43  | 293 | .253 | 7  | 15  | 4   | 0   | 4   | 102 | 82.4% | 51  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1994 | PIT | 53-61  | 8.3    | -    | -    | -    | 62 | 6   | 285        | 204    | 52  | 163 | .223 | 3  | 6   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 49  | 75.5% | 19  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1995 | PIT | 58-86  | -2.8   | -    | -    |      | 71 | 5   | 391        | 280    | 50  | 279 | .257 | 5  | 9   | 9   | 2   | 2   | 67  | 80.6% | 23  | 1       | -     |         |
| 1996 | PIT | 73-89  | -2.3   | -    | -    | -    | 69 | 6   | 423        | 291    | 50  | 293 | .285 | 10 | 17  | 9   | 3   | 1   | 107 | 74.8% | 36  | 4       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | FL0 | 92-70  | 2.9    | -    | -    | -    | 95 | 2   | 404        | 300    | 41  | 251 | .250 | 4  | 5   | 4   | 0   | 1   | 95  | 84.2% | 54  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | FL0 | 54-108 | -1.6   | 91.1 | 62   | 24   | 65 | 9   | 420        | 288    | 61  | 275 | .208 | 3  | 13  | 8   | 1   | 4   | 94  | 83.0% | 58  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | COL | 72-90  | 1.2    | 98.3 | 84   | 19   | 57 | 7   | 420        | 285    | 46  | 291 | .279 | 9  | 12  | 7   | 0   | 2   | 91  | 67.0% | 29  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2006 | DET | 95-67  | -1.8   | 93.9 | 67   | 2    | 88 | 4   | 390        | 301    | 35  | 60  | .232 | 0  | 11  | 6   | 0   | 2   | 61  | 82.0% | 49  | 1       | 319   | 115     |
| 2007 | DET | 88-74  | -1.6   | 94.5 | 64   | 1    | 71 | 5   | 443        | 331    | 41  | 71  | .237 | 2  | 16  | 4   | 1   | 1   | 43  | 81.4% | 34  | 2       | 362   | 127     |
| 2008 | DET | 74-88  | -3.5   | 94.8 | 65   | 2    | 67 | 12  | 440        | 321    | 63  | 63  | .268 | 2  | 5   | 5   | 0   | 2   | 41  | 87.8% | 33  | 0       | 315   | 122     |
| 2009 | DET | 86-77  | 4.7    | 96.9 | 72   | 13   | 73 | 4   | 439        | 338    | 42  | 95  | .256 | 3  | 8   | 2   | 1   | 2   | 71  | 85.9% | 59  | 4       | 363   | 126     |
| 2010 | DET | 81-81  | -0.9   | 99.4 | 85   | 9    | 79 | 4   | 416        | 317    | 29  | 121 | .214 | 2  | 1   | 8   | 0   | 0   | 59  | 88.1% | 50  | 2       | 344   | 109     |
| 2011 | DET | 95-67  | 5.8    | 98.2 | 78   | 9    | 90 | 3   | 421        | 337    | 34  | 79  | .300 | 5  | 1   | 3   | 0   | 0   | 72  | 79.2% | 57  | 3       | 305   | 105     |

2012: Leyland has always received high marks for that most important of all managerial traits: leadership. While there's no way we can definitively quantify such a thing, most observers notice that players seem to play hard for his teams, they take the field prepared, and few have left the Tigers, Marlins, or Pirates publicly grumbling about the way the old skipper handled them. He has also shown an admirable willingness over the years to adapt his tactics to the skills of the players he is given, bunting more last year when lineup disasters at second, third, and in the outfield made it less egregious to trade outs for bases, and ranking among the league leaders in both fast and slow hooks. While some questioned his stubbornness in keeping Peralta and Avila low in the order during their breakout seasons, given their track histories and the perpetual sabermetric drumbeat to ignore small sample sizes, isn't that something to celebrate? He has his fetishes, of course (we're looking at you, Don Kelly), but on the whole Leyland continues to rest comfortably in the upper tier of major league managers.

2011: Watching Leyland work interleague games cements the impression that he's happiest when negotiating the maze of double-switches, pinch-hits, and sacrifice bunts that characterized his younger days in the senior circuit, but to his credit he has always adapted his tactics to the talent he's been given. Give him Adam Everett at shortstop, and Leyland is more than happy to take the bat out of his hands; give him Jhonny Peralta, and he'll let him swing. Leyland is happy enough to pencil rookies into the lineup, and lets his pitchers pitch without rifling through every situational option—last year, Tigers relievers were near the bottom in appearances and near the top in multi-inning outings, and Tigers starters led the majors in outings of 120 pitches or more, doubling the total of every other AL Central team combined. Couple his adaptability with a reputation for getting the most out of his players—something far more important over the course of a season than tactical wizardry—and Old Smokey remains one of the league's better skippers, worth his seat in the clubhouse for as long as the game still engages him.

2010: Leyland's got his one ring as a Fish skipper, and after being ground down by the Bonds-less aftermath in Pittsburgh, sticking with the melted-down Marlins in '98, and then a quick fail-and-bail season in Denver in '99, we'll have to see if he can wait out a pre-planned setback season with this year's strange brew of inexpensive kitties and overpaid old toms. In some ways, he was more tactically active last year, but employing Gerald Laird and Adam Everett has a way of putting the sac bunt on the options menu, and it wasn't until September that it occurred to him to drop Curtis Granderson from the leadoff slot against lefties. He worked Verlander hard by current standards down the stretch, but never pushed him to 130 pitches, and avoided asking too much of Porcello; he also enjoyed the benefit of a miraculously good year from a dubious cast in the pen. Whether, like Sparky Anderson, he gets a free pass forever and eventually packs it in himself remains to be seen, but he and Dombrowski go back decades, they're both signed through 2011, and it seems more likely that they're a package as long as Ilitch wants to afford them.

2009: No combination of tactics, lineups, or defensive alignments could have made the 2008 Tigers contenders, but Leyland wasn't satisfied until he had tried them all, just to be certain. Of course, he would have been roundly criticized had he watched the ship go down without pulling a few levers and twirling various dials, but Leyland's efforts, which have never strayed far outside the box, may have reached the point at which "trying" becomes "trying too hard." He attempted to cope with an ineffective pitching staff by walking anyone who looked dangerous with a bat in his hands (particularly Justin Morneau), dispensing a league-leading 63 IBB, but starters with shaky control and a LOOGY who couldn't retire lefties was akin to pouring fuel on the fire. Leyland also deserves to take part of the blame for the failures of evaluation which sent his first and third basemen ricocheting around the diamond. He attempted to stimulate the lineup by going through variants faster than Miguel Cabrera went through corn fritters, generating 110 unique permutations (the fourth-highest total in the American League) in an effort to recapture 2007's offensive mojo. Leyland's reputation for leadership remains intact, but if he made any contribution on the margins last season—precisely that to which most managers should aspire—it was likely a negative one.

| Joe  | Ma  | addo   | n             |           |           | M         | gr | B   | / T | BA              |     |     |           |          |     |     |     |     |            |          |            |         |       |         |
|------|-----|--------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|----------|------------|---------|-------|---------|
| YEAR | TM  | W-L    | Pythag<br>+/- | Avg<br>PC | 100+<br>P | 120+<br>P | QS | BQS | REL | REL w<br>Zero R | IBB | PH  | PH<br>Avg | PH<br>HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | SAC<br>Att | Sac<br>% | POS<br>SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1996 | CAL | 6-16   | 0.0           | 89.1      | 60        | 4         | 10 | 4   | 52  | 43              | 10  | 21  | .235      | 0        | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 11         | 54.5%    | 6          | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | ANA | 19-10  | 1.6           | 96.3      | 13        | 3         | 11 | 1   | 85  | 72              | 3   | 27  | .238      | 1        | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 13         | 92.3%    | 12         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2006 | TBA | 61-101 | -2.7          | 92.8      | 48        | 1         | 65 | 6   | 444 | 303             | 39  | 76  | .217      | 1        | 24  | 7   | 1   | 0   | 69         | 71.0%    | 46         | 3       | 417   | 112     |
| 2007 | TBA | 66-96  | 0.1           | 96.9      | 77        | 0         | 73 | 8   | 484 | 320             | 31  | 68  | .167      | 0        | 16  | 4   | 1   | 1   | 50         | 82.0%    | 40         | 4       | 350   | 92      |
| 2008 | TBA | 97-65  | 4.5           | 95.9      | 71        | 0         | 82 | 3   | 448 | 365             | 29  | 90  | .184      | 1        | 28  | 10  | 1   | 2   | 40         | 75.0%    | 27         | 0       | 388   | 94      |
| 2009 | TBA | 84-78  | -2.1          | 99.1      | 80        | 1         | 76 | 5   | 510 | 425             | 22  | 134 | .164      | 7        | 26  | 11  | 1   | 1   | 41         | 90.2%    | 36         | 6       | 404   | 101     |
| 2010 | TBA | 96-66  | -1.9          | 98.9      | 90        | 2         | 95 | 5   | 491 | 412             | 34  | 154 | .242      | 3        | 25  | 7   | 0   | 1   | 67         | 88.1%    | 58         | 6       | 404   | 120     |
| 2011 | TBA | 91-71  | -1.3          | 102.1     | 98        | 5         | 99 | 10  | 438 | 355             | 38  | 129 | .252      | 1        | 20  | 8   | 1   | 0   | 63         | 77.8%    | 47         | 5       | 441   | 138     |

2012: Maddon continues to keep fans and experts alike on their toes. He hit ten different hitters in the leadoff spot in 2011, including a catcher five times and even Evan Longoria for three games at the end of May. In all, he used 130 different batting orders, wore a football helmet to a postgame media session, and ejected the entire umpiring crew in an early April game in Chicago that was reminiscent of Scarface's restaurant scene in the movie *Half-Baked*. He works closely with the front office staff behind the scenes to comb through the data available to see where the team can make up the gaps. He also comes to them with things he picks up while observing the game from the dugout or reading up on his iPad. Baseball Info Solutions tells us the Rays had more defensive shifts employed during outs made on the field than any team in baseball in 2011 by a considerable margin. The data on where to place the fielders comes from the spray charts and other data the back office group shares with Maddon. This relationship originally began when Maddon employed the Danks Theory at the behest of the guys behind the curtain. They had noted how much Danks struggled with left-handed hitters; his changeup on the outside corner that so effectively neutralized right-handed hitters was useless on lefties. Maddon mixes together advanced data and scouting into a

mix of what he often refers to as "the information at hand" to put a winning product on the field. *Sports Illustrated* published a players' poll this season that had 291 responses from players; Maddon was selected as the Most Popular Manager by the group. When you see how he openly encourages aggressive mistakes, how he sets up road trip dress themes for the team, and how he runs a self-described "Republican-style running game" with the players, it is easy to see why players enjoy playing for him. Merlot Joe, as he is known in the area, loves his wines, but you will never hear him whine about what the Rays do not have on the roster. He takes what he is given. With the tools at hand, he has guided the Rays to the postseason in three of the last four seasons and to the third-highest win total over the past four seasons behind only the huge payrolls in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.

