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August 17, 2006 Schrodinger's BatUsing The House Advantage"I do think running the bases aggressively is something that should be the tendency in every team. I do. That aggressiveness is part of baseball whether you believe in waiting for the three-run homer or not. If you can get that guy to third instead of to second that's a lot better statistical position to be in. If you can create more of those situations, you're going to have more runs on the bottom line."--Angels Manager Mike SciosciaAfter taking a break last week to lament the Cubs swap of Greg Maddux for Cesar Izturis, I'm back to dissecting the running game this week. However, this time, rather than look at individuals we'll travel up the ladder to create a team perspective. We're taking this detour in our series because the most frequently asked questions by readers pertaining to the entire topic is probably how the calculation of Equivalent Ground Advancement Runs (EqGAR) and Equivalent Air Advancement Runs (EqAAR) applies to teams and whether we can learn anything about coaching or team philosophies as a result. This week, we'll perform a few aggregations and take a look at the seasonal team leaders in both metrics, as well as examine the seasonal fluctuations that are in play, and then delve a little deeper into the meaning of metrics such as these. Keep in mind that this is just a pit stop--next week we'll move the ball forward a bit in hopes of eventually actually ending this series, as we visit an old friend well-known to those in the performance analysis community by adding stolen bases and pickoffs to our baserunning toolbox. Be the House Let's get right to it. First, here are the 2005 results, ranked first by the Ground Advancement Rate (GA Rate, calculated as the ratio of total ground advancement runs to expected ground advancement runs) and then by Air Advancement Rate (AA Rate). We're using the rate statistic since teams differ in the number of opportunities they receive in a given season, with National League teams getting fewer opportunities for both ground and air advancement.
Team Totals for 2005 Sorted by GA Rate GA Opps EqGAR GA Rate AA Opps EqAAR AA Rate ANA 321 5.99 1.22 265 -2.83 0.90 SLN 308 3.94 1.18 253 4.46 1.22 CHN 314 2.97 1.12 252 -2.22 0.92 SFN 360 3.10 1.12 259 -5.95 0.81 PIT 287 2.40 1.11 265 -4.23 0.87 CHA 281 2.35 1.10 273 1.58 1.06 NYN 289 2.40 1.09 246 -2.57 0.90 FLO 324 1.68 1.08 280 1.25 1.04 COL 311 1.47 1.06 259 1.08 1.05 MIL 297 0.79 1.03 239 -0.82 0.97 ARI 310 0.77 1.03 249 3.32 1.13 HOU 307 0.38 1.02 237 3.01 1.12 SDN 298 0.03 1.00 297 -1.23 0.96 CIN 255 -0.11 0.99 242 0.34 1.01 WAS 326 -0.18 0.99 237 0.58 1.02 KCA 294 -0.95 0.96 293 2.43 1.08 MIN 329 -1.07 0.95 241 -4.78 0.83 ATL 313 -1.32 0.94 269 0.61 1.02 SEA 286 -1.30 0.94 273 -1.80 0.92 PHI 302 -1.65 0.93 304 -2.37 0.93 TBA 283 -1.66 0.92 277 -2.49 0.93 CLE 290 -1.82 0.91 280 4.30 1.17 BAL 295 -2.21 0.90 280 3.07 1.12 TOR 292 -2.37 0.89 257 4.22 1.13 NYA 264 -1.84 0.88 294 -0.73 0.98 TEX 244 -1.71 0.88 276 3.58 1.18 BOS 255 -2.03 0.88 329 3.64 1.10 LAN 312 -3.00 0.87 255 0.19 1.01 OAK 259 -2.24 0.87 320 -2.58 0.92 DET 285 -4.57 0.79 260 5.07 1.17
Team Totals for 2005 Sorted by AA Rate GA Opps EqGAR GA Rate AA Opps EqAAR AA Rate SLN 308 3.94 1.18 253 4.46 1.22 TEX 244 -1.71 0.88 276 3.58 1.18 DET 285 -4.57 0.79 260 5.07 1.17 CLE 290 -1.82 0.91 280 4.30 1.17 TOR 292 -2.37 0.89 257 4.22 1.13 ARI 310 0.77 1.03 249 3.32 1.13 BAL 295 -2.21 0.90 280 3.07 1.12 HOU 307 0.38 1.02 237 3.01 1.12 BOS 255 -2.03 0.88 329 3.64 1.10 KCA 294 -0.95 0.96 293 2.43 1.08 CHA 281 2.35 1.10 273 1.58 1.06 COL 311 1.47 1.06 259 1.08 1.05 FLO 324 1.68 1.08 280 1.25 1.04 WAS 326 -0.18 0.99 237 0.58 1.02 ATL 313 -1.32 0.94 269 0.61 1.02 CIN 255 -0.11 0.99 242 0.34 1.01 LAN 312 -3.00 0.87 255 0.19 1.01 NYA 264 -1.84 0.88 294 -0.73 0.98 MIL 297 0.79 1.03 239 -0.82 0.97 SDN 298 0.03 1.00 297 -1.23 0.96 TBA 283 -1.66 0.92 277 -2.49 0.93 PHI 302 -1.65 0.93 304 -2.37 0.93 SEA 286 -1.30 0.94 273 -1.80 0.92 CHN 314 2.97 1.12 252 -2.22 0.92 OAK 259 -2.24 0.87 320 -2.58 0.92 ANA 321 5.99 1.22 265 -2.83 0.90 NYN 289 2.40 1.09 246 -2.57 0.90 PIT 287 2.40 1.11 265 -4.23 0.87 MIN 329 -1.07 0.95 241 -4.78 0.83 SFN 360 3.10 1.12 259 -5.95 0.81 There are a couple things we can learn from these lists. First, the range for teams who do well in EqGAR and those who do well in EqAAR is in the range of -5 to +5 runs a season, or a spread equivalent to about a win. So, at the team level, we're really talking about small differences over the course of a season. I'm sure some readers will scoff at the notion that something that seems so important could add up to what amounts a pretty small difference in the end. One should keep in mind though that in calculating these metrics we've used a standard analytic approach based on comparing before and after "snapshots" based on the Run Expectancy matrix. Individual plays some readers probably well remember may indeed have cost their team an excellent or even certain chance of winning a particular game or games. For example, if Eric Munson of the Devil Rays gets gunned down at the plate in the bottom of the tenth with the score tied (as he was on June 28, 2005), that clearly has a large impact on that game. However, Run Expectancy only allows us to credit plays at the granularity of differences in average run scoring given particular base/out combinations, and the technique is inherently not quite so context-specific. In order to account for the context more fully we could instead use the Win Expectancy (WE) Framework, which allows us to quantify events by their impact not in terms of runs but in wins (or actually percentages of wins), therefore capturing the importance of that tenth-inning play. However, doing so puts us in danger of tipping too far in the other direction, and would skew the results if players happened to find themselves in an inordinate number of high- or low-impact situations. In essence, what these metrics measure is not really the actual number of runs a team gained or lost by an advancement event but theoretically how the many decisions made throughout the course of the season in the aggregate put the team in more or less advantageous situations measured in terms of runs. If events in the real world always worked out exactly as our models tell us they should, the team would in reality gain or lose the number of runs calculated in these metrics. As we all know, the real world doesn't quite work like that, but in the end, this more theoretical perspective is what I think anyone interested in even these kinds of small advantages should be looking at. This philosophy, as hinted at by Mike Scioscia, was summed up nicely by former Dodgers GM and current Padres Special Assistant for Baseball Operations Paul DePodesta in an article penned a couple years ago, where he likened the philosophy to the house advantage enjoyed by casinos:
"I was on a quest to find relevant relationships. Usually it wasn't as simple as 'if X then Y.' I was looking for probabilistic relationships. I christened the new model in the front office: 'be the house.' Every season we play 162 games. Individual players amass over 600 plate appearances. Starting pitchers face 1,000 hitters. We have plenty of sample size. I encouraged everyone to think of the house advantage in everything we did. We may not always be right but we'd be right a lot more often than we'd be wrong. In baseball, if you win about 60% of your games, you're probably in the playoffs." Teams that do well in these metrics can in some sense be said to have used their house advantage. The second thing we can learn from the above