2011: Maddon continues to carve a niche as one of the majors' best and most interesting managers, comfortable with progressive thought yet grounded in traditionalism, renowned both for his rapport with players and his facility in adhering to the front office's occasionally unorthodox ways. In 2010, he coaxed an offense that ranked 13th in batting average to the league's third-highest run total—from a team playing in a pitchers' park, no less—because of his appreciation of the virtues of OBP. He experimented with catcher John Jaso in the leadoff role despite his lack of speed, and worked a decent season out of the displaced B.J. Upton. He batted the center fielder lower in the lineup despite some ups and downs, reaping the benefits of Upton's rebound against lefties after an off year. Maddon took advantage of the versatility of Ben Zobrist and Sean Rodriguez to work around minor injuries and slumps elsewhere in the lineup, led the league in pinch-hitters by a wide margin (173, batting .245/.343/.422) and along the way managed to secure the platoon advantage for his hitters 63.4 percent of the time, the league's second-highest clip. He didn't overdo one-run strategies, yet the Rays ranked second in the league in stolen-base opportunities, third in success rate, and first in BRR. The presence of Rafael Soriano allowed him to adhere to a traditional closer model with regard to his bullpen, which didn't stop his relief corps from leading the league in WXRL and placing three relievers in the individual top 10. He'll be faced with a very different bullpen in 2011, and indeed a very different team, but his flexibility and patience should continue to work in the Rays' favor.

2010: Maddon's skills as a motivator received plenty of attention throughout the Rays' 2008 climb from the basement to the World Series, but for all the Camus quotes and "9=8" t-shirts, neither his motivational ability nor his tactical skills were enough to help the team return to the postseason in 2009. Though he did well to find playing time for the versatile and suddenly unstoppable Ben Zobrist, and adhered strictly to a right-field platoon, he could do little to coax adequate performances out of the walking wounded Pat Burrell, Dioner Navarro, and B.J. Upton. Indeed, though the offense continued to hum in spite of their struggles, it may have been prudent for Maddon to seek out alternatives, at least in a part-time capacity. As for the pitching staff, though Maddon rode many of the same horses as the year before—always a danger for a successful skipper who feels bound by sentiment to rely on "my guys"—he got considerably less out of those standbys, particularly the ones in his bullpen. After the team's late 2008 success provided at least some amount of vindication for a matchup-based late-inning solution, he vacillated between a desire to rely upon a proven closer (Troy Percival early, J.P. Howell later on) with diminishing returns. The addition of Rafael Soriano and his closer-like salary should make Maddon's bullpen machinations one area to keep an eye on in 2010.

2009: When Joe Maddon came to camp spouting his "9=8" slogan, it seemed like another version of Pancho Villa's supposed last words: "Don't let it end like this. Tell them I said something." After all, Maddon was entering his third year at the Tampa helm, and though the team's indisputable failures in the first two seasons were clearly more the fault of a neglected roster than anything he had done or failed to do, even as pragmatic a front office as that of the Rays might prefer to make a change after yet another flop season. Yet, the slogan, which meant that nine committed players could win one of eight playoff spots, did capture, if not the reality of the Rays, some of the "impossible dream" spirit of the effort of winning the team's first pennant and grabbed the imagination of a group of players who had every right to be skeptical. However, it also shortchanged Madden's own contribution, which was to guide the club to a 180-degree reversal in two key categories, WXRL and defensive efficiency. The Rays went worst-to-first in both categories from 2007 to 2008. Maddon the tactician was not always the equal of Maddon the motivator. Handicapped by many injuries, he tried his best to patch by creating platoons at designated hitter and right field, but production at both positions was weak, and the usage required him to pinch-hit more often than any manager in the AL, but he could not find a successful pinch-hitter. The Rays were also a poor baserunning club (23rd in the majors in EQBRR) despite leading the league in steals with an acceptable success rate. Finally, his failure to use his lefty relievers in spot matchups opened him to criticism during the playoffs. Maddon did show imagination in embracing Ben Zobrist's unexpected power surge and in turning to the inexperienced David Price in key playoff situations in the absence of an experienced closer.

| Cha  | arlie | е Ма   | nuel          |           |           | M         | gr  | B   | ¶ P | н               |     |     |           |          |     |     |     |     |            |          |            |         |       |         |
|------|-------|--------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|----------|------------|---------|-------|---------|
| YEAR | TM    | W-L    | Pythag<br>+/- | Avg<br>PC | 100+<br>P | 120+<br>P | QS  | BQS | REL | REL w<br>Zero R | IBB | PH  | PH<br>Avg | PH<br>HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | SAC<br>Att | Sac<br>% | POS<br>SAC | Squeeze | Swing | in Play |
| 2000 | CLE   | 90-72  | -3.2          | 97.4      | 81        | 19        | 70  | 2   | 463 | 348             | 45  | 62  | .211      | 0        | 26  | 3   | 2   | 0   | 53         | 96.2%    | 48         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2001 | CLE   | 91-71  | 2.8           | 90.8      | 61        | 9         | 63  | 9   | 483 | 385             | 44  | 96  | .244      | 2        | 15  | 5   | 0   | 0   | 72         | 88.9%    | 59         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | CLE   | 74-88  | 3.0           | 96.7      | 82        | 5         | 74  | 5   | 421 | 306             | 38  | 87  | .224      | 0        | 3   | 3   | 0   | 1   | 55         | 85.5%    | 45         | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2005 | PHI   | 88-74  | -1.5          | 93.0      | 57        | 3         | 84  | 4   | 442 | 337             | 51  | 263 | .232      | 4        | 17  | 1   | 0   | 0   | 95         | 74.7%    | 34         | 0       | 303   | 83      |
| 2006 | PHI   | 85-77  | -1.1          | 92.8      | 55        | 2         | 74  | 5   | 500 | 393             | 63  | 295 | .210      | 3        | 5   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 91         | 65.9%    | 31         | 0       | 242   | 69      |
| 2007 | PHI   | 89-73  | 1.3           | 92.6      | 54        | 1         | 74  | 7   | 498 | 388             | 62  | 261 | .227      | 9        | 11  | 2   | 1   | 0   | 94         | 73.4%    | 30         | 1       | 349   | 113     |
| 2008 | PHI   | 92-70  | -2.0          | 95.9      | 61        | 2         | 88  | 5   | 468 | 384             | 64  | 280 | .254      | 9        | 17  | 2   | 0   | 1   | 99         | 73.7%    | 27         | 1       | 329   | 99      |
| 2009 | PHI   | 93-69  | 0.3           | 97.4      | 86        | 7         | 83  | 4   | 459 | 351             | 31  | 268 | .184      | 9        | 21  | 8   | 2   | 1   | 81         | 72.8%    | 18         | 0       | 322   | 98      |
| 2010 | PHI   | 97-65  | 1.0           | 98.4      | 86        | 4         | 94  | 9   | 452 | 362             | 42  | 269 | .188      | 8        | 20  | 3   | 0   | 2   | 70         | 68.6%    | 19         | 1       | 279   | 101     |
| 2011 | PHI   | 102-60 | -2.5          | 98.0      | 86        | 10        | 107 | 7   | 394 | 308             | 41  | 259 | .236      | 4        | 15  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 91         | 74.7%    | 28         | 0       | 276   | 105     |

2012: Charlie Manuel's Virginia drawl and Droopy Dog visage often give the impression that he isn't paying attention very closely. To a certain type of baseball fan, so too does his calling for the third-fewest intentional walks and the tied-for-fifth-fewest sacrifices in the league last year. From a traditionalist perspective, Manuel can look like a go-along-to-get-along player's manager who cannot make the tough decisions. Face facts: This is a guy who once thought it was a good idea to wear a football face mask at the plate to protect a broken jaw. But he's also a guy who coaxed a star turn from John Mayberry by pinch-hitting him liberally against lefties when he wasn't yet the starter. Even after the departure of former Phillies first-base coach Davey Lopes, Manuel led the Phillies to an 80 percent stolen-base percentage. In a season in which the closer role was like a lightning rod for injury, he built a coherent bullpen and doled out high-leverage appearances roughly in proportion to reliever quality. Charlie Manuel is quietly one of the brightest baseball men in the game whose theories of pure hitting are as detailed as the velvety tapestry of his prolonged vowels.

2011: Manuel's press conferences are the highlight of every Phillies postgame. Last year he featured references to '80s wrestling icon Ric Flair, warnings to other teams that he would steal their signs if he could, and an age-old reminder that sometimes the bear eats you rather than the other way around. His nuggets of West Virginian wisdom do a nice job of masking the depth of his knowledge of baseball minutiae, making him easy to underestimate. He doesn't mess with his lineup unless he has to—which he did often in 2010, as injuries struck with greater frequency than they had in recent years. His teams have experienced excellent success on the basepaths, and in 2010 the Phillies again boasted the highest stolen-base percentage in baseball. Manuel will be without highly-regarded first-base coach Davey Lopes in 2011, so it remains to be seen whether the team's running game will remain among the league's best. Manuel's approach to offense is mostly hands-off, which breeds frustration when the team doesn't score runs, but pays dividends overall. The biggest knock against him last year was his usage of his right-handed fourth outfielder Ben Francisco, who faced more righties than he did lefties.

2010: The only manager in Phillies history to win two pennants with the club, Manuel prefers to stay out of the spotlight, his light touch endearing him to sabermetricians in the process. He runs because his team can, finishing first in double-steals, but among full-season NL skippers, only Ken Macha ordered fewer position-player sac bunts, and only Tony La Russa issued fewer intentional walks. Manuel does not overreact to small sample sizes, letting players work through slumps, and changing his lineup only rarely: he consistently has the least lineup variation in the game. Far from perfect, Manuel makes some questionable in-game pitching moves, and his fixation with retaining the struggling Brad Lidge in the closer role was a case of loyalty (and perhaps also dollars) transcending common sense. He makes his biggest impact with his understanding of hitting, as many hitters have improved under his watch, even since he became manager, and his emphasis on patiently waiting for your pitch has helped a number of talented hitters become major-league run producers.

**2009**: Manuel may not be the classic, generalized ideal of a sabermetric manager, but if there's a good reason why not, we'd like to hear it. On offense, he runs with the people he should, avoids bunting with his position players over much, and pinch-hits aggressively with a bench full of players capable of delivering in different situations. On defense, he uses his bullpen creatively in a way that reflects an understanding of what his pitchers' specific skill sets are instead of following a more standard-issue platoon differential-driven playbook, he doesn't get overly cute with his rotation despite considerable in-season uncertainty. In short, he uses his entire roster, generally tries to sort out what people can do and sets them to it, and he's gotten considerable good work out of other people's cast-offs. If that isn't sound management, what is? He will probably never win a Manager of the Year Award—setting aside any readiness for city slickers to get tripped up by the Appalachian accent, appreciation of his skill in game and roster management is probably best observed on the diamond, and not in the interview room.

| Mik  | ce N | lath | eny    |     |      | M    | gr | B   | ₹ SI | LN       |        |      |          |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|------|--------|-----|------|------|----|-----|------|----------|--------|------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |      | Pythag | Avg | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |      | REL w    |        |      | PH       | PH     |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L  | +/-    | PC  | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL  | Zero R   | IBB    | PH   | Avg      | HR     | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %   | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
|      |      |      |        |     |      |      |    |     |      | no maior | looduc | mana | rorial a | norior | 000 |     |     |     |     |     |     |         |       |         |

2012: This space was to be a dispassionate, reasoned analysis of Game 5 of the 2011 World Series, a managerial quagmire of such breadth and depth that it might never be fully explained or understood. That plan changed somewhat after the Cardinals rallied to win the final two games of the Series and the championship, La Russa's second title in St. Louis and the third of his career. And that plan changed again, more dramatically, when La Russa announced his retirement the day after the Cardinals celebrated their 11th title with a parade through downtown St. Louis. La Russa's legacy is unquestioned, starting with his rank of third on the all-time list of managerial victories. Former Cards catcher Mike Matheny, who has never managed at any level, faces a daunting task in living up to his predecessor.

| Do   | n M | attir | igly   |      |      | M    | gr | B   | L   | AN     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2011 | IAN | 82-79 | -2.6   | 97.8 | 66.0 | 3.0  | 94 | 4   | 461 | 369    | 48  | 229 | .199 | 4  | 17  | 9   | 1   | 0   | 101 | 80.2% | 46  | 2       | 360   | 118     |

2012: It's easy to find faults with some of the rookie manager's decisions. Tactically, Mattingly fell into too many one-run traps for an offense-challenged ballclub. The Dodgers ranked fourth in the league in positional sacrifice bunts and fifth in hit-and-run plays. They did run the bases well (fifth in EqBRR), a testament to the influence of first-base coach Davey Lopes. Mattingly gave far too many at-bats to the low-wattage likes of Gwynn, Sellers, and Miles in the lineup's top two spots, and too much playing time to the aforementioned when he could have given Ivan DeJesus Jr. a shot. On the other hand, he strung together a reasonably effective bullpen despite the losses of Broxton, Kuo, and Padilla, and nursed outstanding partial seasons out of a host of green rookie pitchers. He kept a poorly designed team 10 games under .500 at the All-Star break invested enough to go 41-28 in the second half despite a sea of empty seats, a growing reaction to the maelstrom of McCourt misery that continuously threatened to overshadow the team. Most teams would have packed it in for a 95-loss season. This one didn't, and the credit for that has to land somewhere.

2011: In his 30th and final year of managing, Joe Torre presided over a team whose second-half collapse owed much to the failings of the same young, homegrown stars who had fueled his success in guiding the Dodgers to the NLCS in his previous two campaigns. He's not the first septuagenarian manager to have trouble bridging the generation gap, but in allowing members of his coaching staff to take public shots at Russell Martin and Matt Kemp, Torre made it easier for his players to tune him out as an old codger despite his long track record as a player's manager. Torre didn't cover himself in glory elsewhere, overworking key members of his bullpen early in the season in typical Torre fashion and often failing to get Jonathan Broxton into the situations that mattered most. Taking over in the wake of his retirement is Don Mattingly, who has never managed at any level; he served six-and-a-half seasons as a coach for Torre, all but one of them as a hitting coach. In the rare moments that he's had the chance to run a team, he's shown his inexperience, making a series of widely ridiculed basic errors. While his strategic preferences may be unknown, as a former star two decades younger than Torre, Mattingly has a better shot at reaching the youngsters; he was particularly vocal about connecting with Kemp in the weeks after his appointment, a move which may help motivate the star-caliber center fielder for 2011 and beyond.

| Bo   | b M | elvin |        |       |      | M    | gr | <b>3</b> | O A | AK     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|-------|--------|-------|------|------|----|----------|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |       | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |    |          |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L   | +/-    | PC    | P    | P    | QS | BQS      | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2003 | SEA | 93-69 | -5.7   | 101.9 | 108  | 6    | 94 | 8        | 366 | 305    | 24  | 62  | .154 | 2  | 19  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 52  | 75.0% | 36  | 1       | 248   | 91      |
| 2004 | SEA | 63-99 | -4.8   | 101.7 | 99   | 12   | 70 | 10       | 414 | 305    | 32  | 99  | .276 | 4  | 18  | 9   | 0   | 0   | 63  | 82.5% | 51  | 0       | 355   | 112     |
| 2005 | ARI | 77-85 | 12.5   | 96.6  | 64   | 3    | 84 | 10       | 458 | 330    | 43  | 309 | .232 | 9  | 3   | 4   | 0   | 1   | 107 | 71.0% | 32  | 1       | 281   | 86      |
| 2006 | ARI | 76-86 | -3.4   | 94.9  | 68   | 3    | 81 | 8        | 461 | 349    | 44  | 274 | .194 | 7  | 11  | 4   | 1   | 0   | 94  | 70.2% | 25  | 0       | 237   | 80      |
| 2007 | ARI | 90-72 | 11.2   | 94.7  | 68   | 4    | 84 | 5        | 469 | 367    | 38  | 239 | .239 | 11 | 18  | 8   | 1   | 0   | 85  | 71.8% | 32  | 0       | 295   | 89      |
| 2008 | ARI | 82-80 | -0.6   | 95.7  | 55   | 3    | 95 | 3        | 443 | 336    | 41  | 257 | .226 | 3  | 12  | 5   | 0   | 2   | 95  | 74.7% | 32  | 1       | 261   | 89      |
| 2009 | ARI | 12-17 | 0.2    | 95.9  | 10   | 0    | 16 | 2        | 91  | 64     | 3   | 47  | .209 | 3  | 5   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 18  | 61.1% | 8   | 0       | 61    | 17      |
| 2011 | OAK | 47-52 | -0.3   | 100.4 | 51   | 1    | 55 | 3        | 282 | 220    | 9   | 30  | .276 | 2  | 19  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 38  | 78.9% | 28  | 0       | 229   | 63      |

2012: After finishing his playing career just a bit shy of 1 WAR, former catcher Bob Melvin has had a more successful career

as a manager, one that gets to start another act with the Oakland Athletics. Known for his insider communication skills and player-friendly approach, Melvin will face a tough task as a full-time manager. Having taken over in an interim role partway through the season, he was awarded a three-year contract in September. For all his lauded communication skills, all the talk in the world might not be enough to convince the players under his leadership that they can compete, as the A's continue to sell off major league players in exchange for younger, more cost-controlled talent. Fans of the green-and-gold hope that being close to home will allow the native of Palo Alto and one-time Manager of the Year to channel some of his latent managerial magic, as it's going to take an act of sorcery to propel the Athletics beyond the dungeon of the American League West. But with strong character and conviction, Melvin is actually a very good choice for a ship in desperate need of new supplies; it's not easy to keep a team playing hard in the face of what very well could be several 100 loss seasons in the coming years. Situation aside, Melvin will get the most from his players, and when the talent proves to be a little thin and the ship starts to sink, Melvin will be the first one to suggest they are a team with a chance to win.

**2009**: Melvin is an interesting manager in that he's an inveterate tinkerer *before* the game, treating his lineup card with an elaborate care that might have left set-lineup doyen Ralph Houk wondering how the young man ever gets out of the office. *During* the game, however, Melvin's not an especially aggressive tactician, although he got more involved with one-out strategies on the road last season. This is one of those tendencies that can help make a bad situation just that wee bit worse, and Melvin's just one of many managers who has tried to "help" in the face of mounting frustration. It would be easy to bash the man for the way Lyon-as-closer flopped, but the pen was going to come down a peg regardless, and he didn't freak out once it became obvious he didn't have a reliable lefty reliever.

| Bra  | ad N | Iills  |        |       |      | M    | gr | 岬   | НО  | U      |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|--------|--------|-------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |        | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L    | +/-    | PC    | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2010 | HOU  | 76-86  | 9.2    | 99.8  | 92   | 4    | 95 | 4   | 508 | 400    | 38  | 278 | .224 | 3  | 10  | 4   | 0   | 0   | 100 | 84.0% | 36  | 6       | 298   | 84      |
| 2011 | HOU  | 56-106 | -4.6   | 100.3 | 88   | 3    | 80 | 8   | 503 | 378    | 59  | 278 | .263 | 6  | 20  | 1   | 0   | 2   | 112 | 73.2% | 48  | 2       | 318   | 87      |

2012: Mills managed to survive the front-office purge, and he has the most important thing for the woeful Astros: the ability to see the glass as half full when it's 3/4 empty. Always expecting the best, and perhaps conditioned by six years as a bench coach watching Boston's stout starting rotations, Mills was one of just four managers who averaged more than 100 pitches from his starters. Yet, somewhat surprisingly—as Mills appeared to green-light a lot of runners—only the Padres and Mets had higher stolen-base percentages in 2011, suggesting that the optimism didn't result in recklessness. The team was about four wins under projections, coming off a 2010 season when it was a miraculous eight wins over with Mills at the reins. While stats like this can be as fickle as a closer's health, the organization—whoever is in charge at the time—may decide that a manager with less of a "positivity" approach is required once the team is ready to compete. Fortunately for Mills, that should give him a few years of job security.

2011: Mills was hired to replace Cecil Cooper prior to last season as much for his personality as his tactical skills. Mills, who spent the previous six seasons as the Red Sox' bench coach, is upbeat and has good people skills, much like Terry Francona, his former boss and best friend. The Astros needed a change of atmosphere after two years of the aloof Cooper, and Mills brought that to a team that got younger once veterans Roy Oswalt and Lance Berkman were traded in late July. The Astros went 36-27 from July 27 on and outperformed their Pythagenport record by 7.9 wins. Owner Drayton McLane was so impressed that he picked up Mills' option for 2012 and added an option year to his contract for 2013. From a strategic standpoint, Mills mostly managed by the numbers, with the exception that he allowed his starting pitchers quite a bit of leeway: the Astros had an NL-high 41 starts of at least 110 pitches.

| Ro   | n Ro | enic  | ke     |      |      | M    | gr | B   | <b>∦</b> M | IIL    |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|------------|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |            | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL        | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2011 | MIL  | 96-66 | 5.1    | 99.3 | 85   | 2    | 98 | 7   | 434        | 342    | 16  | 257 | .222 | 5  | 12  | 5   | 0   | 3   | 117 | 82.1% | 54  | 5       | 297   | 109     |

2012: On the one hand, when a manager is handed a great starting rotation, a fearsome closer, two serious MVP candidates, and a couple of other guys who've made All-Star teams, he's only expected to be a caretaker for the regular season and then shine in the playoffs. On the other hand, the Brewers featured some players who had awful defensive reputations during rookie manager Roenicke's first year at the helm, putting his decision-making to the test. To the surprise of most, he waited until the playoffs to show any drastic reactions to perceived defensive shortcomings, benching Casey McGehee and even sending Nyjer Morgan to

the penalty box (and starting Mark Kotsay in center field in the NLCS). Roenicke managed the team to five more wins than projected by Pythagenpat, despite doing a 180-degree turnaround from Ken Macha in terms of bunting (Macha's teams were actually out-bunted by some American League teams) and leading the league in sacrifice attempts. The aggressive attitude Roenicke brings motivated the team, and should continue to do so, as the players like playing for him, but throwing away outs will catch up with him, and the team will miss the lost runs even more as the actual win total drops toward the number projected by the models. Don't confuse Roenicke with a "small ball" manager on the other side of the ball, though. In addition to not placing an emphasis on defense, he was responsible for Brewers pitchers issuing as few intentional walks as any NL team (the Diamondbacks also issued just 16 to tie for the lowest total in the league). In other areas of the game, Roenicke's decisions were mainstream, with lineups and platoons that made sense, typical bullpen usage, and—belying his "Runnin' Ron" nickname—a relative reluctance to employ the stolen base (fifth-least stolen base attempts in the National League, with the sixth-best success rate).

| Mil  | ke S | cios   | cia    |       |      | M    | gr | E.  | A   | NA     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|--------|--------|-------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |        | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L    | +/-    | PC    | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2000 | ANA  | 82-80  | 1.5    | 92.0  | 64   | 6    | 58 | 9   | 441 | 341    | 44  | 86  | .231 | 2  | 13  | 4   | 0   | 1   | 57  | 94.7% | 51  | 4       | -     | -       |
| 2001 | ANA  | 75-87  | -1.6   | 97.2  | 73   | 5    | 83 | 10  | 385 | 303    | 47  | 86  | .200 | 4  | 20  | 3   | 1   | 4   | 61  | 90.2% | 55  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | ANA  | 99-63  | -4.0   | 99.3  | 86   | 5    | 94 | 8   | 400 | 334    | 24  | 103 | .281 | 2  | 15  | 8   | 0   | 1   | 64  | 95.3% | 58  | 3       | -     | -       |
| 2003 | ANA  | 77-85  | -3.2   | 94.2  | 63   | 1    | 65 | 5   | 375 | 310    | 38  | 97  | .330 | 1  | 14  | 3   | 2   | 4   | 71  | 81.7% | 57  | 2       | 362   | 117     |
| 2004 | ANA  | 92-70  | 0.5    | 96.8  | 79   | 3    | 79 | 7   | 343 | 269    | 27  | 81  | .265 | 1  | 19  | 3   | 1   | 1   | 79  | 83.5% | 64  | 3       | 458   | 130     |
| 2005 | ANA  | 95-67  | 0.5    | 96.9  | 76   | 1    | 99 | 4   | 379 | 306    | 24  | 78  | .239 | 1  | 12  | 8   | 0   | 2   | 64  | 81.3% | 51  | 2       | 417   | 138     |
| 2006 | ANA  | 89-73  | 4.3    | 97.0  | 78   | 2    | 97 | 6   | 380 | 292    | 27  | 87  | .159 | 3  | 23  | 6   | 2   | 6   | 44  | 81.8% | 34  | 2       | 452   | 154     |
| 2007 | ANA  | 94-68  | 3.5    | 97.2  | 83   | 0    | 90 | 1   | 396 | 310    | 22  | 91  | .270 | 2  | 20  | 8   | 1   | 0   | 47  | 76.6% | 35  | 2       | 424   | 142     |
| 2008 | ANA  | 100-62 | 11.5   | 99.4  | 84   | 0    | 92 | 3   | 383 | 302    | 32  | 67  | .200 | 0  | 19  | 8   | 1   | 2   | 48  | 81.3% | 39  | 1       | 364   | 113     |
| 2009 | ANA  | 97-65  | 4.0    | 96.9  | 82   | 1    | 77 | 7   | 434 | 340    | 35  | 65  | .321 | 2  | 22  | 5   | 2   | 1   | 63  | 81.0% | 49  | 3       | 447   | 134     |
| 2010 | ANA  | 80-82  | 1.5    | 102.1 | 105  | 3    | 93 | 6   | 410 | 325    | 33  | 86  | .174 | 0  | 14  | 10  | 0   | 3   | 70  | 72.9% | 50  | 3       | 400   | 125     |
| 2011 | ANA  | 86-76  | 0.8    | 101.0 | 98   | 11   | 98 | 8   | 386 | 313    | 34  | 75  | .154 | 2  | 18  | 4   | 1   | 1   | 78  | 80.8% | 59  | 1       | 417   | 144     |

2012: A veteran Angel told an ESPN reporter, not-for-attribution, that Scioscia should quit playing Jeff Mathis. Fernando Rodney openly challenged Scioscia's bullpen usage and lived to complain another day. Mike Napoli, thriving in Texas, blamed Scioscia for bumming out his time in Anaheim. Winning mutes a lot of criticism in-and-around a clubhouse, but Scioscia's Angels have now missed the playoffs in back-to-back seasons, and cracks are showing. Does any of this matter on the field? The Angels, after all, did outperform their run differential for an eighth season in a row, though by the thinnest of margins. And they held on to playoff hopes until the final series of the year, despite never having playoff odds (according to our simulations) higher than 25 percent. Their position in the standings—longshots, but shots nonetheless—made Scioscia less risk-averse than he been since 2002. When he needed a fifth-starter, he called up a 21-year-old with just one outing above Double-A. Later in the year, he added Garrett Richards and Mike Trout straight from Double-A. He moved players to positions they had never played, with short notice. He made a rookie his closer, and—for the first time since 2007—he occasionally went to his closer in the eighth inning. To some degree, he even relinquished his security blanket, Jeff Mathis, late in the season. His skill at managing catchers remains one of the mysteries of his tenure. He should be the best manager a catcher should ask for, but touted prospect Hank Conger all but dissolved under his tutelage in 2011. Scioscia's 2012 evaluation, and the Angels' success this year, will largely hinge on how much production he gets from his catchers; how successfully he gets Mike Trout into the lineup; how efficiently he can clear a seven-player pile-up at DH and the corners; and whether he extends that streak of beating Pythagoras to nine.

2011: For only the third time in his 11-year tenure as Angels manager—and the first time since 2003—Scioscia's charges finished under .500, though the Halos did manage to extend their streak of exceeding their Pythagorean record to seven seasons, if only just barely. Attributing super-Pythagorean performance to a manager's influence smacks of oversimplification, but the Angels' tendency to play better than the sum of their parts in recent campaigns had enhanced their long-time skipper's reputation. Their failure to summon a slew of wins from thin air last season may have dimmed his aura slightly, but aspects of their offensive approach invited more serious concerns. The hallmark of Scioscia's managerial style has been aggressive and intelligent baserunning, but the Halos ran themselves into outs at an unprecedented rate in 2010. Not since the skipper's first year on the job had the Angels' performance on the bases placed in the bottom half of teams, but last season they ranked 29th overall while costing themselves nearly two wins, as a league-low 66.7 percent stolen-base success rate resulted in an unsightly -15.5 stolen base runs, the worst showing by any club since the 2005 Nationals. Scioscia also ordered more sacrifice attempts than any AL manager outside of Ron Washington, and succeeded at the lowest rate in the league. He remains under contract for

eight more years, which speaks to ownership's confidence in his abilities as a leader of men—few employees enjoy that kind of job security in any field, let alone one fraught with attrition rates as high as those endemic to the major-league managing biz—but Scioscia's string-pulling last season did little to strengthen his future Hall of Fame case.

2010: Mike Scioscia is building a Hall of Fame career as a manager. Like Bobby Cox, Tony La Russa, and Joe Torre in his Bronx days, he's become inextricably identified not just with a string of successful teams but with a successful brand of baseball. The 10-year extension he signed last winter only underscores the faith that the Angels have in that brand, even as their cast changes. The 2009 club featured the most robust offense in the franchise's history, but that didn't stop Scioscia from pressing his advantage by implementing his signature running game. The Angels were second in the majors in stolen base attempts, and first in hit-and-run plays, although their runners went just 37-for-63 (58.7 percent) when hitters swung and missed in such cases, lowering their overall EqBRR total to 1.3 runs—still fifth in the league thanks to the team's MLB-leading EqHAR total (10.7 runs). In other words, their aggressiveness on the basepaths—a core component of his offensive philosophy—remains a net positive. Scioscia also managed to apply his stamp to a changing pitching staff, not only to a rotation torn apart by injury and the Adenhart tragedy (a crisis unto itself where the skipper's blend of leadership and compassion came to the fore) but a bullpen that initially struggled given significant turnover from a successful core. His deft touch with the latter remains a major factor in the Angels' continued success, as does his ability to take advantage of the team's considerable depth while challenging its younger players such as Erick Aybar, Mike Napoli, and Howie Kendrick to fully round their games.

2009: Whitey Herzog always said he'd like to show what he might do with a team of sluggers in a hitter's park, but the White Rat never did get the opportunity. Scioscia won't have to change organizations to get to find out for himself—as the Angels get older and slower, and as replacements like Kendry Morales and Brandon Wood come aboard (or in Juan Rivera's case, come back), the skipper's being handed a different sort of ballclub than the much-discussed one focused on contact and speed. Scioscia's not Chuck Tanner; he'll adapt, having already proven a steady hand with younger players, creating roles for youngsters on the margins, and avoiding the over-management of his bullpen. That's not to say he won't hit-and-run more than most, but he's not going to make people run who can't, and he's not likely to go bunt-happy. The interesting elective choices will be to see who he picks to fill Garland's slot in the rotation, who starts in the left side of the infield, and who winds up starting at first and left.

| Bu    | ck S | how    | alter  |       |      | M    | gr | B   | <b>∥</b> B/ | AL     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|-------|------|--------|--------|-------|------|------|----|-----|-------------|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
| VE4.0 |      |        | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ | 00 | 200 | 251         | REL w  |     | BU  | PH   | PH | 000 | 000 | 202 | 000 | SAC | Sac   | POS | •       |       |         |
| YEAR  | TM   | W-L    | +/-    | PC    | Р    | P    | QS | BQS | REL         | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1992  | NYA  | 76-86  | -3.6   | -     | -    | -    | 85 | 14  | 308         | 236    | 49  | 89  | .247 | 3  | 13  | 4   | 0   | 2   | 36  | 86.1% | 31  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1993  | NYA  | 88-74  | 0.9    | -     |      | -    | 81 | 13  | 333         | 253    | 58  | 131 | .272 | 4  | 4   | 4   | 1   | 0   | 37  | 70.3% | 26  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1994  | NYA  | 70-43  | 0.9    | -     | -    | -    | 61 | 8   | 241         | 181    | 24  | 79  | .232 | 4  | 7   | 4   | 0   | 0   | 37  | 89.2% | 33  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1995  | NYA  | 79-66  | 0.4    | -     |      | -    | 74 | 5   | 302         | 233    | 21  | 103 | .266 | 1  | 4   | 5   | 0   | 1   | 27  | 92.6% | 25  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1998  | ARI  | 65-97  | 0.0    | 89.5  | 59   | 8    | 75 | 18  | 368         | 267    | 32  | 248 | .171 | 3  | 5   | 4   | 1   | 2   | 70  | 74.3% | 22  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1999  | ARI  | 100-62 | -4.2   | 103.2 | 107  | 27   | 98 | 7   | 382         | 298    | 48  | 216 | .321 | 5  | 16  | 3   | 2   | 1   | 77  | 87.0% | 27  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2000  | ARI  | 85-77  | 0.0    | 94.9  | 63   | 18   | 84 | 8   | 390         | 294    | 53  | 248 | .230 | 2  | 12  | 8   | 0   | 2   | 85  | 78.8% | 26  | 3       | -     | -       |
| 2003  | TEX  | 71-91  | 2.8    | 87.9  | 45   | 4    | 51 | 7   | 494         | 347    | 45  | 72  | .177 | 0  | 4   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 38  | 84.2% | 29  | 0       | 260   | 90      |
| 2004  | TEX  | 89-73  | 1.5    | 92.3  | 47   | 3    | 61 | 6   | 468         | 381    | 29  | 75  | .143 | 1  | 5   | 4   | 0   | 0   | 37  | 70.3% | 25  | 0       | 257   | 87      |
| 2005  | TEX  | 79-83  | -2.7   | 92.5  | 66   | 2    | 66 | 2   | 454         | 325    | 31  | 43  | .238 | 3  | 6   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 12  | 75.0% | 9   | 0       | 304   | 92      |
| 2006  | TEX  | 80-82  | -6.1   | 91.0  | 46   | 0    | 74 | 2   | 489         | 378    | 18  | 37  | .182 | 0  | 6   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 35  | 74.3% | 23  | 0       | 253   | 83      |
| 2010  | BAL  | 34-23  | 2.7    | 98.7  | 31   | 0    | 36 | 3   | 144         | 106    | 10  | 15  | .154 | 0  | 4   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 15  | 80.0% | 12  | 0       | 78    | 26      |
| 2011  | BAL  | 69-93  | 3.6    | 91.8  | 50   | 0    | 60 | 6   | 478         | 351    | 42  | 57  | .309 | 1  | 7   | 5   | 0   | 0   | 41  | 65.9% | 26  | 2       | 309   | 97      |

2012: Buck Showalter has received more press this offseason than usual, thanks to the shake-up in the Orioles front office. With team president Andy MacPhail stepping down, there were rumors that Showalter could move upstairs to take the reins. He'll ultimately stay on as field general, but it appears he will have input in personnel decisions. Showalter has been around the game a long time and doesn't have a reputation as a progressive thinker, more fitting the "baseball man" mold. Old-school attitudes fly well enough in the dugout, but the GM chair needs to be filled by someone who is open to varied approaches and is well-versed in the statistical side. Showalter is known as a strict leader who expects a lot of his players; a team stocked with youngsters will benefit from his presence in the clubhouse. On the field, his tactics were a mixed bag in 2011. He employed the second fewest sacrifices in baseball but intentionally walked more batters than average. He wasn't afraid to plug new faces into the rotation when things weren't working, but there's only so much a manager can do when just three of the 12 starters he used posted ERAs under 5.00. While Showalter provides a net positive as skipper, the O's should be careful about giving him too much say in the front office, particularly in terms of major league acquisitions.

2011: Whether we should infer a causal relationship from that sequence of events is unclear, but after GM Andy MacPhail expressed his hope to "ignite a spark" by switching skippers, he got an inferno: following an unremarkable stretch under interim manager Juan Samuel, the team began winning at a torrid pace under "permanent" hire Buck Showalter. The immediate on-field turnaround—detailed elsewhere in this chapter—that followed his installation appears to have been divorced from any in-game decisions Showalter may have made, since the new skipper was tactically inert, pulling relatively few strings as he familiarized himself with his roster. The passage of time might not give rise to increased in-game activity, given that Showalter's Rangers ranked at or near the bottom of the league in intentional passes and sac bunts in his last two seasons at the helm, though they also led the league in relievers used (which was as much a function of their poor pitching as a quick hook on the manager's part). After inheriting the Orioles, Showalter's work in the clubhouse drew rave reviews, as players and observers alike responded to a newfound culture of discipline, accountability, and attention to detail, tinged with an undercurrent of anxiety emitted by a passel of young players anxious to prove their worth to the arbiter of their playing time. If history is any guide, Showalter will wear out his welcome a few years down the road, but he has a chance to make something of a pliable young team before his approach loses its luster. His success will hinge on the work of new pitching coach Mark Connor, who's served as Buck's sidekick in each of his three stints as skipper. Connor has a reputation for a hands-off approach with veterans, but he'll have to take an active role as he attempts to cajole some consistency out of the Orioles' young staff.

| Da   | le S | veun | n      |      |      | M    | gr |     | CH  | IN     |     |    |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |      | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |    | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L  | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2008 | MIL  | 7-5  | 0.0    | 77.8 | 3    | 1    | 2  | 1   | 46  | 40     | 2   | 32 | .231 | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 13  | 69.2% | 7   | 0       | 23    | 7       |

2012: A favorite pastime of casual fans everywhere is playing the "guess how hard someone is trying" game. Of course, the players are professionals, among the top 1000 or so in their field, and have dedicated their life to the sport of baseball, but when teams lose, fans need somewhere to direct their rage. So the guys who have a relaxed demeanor get an abundance of blame. Hence, when a new manager says that all his players will play hard, it's mostly pablum for the masses, an announcement that he's going to work on making his players appear to try harder. Yet that's important. It may or may not help motivate the other professional athletes on the team, but part of baseball is show business, and selling the product is always important. Sveum's tactics remain to be seen, but at least he's not expected to be a bunt-tastic manager like Ron Roenicke, under whom he did his last stint as hitting coach. He's shown leadership skills in his various coaching positions, and is expected to be a hard worker and open to some introduction of advanced concepts into the managerial routine. In choosing a rookie manager, the new front office has hopes that Sveum can turn into the face of the franchise. He has emphasized his belief that being body-language neutral is important, citing Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Jim Leyland as his biggest influences. That is likely to go a long way toward keeping things on track in Wrigley Field's tiny, archaic clubhouse and helping the team deal with the massive changes that appear to be on the horizon. It won't, however, win the hearts of the casual fans, who often confuse a steady mien with "not trying." He'll just have to win games to convince them.

| Jim  | Tra | су    |               |           |           | M         | gr | B   | C   | )L              |     |     |           |          |     |     |     |     |            |          |            |         |       |         |
|------|-----|-------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|----------|------------|---------|-------|---------|
| YEAR | TM  | W-L   | Pythag<br>+/- | Avg<br>PC | 100+<br>P | 120+<br>P | QS | BQS | REL | REL w<br>Zero R | IBB | PH  | PH<br>Avg | PH<br>HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | SAC<br>Att | Sac<br>% | POS<br>SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2001 | LAN | 86-76 | 3.5           | 96.3      | 65        | 6         | 88 | 10  | 408 | 285             | 37  | 253 | .194      | 6        | 9   | 4   | 1   | 2   | 75         | 82.7%    | 25         | 4       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | LAN | 92-70 | 2.7           | 92.7      | 50        | 3         | 97 | 4   | 424 | 330             | 45  | 271 | .276      | 4        | 9   | 4   | 0   | 1   | 90         | 82.2%    | 36         | 1       |       |         |
| 2003 | LAN | 85-77 | 1.4           | 94.8      | 59        | 3         | 97 | 3   | 438 | 372             | 35  | 236 | .224      | 3        | 7   | 5   | 0   | 2   | 110        | 70.0%    | 38         | 1       | 208   | 57      |
| 2004 | LAN | 93-69 | 3.4           | 89.4      | 44        | 4         | 87 | 4   | 460 | 367             | 47  | 285 | .211      | 9        | 10  | 3   | 1   | 3   | 108        | 67.6%    | 40         | 5       | 283   | 89      |
| 2005 | LAN | 71-91 | -2.1          | 91.8      | 53        | 6         | 79 | 7   | 458 | 335             | 34  | 296 | .229      | 4        | 4   | 2   | 0   | 0   | 90         | 73.3%    | 25         | 2       | 270   | 96      |
| 2006 | PIT | 67-95 | -2.5          | 94.4      | 58        | 2         | 73 | 3   | 505 | 379             | 62  | 261 | .226      | 5        | 5   | 3   | 0   | 2   | 90         | 81.1%    | 41         | 0       | 251   | 81      |
| 2007 | PIT | 68-94 | -0.5          | 92.4      | 48        | 1         | 74 | 8   | 495 | 355             | 55  | 238 | .231      | 9        | 6   | 2   | 0   | 1   | 86         | 77.9%    | 28         | 2       | 271   | 85      |
| 2009 | COL | 74-42 | 4.3           | 95.9      | 56        | 5         | 68 | 6   | 349 | 278             | 40  | 183 | .279      | 3        | 9   | 2   | 0   | 2   | 81         | 80.2%    | 39         | 3       | 266   | 78      |
| 2010 | COL | 83-79 | -3.8          | 95.9      | 66        | 9         | 86 | 4   | 513 | 407             | 54  | 256 | .236      | 6        | 10  | 6   | 1   | 0   | 83         | 77.1%    | 32         | 2       | 349   | 110     |
| 2011 | COL | 73-89 | -3.8          | 94.0      | 56        | 0         | 71 | 3   | 517 | 410             | 47  | 251 | .221      | 4        | 11  | 3   | 1   | 1   | 109        | 76.1%    | 38         | 1       | 423   | 145     |

2012: Since taking over as manager of the Rockies at the end of May 2009 and leading them to the postseason that year, Tracy hasn't enjoyed much success in Colorado. That 2009 showing led to his being named National League Manager of the Year, but he followed with a lackluster 83-79 showing. Still, there was reason to be hopeful entering 2011, in a division devoid of any single dominant team. Much of the core of that 2009 club remained, but injuries to key players (Ubaldo Jimenez, Jorge de la Rosa) conspired to undermine the Rockies; beyond that, there were undercurrents of discontent within the ranks. Tracy's calm demeanor in the face of mounting losses rubbed some people the wrong way. It is oversimplifying matters and perhaps too

convenient to blame a team's struggles on the manager's personality, but at some point perception becomes a problem. When the skipper has to spend time fighting (or avoiding) public relations battles, he has less time to work on fixing whatever ails his team. Tracy is no stranger to such battles, as he saw even more explosive ones toward the end of his Dodgers tenure (Milton Bradley vs. Jeff Kent, anyone?). In addition, Tracy drew criticism for his handling of Ian Stewart, who in May was shipped to Triple-A so that veteran imports Ty Wigginton (who wasn't hitting at the time) and Jose Lopez (who won't ever hit) could get their plate appearances while a once-promising youngster drafted by the organization languished in Colorado Springs. Stewart's poor showing isn't Tracy's fault, but it would be interesting to know how the third baseman, traded to the Cubs in December, might have responded had he been given the opportunity to work through his difficulties at the big-league level.

2011: Jim Tracy's hands-off approach was a welcome and effective alternative to Clint Hurdle's over-managing in 2009, but at times in 2010 it seemed as though Tracy was asleep at the wheel. Most problematically, he kept running out struggling veterans such as Brad Hawpe, Todd Helton, and Clint Barmes to the detriment of the team while simultaneously showing little patience with younger players like Dexter Fowler and Chris Iannetta, both of whom received early-season demotions. Fowler established himself in center field after his return, but after a year and a half under Tracy, Iannetta's career seems to be at a crossroads not unlike that at which Hee Seop Choi found himself under Tracy in Los Angeles. A similar pattern established itself in the rotation when a thriving Jhoulys Chacin was bounced to the bullpen midseason and later lingered in the minors well past the point at which the team required his return. Meanwhile, Tracy's push-button bullpen management resulted in Matt Belisle leading the majors with 92 relief innings. On one particularly perplexing occasion, Belisle, despite being just the third man out of the Rockies' pen that night, was allowed to lose an extra-inning game in his third inning of work, while pitching for the third consecutive day, without so much as another man warming up behind him. In a similar case of Tracy perhaps over-relying on a single pitcher, all nine of the 120-plus-pitch starts listed above were made by Ubaldo Jimenez, who topped out at 128 pitches in his no-hitter and matched that total in his other shutout.

2010: When long-time skipper Clint Hurdle was jettisoned after an 18-28 start, newly-installed bench coach Jim Tracy was handed the reins. The Rockies were a talented, underachieving bunch at the time of his arrival, and Tracy immediately decided the best approach would be to sort out their roles and let them play. He reworked an injured and ineffective bullpen, lending permanence to Huston Street in the closer role and Franklin Morales as a valuable set-up man. He installed Ian Stewart and Clint Barmes as everyday infield starters to improve the defense, and worked Carlos Gonzalez and Seth Smith into the outfield rotation. None of this was revolutionary, but once these questions were settled the Rockies responded to Tracy's "light fuse, get away" approach and launched themselves into contention and an eventual wild-card berth. As much as we like to applaud managers for their tactical brilliance, sometimes it's the application of fundamental personnel management techniques that realize the largest gains in the win column.

| Bo   | bby | Vale  | ntine  |       |      | M    | gr |     | ВО  | S      |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|-----|-------|--------|-------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |     |       | Pythag | Avg   | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM  | W-L   | +/-    | PC    | Р    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 1985 | TEX | 53-76 | 2.2    | -     | -    | -    | 52 | 8   | 208 | 156    | 30  | 116 | .295 | 3  | 15  | 8   | 0   | 3   | 38  | 84.2% | 32  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1986 | TEX | 87-75 | 3.0    | -     |      | -    | 74 | 6   | 328 | 267    | 37  | 109 | .214 | 4  | 11  | 17  | 2   | 4   | 46  | 82.6% | 38  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 1987 | TEX | 75-87 | -3.5   | -     | -    | -    | 63 | 13  | 329 | 240    | 34  | 166 | .210 | 6  | 16  | 13  | 0   | 2   | 64  | 79.7% | 51  | 5       | -     | -       |
| 1988 | TEX | 70-91 | 0.9    | -     | -    | -    | 93 | 11  | 252 | 196    | 33  | 123 | .187 | 2  | 17  | 9   | 1   | 4   | 72  | 84.7% | 61  | 4       | -     |         |
| 1989 | TEX | 83-79 | 4.2    | -     | -    | -    | 82 | 8   | 323 | 268    | 42  | 167 | .257 | 3  | 11  | 5   | 2   | 3   | 83  | 84.3% | 70  | 3       | -     | -       |
| 1990 | TEX | 83-79 | 4.4    | -     | -    | -    | 84 | 11  | 304 | 231    | 39  | 247 | .221 | 3  | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 70  | 81.4% | 57  | 5       | -     | -       |
| 1991 | TEX | 85-77 | 2.5    | -     | -    | -    | 83 | 10  | 388 | 283    | 37  | 198 | .211 | 2  | 12  | 10  | 0   | 4   | 78  | 80.8% | 63  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1992 | TEX | 45-41 | 4.3    | -     | -    | -    | 51 | 4   | 190 | 129    | 19  | 85  | .264 | 2  | 8   | 1   | 0   | 3   | 31  | 83.9% | 26  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 1996 | NYN | 12-19 | -2.4   | 95.0  | 71   | 10   | 18 | 1   | 75  | 44     | 14  | 86  | .250 | 1  | 1   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 26  | 80.8% | 11  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1997 | NYN | 88-74 | -0.4   | 101.3 | 91   | 9    | 96 | 6   | 377 | 263    | 43  | 303 | .249 | 11 | 17  | 9   | 1   | 7   | 85  | 80.0% | 45  | 3       | -     | -       |
| 1998 | NYN | 88-74 | -0.3   | 92.0  | 66   | 19   | 95 | 10  | 399 | 301    | 59  | 294 | .224 | 4  | 13  | 6   | 0   | 0   | 114 | 83.3% | 52  | 2       | -     | -       |
| 1999 | NYN | 97-66 | 0.8    | 93.5  | 63   | 13   | 87 | 7   | 439 | 344    | 53  | 306 | .200 | 2  | 26  | 10  | 0   | 2   | 78  | 92.3% | 35  | 0       | -     | -       |
| 2000 | NYN | 94-68 | 5.8    | 100.1 | 97   | 17   | 86 | 7   | 411 | 313    | 42  | 287 | .248 | 7  | 9   | 4   | 0   | 1   | 81  | 90.1% | 30  | 1       | -     | -       |
| 2001 | NYN | 82-80 | 9.5    | 96.6  | 85   | 9    | 98 | 9   | 397 | 308    | 60  | 278 | .233 | 1  | 7   | 6   | 0   | 6   | 73  | 83.6% | 37  | 7       | -     | -       |
| 2002 | NYN | 75-86 | -4.0   | 97.0  | 72   | 8    | 81 | 5   | 451 | 356    | 75  | 300 | .245 | 6  | 8   | 5   | 1   | 3   | 103 | 82.5% | 50  | 5       | -     |         |

**2012**: Whereas during the injury-plagued 2010 season it was difficult to find fault with much that Terry Francona did, 2011 had its moments. There was his refusal to use Dan Wheeler in higher leverage situations, even when the bullpen was thinning out. The obvious and constant push to earn Tim Wakefield career win 200 over the summer—even when it was clear holding the lead should be left to... well... pitchers like Wheeler—was a source of agony. Francona's strength was never in-game decisions,

but in his ability to run an often tumultuous clubhouse. By his own admission that was becoming too difficult, even without Manny Ramirez around. Hence the divorce of Francona and the Red Sox and the hiring of Bobby Valentine. Valentine has a background as a stats-oriented manager, and from an era when Sox fans still felt cursed, even. Valentine is always willing to try out new things if the result could be more winning baseball; when those nuggets of learning are presented by a front office as statistically-inclined as Boston's, it's easy to see why his introductory press conference caused a collective swoon for even Red Sox Nation's toughest critics. Valentine might one day outstay his welcome—as every manager does—but for now, the Red Sox likely found the best man for the job.

| Ro                                    | bin \ | Vent | tura   |     |      | M    | gr | E.  | C   | <b>IA</b> |     |    |     |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |         |       |         |
|---------------------------------------|-------|------|--------|-----|------|------|----|-----|-----|-----------|-----|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|                                       |       |      | Pythag | Avg | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w     |     |    | PH  | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR                                  | TM    | W-L  | +/-    | PC  | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R    | IBB | PH | Avg | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %   | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| no major league managerial experience |       |      |        |     |      |      |    |     |     |           |     |    |     |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |         |       |         |

2012: After the organization's oft-tempestuous eight year relationship with Ozzie Guillen, it would be easy to characterize the hiring of Ventura as a typical "rebound date" choice. The popular conception is that they are polar opposites: where Guillen was hyperkinetic, unconventional, and confrontational, Ventura is viewed as easygoing, traditional, and an organization man, more likely to work smoothly with Kenny Williams and certain to keep whatever differences they may have behind closed doors. However, missing in that analysis is the new skipper's reputation as a quietly demanding leader during his playing days—any player expecting a classic-rock cruise down the Ventura Highway will likely be in for a surprise. With Ventura having never run a clubhouse at any level, it's impossible to guess what sort of managerial tics or personnel fetishes he might display, but if he can build on his predecessor's legacy of solid pitching staff management, the Sox will be in good hands.

| Ro   | n Wa | ashiı | ngton  |      |      | M    | gr | B   | 7 T | EX     |     |    |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |    | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2007 | TEX  | 75-87 | -3.3   | 89.8 | 44   | 0    | 55 | 4   | 467 | 355    | 38  | 82 | .192 | 3  | 12  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 83  | 84.3% | 66  | 1       | 306   | 101     |
| 2008 | TEX  | 79-83 | 3.7    | 91.1 | 53   | 1    | 54 | 7   | 458 | 321    | 44  | 86 | .257 | 0  | 10  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 60  | 78.3% | 43  | 0       | 306   | 93      |
| 2009 | TEX  | 87-75 | 1.3    | 96.6 | 66   | 4    | 68 | 8   | 436 | 354    | 14  | 44 | .132 | 0  | 32  | 3   | 0   | 2   | 54  | 88.9% | 43  | 2       | 323   | 96      |
| 2010 | TEX  | 90-72 | -1.9   | 98.1 | 87   | 2    | 76 | 10  | 482 | 397    | 24  | 82 | .229 | 1  | 16  | 6   | 2   | 0   | 82  | 81.7% | 64  | 3       | 325   | 107     |
| 2011 | TEX  | 96-66 | -3.6   | 99.2 | 103  | 3    | 99 | 5   | 417 | 335    | 21  | 59 | .204 | 1  | 18  | 4   | 2   | 2   | 63  | 73.0% | 45  | 3       | 374   | 117     |

2012: As outside observers, it is difficult for us to quantify the value a manager provides for a team. Success on the field is the obvious measure of good or bad, reductive as it might be, but the talent on the field is the overwhelming deciding factor in that equation. Perhaps we might consider, then, that getting the most from that talent is the manager's most crucial role. Successful managers are sagacious psychologists, scientists of the minds of men, and what Ron Washington might lack in articulate media response or in-game management strategy he makes up for with genuine influence on the chemistry of the clubhouse. Leading a team with back-to-back World Series appearances under its belt, Washington has taken a diverse and combustible mix of personalities (from Josh Hamilton's demons to Michael Young's contentment to the foreign youth of Neftali Feliz and Elvis Andrus to the veteran maturity of Darren Oliver and Adrian Beltre) and cultivated an environment where each player has a place and a voice. As the man at the helm of a winning franchise, 59-year-old Ron Washington has already cemented himself as one of the top managers in the game. But if you ask the players who have been pushed by his voice or taught by his hand, you don't need to look at the standings to make that determination.

2011: On the morning of March 17, 2010, news broke that Washington had failed a drug test administered the previous summer. According to the reports, he had tested positive for cocaine. With the dawn of a new season freshly upon them, the Rangers' front office decided to channel their inner Tammy Wynette and stand by their man, thus setting the tone for a season that would see Washington fully embrace that theme, standing behind his players for better or worse and guiding the team to its first World Series appearance. his ability to manage the mood of the clubhouse and prepare his team to take the field are the hallmarks of his skill set, qualities that normally reside in the box of esoterica labeled "intangibles." Still, after the players lined up to support their embattled leader, it was the apparent importance of Washington's interpersonal skills to his team's fortunes made his continued presence palatable to the fanbase. On the flip side, Washington's in-game management doesn't always pass the smell test, as his bullpen management (read: mismanagement) and "small-ball" tendencies can baffle the mind. Washington presided over the most sacrifices of any AL manager. On the flip side, he also issued the fewest free passes of any AL field general save Ron Gardenhire. With an American League pennant flying in Arlington and a locker room willing to follow him once more unto the breach, Washington has, however improbably, secured his position as skipper for the foreseeable future.

2010: Washington's coaching staff still isn't exactly stocked with his selections, with pitching coach Mike Maddux being a deliberate acquisition by higher authority, while new hitting coach (and former pennant-winning Rockies skipper) Clint Hurdle was brought in to replace highly regarded hitting coach Rudy Jaramillo after the Cubs bought away the latter. That shouldn't be an instance of hauling in a stalking horse, but you never know, as "Wash" has been in hot water before. The pen was a better unit and the rotation came along extremely well, and there's no harm in sharing credit to Washington's benefit; an improved infield defense that helped create that success bore some of his stamp as a former instructor. On offense, he's becoming more and more willing to let loose with the running game, ranking third in stolen-base attempts and first in attempted and successful double steals (17-for-19); those kinds of numbers figure to go up if Borbon's starting in center. The other added kink were a few squeezes, which you can again interpret as exploiting the addition of people who can run. If there's an area of complaint, it might be over how much time he took to decide maybe Josh Hamilton's not really a center fielder, but it's a minor complaint at most.

2009: "Wash" came into his second season of skippering already under a bit of a cloud of doubt, but it wasn't like Earl Weaver was going to win with this lot. You can find plenty of nits to pick in terms of in-game tactics, whether in the management of a bad bullpen, or trying to extend starters in their better outings, only to wind up with a generous blown quality start tally. Pen management wasn't a strength, but what did he have to work with? He probably deserves some credit for how he handled a club that brought in famous former problem children Josh Hamilton and Milton Bradley; nothing bad happened, and nobody's head exploded, after all. The shakeup of the coaching staff during and after the season involved unloading a lot of overlapping legacies and other people's hires. The new coaches reflect that Washington's not getting total authority over his own staff, which is neither a good thing or bad, but it does reflect that he's not solely responsible for how things are getting done. If and when he's scapegoated if and when the Rangers manage to disappoint people again, keep that in mind.

| Eric | c We | edge  | <b>:</b> |      |      | M    | gr | B   | S   | EA     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |      |
|------|------|-------|----------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|------|
|      |      |       | Pythag   | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |      |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-      | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In F |
| 2003 | CLE  | 68-94 | -4.4     | 91.1 | 47   | 1    | 76 | 6   | 428 | 325    | 37  | 92  | .158 | 0  | 12  | 7   | 1   | 1   | 73  | 76.7% | 54  | 1       | 262   | 8    |
| 2004 | CLE  | 80-82 | -1.1     | 95.7 | 82   | 2    | 73 | 6   | 479 | 344    | 47  | 75  | .238 | 3  | 11  | 7   | 0   | 2   | 61  | 86.9% | 52  | 0       | 287   | 1    |
| 2005 | CLE  | 93-69 | -4.6     | 96.4 | 72   | 0    | 91 | 8   | 409 | 343    | 20  | 82  | .229 | 0  | 6   | 5   | 1   | 1   | 55  | 81.8% | 44  | 0       | 281   | g    |
| 2006 | CLE  | 78-84 | -11.6    | 97.4 | 80   | 2    | 82 | 11  | 377 | 269    | 35  | 93  | .244 | 2  | 5   | 4   | 0   | 0   | 43  | 83.7% | 33  | 0       | 232   | 8    |
| 2007 | CLE  | 96-66 | 3.6      | 95.7 | 68   | 1    | 94 | 7   | 395 | 302    | 42  | 111 | .276 | 4  | 6   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 43  | 88.4% | 36  | 0       | 285   | g    |
| 2008 | CLE  | 81-81 | -4.5     | 94.7 | 60   | 1    | 84 | 8   | 399 | 287    | 28  | 95  | .256 | 2  | 3   | 3   | 1   | 0   | 55  | 83.6% | 45  | 0       | 318   | 9    |
| 2009 | CLE  | 65-97 | -6.9     | 94.4 | 64   | 2    | 71 | 6   | 444 | 318    | 31  | 55  | .250 | 0  | 13  | 2   | 0   | 0   | 54  | 83.3% | 41  | 0       | 312   | 1    |
| 2011 | SEA  | 67-95 | 1.5      | 99.7 | 83   | 6    | 94 | 10  | 351 | 272    | 27  | 49  | .209 | 1  | 18  | 3   | 0   | 0   | 49  | 91.8% | 44  | 2       | 322   | Ş    |

2012: There are odd things Eric Wedge did this year that would matter... if they had mattered. If the Mariners were competing for something, and Adam Kennedy were still batting cleanup, or Carlos Peguero were still playing every day, or Ichiro were still locked into the leadoff spot, Wedge would have to explain himself. But Wedge didn't sweat the details in his first year, focusing instead on evaluating a roster that is in a state of almost total turnover. That position led to some unusual playing-time decisions, and 152 different batting orders—he used only one lineup more than twice—but it also gave him extended looks at every upper level prospect in the system. Wedge is more the leader-of-men type than a creative strategist, and little stands out about his game management. His Mariners tallied exactly the league average number of sacrifice bunts and issued one fewer intentional pass than league average. Seattle has been willing to take on a lot of "bad-makeup" guys lately, yet 2011 was a relatively drama-free season, even during a 17-game losing streak in July. Wedge deserves credit for that, and for maintaining a disciplined clubhouse that may pay long-term dividends as prospects matriculate. But the attitude demands he puts on his players—"It takes men to win championships," he said in a September radio interview—will really pay off or backfire when the Mariners are playing games that matter.

2010: If one had to pick a single word to describe the Eric Wedge era it would be "underachievement." In only one year (the division-winning 2007 campaign) did Wedge's Indians outperform their Pythagorean win expectancy, with the club winding up a total of 30 games below that during his seven-year tenure. Wedge's tenure was characterized by the annual slow start; his Indians had a .495 win percentage overall, but that breaks down to a .432 winning percentage in April and .506 the rest of the time. As a tactician, he was notable for a slow hook; even in the bullpen meltdown seasons of 2008 and 2009, Wedge was near the bottom of the league in relievers used. When Manny Acta comes to town, the bullpen should be prepared to punch the clock more often, as he has led the majors in relievers used since 2007, though some of his high totals are likely due to Washington's starting pitching (and the interchangeable cast of thousands in the Nats' pen). Wedge and Acta were similar in their relatively sparse use of the stolen base, with both managers finishing in the bottom third, though in the latter's case both the low totals

and his team's poor success rate suggests that he understood that if his Nationals couldn't run well they might as well not run often. One potential benefit of the Acta hiring that you won't see in the box scores is his ability to connect with Latino players. Some of the biggest disappointments from last year (Carmona, Rafael Perez, and Peralta) as well as the next group of key prospects (Santana, Rondon, and Carrasco) are from Latin America, and they may benefit from the lack of a language barrier between them and the manager.

**2009**: Amongst AL managers, only Mike Scioscia and Ron Gardenhire have been with their respective teams longer than Wedge, who is now entering his seventh season helming the Tribe, yet at only 41 he remains the youngest skipper in the junior circuit. Wedge has generally displayed a slow hook: he made fewer pitching changes than any other skipper in both 2006 and 2007, and last year finished ahead of only Scioscia. The Indians again got a great deal of length from their starters, who ranked fourth in innings, and the dearth of switches is also a function of having no situational lefty (Rafael Perez being a bit more valuable than that).

Offensively, Wedge sacrificed frequently for an AL manager last season, with 21 of the 43 successes coming from his second basemen. Beyond that, there's not much smallball being played by the lake, and since Wedge took over in 2003 Cleveland has not cracked the top half of the majors in stolen base percentage (it was 16th overall last year, after finishing 28th in 2007). That's mostly a reflection of the personnel on hand. He's cobbled together platoons, having been forced to mix and match in the outfield corners for the majority of his tenure, especially last season. One other thing that stands out about the Wedge-run Indians is underperformance of Pythagorean expectancy. Since 2003, Cleveland has finished a combined 19 wins below its predicted first-order records. This is likely due to the chronic hemorrhaging in the bullpen, and the general lack of a shutdown closer to prevent one-run leads from turning into one-run losses.

| Ne   | d Yo | st    |        |      |      | M    | gr | E.  | K   | CA     |     |     |      |    |     |     |     |     |     |       |     |         |       |         |
|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|------|----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------|---------|
|      |      |       | Pythag | Avg  | 100+ | 120+ |    |     |     | REL w  |     |     | PH   | PH |     |     |     |     | SAC | Sac   | POS |         |       |         |
| YEAR | TM   | W-L   | +/-    | PC   | P    | P    | QS | BQS | REL | Zero R | IBB | PH  | Avg  | HR | SB2 | CS2 | SB3 | CS3 | Att | %     | SAC | Squeeze | Swing | In Play |
| 2003 | MIL  | 68-94 | 3.1    | 95.5 | 70   | 5    | 66 | 7   | 460 | 344    | 43  | 282 | .220 | 6  | 9   | 5   | 1   | 0   | 98  | 71.4% | 37  | 1       | 267   | 82      |
| 2004 | MIL  | 67-94 | 0.6    | 93.2 | 60   | 8    | 82 | 5   | 423 | 299    | 27  | 279 | .205 | 7  | 14  | 2   | 0   | 3   | 96  | 64.6% | 34  | 1       | 358   | 101     |
| 2005 | MIL  | 81-81 | -3.3   | 99.3 | 86   | 4    | 91 | 5   | 396 | 292    | 52  | 253 | .248 | 6  | 11  | 3   | 0   | 1   | 113 | 63.7% | 47  | 5       | 298   | 100     |
| 2006 | MIL  | 75-87 | 4.6    | 94.5 | 67   | 3    | 81 | 7   | 427 | 306    | 34  | 235 | .267 | 4  | 10  | 4   | 1   | 0   | 88  | 69.3% | 23  | 1       | 294   | 96      |
| 2007 | MIL  | 83-79 | -0.6   | 94.0 | 56   | 3    | 76 | 9   | 492 | 368    | 37  | 253 | .224 | 6  | 9   | 4   | 1   | 3   | 81  | 77.8% | 24  | 0       | 321   | 100     |
| 2008 | MIL  | 83-67 | 2.2    | 96.3 | 54   | 6    | 82 | 3   | 399 | 311    | 30  | 217 | .208 | 7  | 20  | 7   | 0   | 2   | 66  | 77.3% | 21  | 3       | 333   | 108     |
| 2010 | KCA  | 55-72 | 4.1    | 96.4 | 59   | 1    | 53 | 7   | 332 | 257    | 25  | 52  | .214 | 2  | 12  | 4   | 1   | 2   | 45  | 77.8% | 30  | 0       | 281   | 78      |
| 2011 | KCA  | 71-91 | -6.5   | 96.9 | 74   | 0    | 75 | 5   | 420 | 339    | 42  | 36  | .152 | 1  | 23  | 8   | 0   | 2   | 75  | 84.0% | 58  | 2       | 399   | 113     |

2012: While his predecessor filled out 141 different lineup cards in his final full season in charge. Yost kept things relatively simple, employing just 87 total batting orders. That, in a nutshell, is what Yost is all about. He believes in his players and he believes in their roles within the team. He may drop a guy a spot or two in the order if he's scuffling, but his ideal situation is one where he fills out his first lineup on Opening Day and never looks back. That extends to the bullpen as well, where everyone has a specific role. Relievers generally enjoy knowing how they're going to be used, but in Yost's case, it led him to severely lean on a couple of select, young bullpen arms early in the season. For example, Aaron Crow emerged from the 'pen 22 times in the Royals first 52 games of the season, while Tim Collins appeared in 28 of the Royals first 51 contests of 2011. No surprise both pitchers were less effective later in the season. The way Yost handles his bullpen and employs small ball tactics offensively, you would think he still believes he's managing in the National League. (Actually, both criticisms were leveled against him during his tenure in Milwaukee, too.) The Royals like to say they are aggressive on the bases. That's all well and good, except the data shows they haven't been aggressive—they've just been foolish. Base runners attempted more steals than any team other than Tampa, but their 73 percent success rate was barely above league average. They also ran into 64 outs on the bases, fourth highest tally in the AL and their EqBRR was the fourth worst in the league. Bunt? We have bunts: Yost ordered more successful sacrifice attempts than any other skipper in the league. His time in Milwaukee proved he can handle a ballclub in transition and the growing pains that accompany young talent. However his poor in-game management didn't translate well to the pressure of a pennant race in 2008, when Milwaukee fired him with just two weeks left in the season and his team clinging to first place. Three years removed from that, with similar complaints being lodged against his managerial style, the jury is still out on whether he will be able to handle the rigors that go with taking a team to the postseason. The Royals' young hitters seem to be jelling and if The Process is to be trusted, Kansas City could soon be in contention in the AL Central. If history is any guide, they may have to find themselves another skipper to take them to the promised land of October baseball.

2011: Once again, Trey Hillman couldn't get anything going in Kansas City and was fired in mid-May, leaving behind an awful bullpen, a lineup that wasn't scoring any runs, and a rotation with roughly one-and-a-half dependable arms in it. That last deficiency was partially his own doing, thanks to the damage he caused Gil Meche in 2009 by ratcheting up the righty's pitch counts during a dead-arm period. Ned Yost inherited Hillman's leavings, and though the team still performed poorly, there were areas in which he represented an improvement. Yost let Luke Hochevar pitch through his struggles—how else was he supposed to learn?—but had a quick hook when it was necessary, unlike his predecessor. His very worst relievers pitched in the least important situations, excepting Jesse Chavez, who was called upon to retire a multitude of batters better left for more effective options. Yost rarely used subs, which isn't out of character for him, a reticence that made sense given the lack of depth on the Royals' bench for much of the season.

2009: Yost went from potential Manager of the Year to ex-manager in the span of two weeks, a tumble which prevented him from entering October with many of the players whom he had first guided (to 68 wins) in 2003. One might presume such a dramatic reversal of fortune was precipitated by some fresh revelation of weakness, but the 3-11 start to September which sealed Yost's fate only intensified pre-existing scrutiny of his tactical decisions. His periodic matchup miscues amounted to a relatively minor issue during seasons when no caliber of field generalship would have resulted in a playoff berth, but became an increasingly glaring fault as the marginal value of each Milwaukee win soared. Although Yost was better suited to a team in transition, Doug Melvin's post-firing endorsement of his former manager suggests that his historically late dismissal was less a commentary on his performance than an attempt to stave off a repeat of the '07 collapse. Yost's in-house, interim replacement, Dale Sveum, exuded calm and averted disaster in his 12-game stint, but Melvin chose to prioritize experience in his post-season search for a permanent successor, hiring former A's skipper Ken Macha, in whom he had expressed interest prior to the 2003 season. Failures in clubhouse communication (some of them involving his once and future catcher, Jason Kendall) dogged Macha during his time in Oakland; Brewers fans will have to hope that his newfound autonomy doesn't prompt him to unleash a flurry of bunts signs, restrained during four years under Billy Beane, upon an unsuspecting National League.

## Leaderboards

The PECOTA leaderboard titled "Wins Above Replacement Player, Rookies" on page 534 of <u>Baseball Prospectus 2012</u> was generated using 2011's rookies. Some of you have requested that we run the list with 2012 rookies instead. In the book, we'll generally restrict the length of these to save some space for other interesting things, but here we can give you the entire list down to a 0.2 projected WARP rather than the top 10.

| RNK | NAME                  | TM  | WARP |
|-----|-----------------------|-----|------|
| 1   | Yu Darvish            | TEX | 4.2  |
| 2   | Yoenis Cespedes       | OAK | 3.1  |
| 3   | Jesus Montero         | SEA | 2.8  |
| 4   | Yonder Alonso         | SDN | 1.9  |
| 4   | Hisashi Iwakuma       | SEA | 1.9  |
| 6   | Zack Cozart           | CIN | 1.7  |
| 7   | Wei-Yin Chen          | BAL | 1.6  |
| 7   | Matt Moore            | TBA | 1.6  |
| 9   | Devin Mesoraco        | CIN | 1.3  |
| 9   | Addison Reed          | CHA | 1.3  |
| 11  | Norichika Aoki        | MIL | 1.2  |
| 11  | Russ Canzler          | CLE | 1.2  |
| 11  | Tsuyoshi Wada         | BAL | 1.2  |
| 14  | Josh Donaldson        | OAK | 1.1  |
| 14  | Drew Pomeranz         | COL | 1.1  |
| 16  | Rex Brothers          | COL | 0.9  |
| 17  | Joe Benson            | MIN | 0.8  |
| 18  | Brad Brach            | SDN | 0.7  |
| 18  | Michael Fiers         | MIL | 0.7  |
| 18  | Tom Milone            | OAK | 0.7  |
| 18  | Dave Sappelt          | CHN | 0.7  |
| 22  | Matt Carpenter        | SLN | 0.6  |
| 22  | Jose Constanza        | ATL | 0.6  |
| 22  | Robert Erlin          | SDN | 0.6  |
| 22  | Lance Lynn            | SLN | 0.6  |
| 22  | Leonys Martin         | TEX | 0.6  |
| 22  | Mike Trout            | ANA | 0.6  |
| 28  | Trevor Bauer          | ARI | 0.5  |
| 28  | Robinson Chirinos     | TBA | 0.5  |
| 28  | Yoshinori Tateyama    | TEX | 0.5  |
| 31  | Fautino De Los Santos | OAK | 0.4  |
| 31  | Ryan Lavarnway        | BOS | 0.4  |
| 31  | Jose Lobaton          | TBA | 0.4  |
| 31  | Andy Parrino          | SDN | 0.4  |
| 31  | Anthony Rizzo         | CHN | 0.4  |
| 31  | Chance Ruffin         | SEA | 0.4  |
| 31  | Eduardo Sanchez       | SLN | 0.4  |
| 31  | Tyler Skaggs          | ARI | 0.4  |
| 31  | Josh Spence           | SDN | 0.4  |

| RNK | NAME               | TM  | WARP |
|-----|--------------------|-----|------|
| 40  | Brad Boxberger     | SDN | 0.3  |
| 40  | Taylor Green       | MIL | 0.3  |
| 40  | Brandon Guyer      | TBA | 0.3  |
| 40  | Jake McGee         | TBA | 0.3  |
| 40  | Kirk Nieuwenhuis   | NYN | 0.3  |
| 40  | Pedro Strop        | BAL | 0.3  |
| 46  | Al Alburquerque    | DET | 0.2  |
| 46  | Matt Antonelli     | BAL | 0.2  |
| 46  | Mike Baxter        | NYN | 0.2  |
| 46  | Chris Carter       | OAK | 0.2  |
| 46  | Welington Castillo | CHN | 0.2  |
| 46  | Collin Cowgill     | OAK | 0.2  |
| 46  | Edgmer Escalona    | COL | 0.2  |
| 46  | Todd Frazier       | CIN | 0.2  |
| 46  | John Gaub          | CHN | 0.2  |
| 46  | Brandon Gomes      | TBA | 0.2  |
| 46  | Matt Hague         | PIT | 0.2  |
| 46  | Brandon Kintzler   | MIL | 0.2  |
| 46  | Michael Kohn       | ANA | 0.2  |
| 46  | Josh Lindblom      | LAN | 0.2  |
| 46  | Steve Lombardozzi  | WAS | 0.2  |
| 46  | Josh Lueke         | TBA | 0.2  |
| 46  | Joe Paterson       | ARI | 0.2  |
| 46  | Anthony Recker     | OAK | 0.2  |
| 46  | Josh Satin         | NYN | 0.2  |
| 46  | Michael Schwimer   | PHI | 0.2  |
| 46  | Drew Smyly         | DET | 0.2  |
| 46  | Eric Surkamp       | SFN | 0.2  |
| 46  | Julio Teheran      | ATL | 0.2  |
| 46  | Kyle Weiland       | HOU | 0.2  |



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