lists, and what you probably noticed already, is although the difference between the top and bottom teams is similar in both metrics, those teams who do well in EqGAR don't necessarily fare well in EqAAR and vice versa. In fact, the correlation coefficient (the measure of the strength of the linear relationship between two sets of values with a perfect positive correlation equaling 1 and a perfect negative correlation at -1) between GA Rate and AA Rate for 2005 was actually negative. In other words, knowing a team's GA Rate tells you nothing about their AA Rate, and vice versa. At first blush, this would seem counterintuitive. After all, it would seem that teams who have personnel who can take extra bases on ground balls should find themselves able to do so on balls hit in the air as well. There are two reasons why this otherwise reasonable expectation might not be the case. First, it just may be that the skills required to do well in one metric are not in fact the skills required for excellence in the other. Perhaps raw speed is more useful in obtaining a good EqGAR while judgment is more useful in EqAAR. That's certainly possible but in my mind what is more likely is that EqGAR has a higher skill component while EqAAR is more infused with randomness making them difficult to correlate. If you look at teams across the six seasons we've been working with (2000-2005), what you find is that the correlation coefficient for GA Rate in the five pairs of seasons runs like so:
Correlation Coefficients for GA Rate 2000-2001 0.54 2001-2002 0.25 2002-2003 0.48 2003-2004 0.62 2004-2005 0.22 Here we can see some middling to weak positive correlations, which indicate that perhaps personnel or coaching or team philosophy may be influencing the repeatability of this metric, even given the turnover that teams deal with. On the other hand, the coefficients for AA Rate are as follows:
Correlation Coefficients for AA Rate 2000-2001 0.16 2001-2002 -0.04 2002-2003 0.14 2003-2004 -0.06 2004-2005 -0.04 As you can see, for air advancement there is no discernible correlation. One might speculate that the reason for this lies in the fact that for advancing on outs in the air there are both fewer opportunities, so our sample sizes are decreased (which increases the variability), and the success rates are so high that getting thrown out a few extra times is enough to send a team plummeting from the upper third to the bottom third. Individual plays have a greater relative impact on the aggregate outcome, so the uncharacteristically great throws by a Johnny Damon or Bernie Williams or an otherwise good runner getting a bad jump or being the victim of a bad call have large impacts on the outcomes, thus scrambling the results. We also haven't accounted for the outfielder's arms for each attempt, so it's possible that a team like the Giants--who scored poorly--just happened to test some good arms and failed when doing so. You can take a look at some of the individual EqAAR results for 2005 for players with 25 or more opportunities on my blog and here for EqGAR. Seasonal Leaders and Trailers To round out this discussion of team performances, we'll leave you with plenty of numbers to chew on. We present the top and bottom five teams for both ground and air advancement for each of our other five seasons (2000-2004) sorted by our rate statistic.
Ground Advancement Air Advancement Year Team GA Opps EqGAR GA Rate Team AA Opps EqAAR AA Rate 2000 COL 315 5.35 1.22 MIN 276 4.62 1.16 2000 MON 361 5.03 1.17 MIL 237 4.39 1.16 2000 ANA 290 3.59 1.17 CIN 295 4.49 1.14 2000 SFN 279 2.57 1.14 SDN 253 3.87 1.14 2000 KCA 326 2.68 1.11 SEA 305 4.35 1.13 2000 NYA 269 -4.12 0.75 ANA 299 -6.10 0.81 2000 BAL 293 -3.54 0.82 CLE 290 -6.41 0.82 2000 LAN 287 -2.94 0.83 PHI 262 -4.24 0.83 2000 TEX 318 -3.59 0.84 DET 307 -5.32 0.85 2000 CLE 280 -1.67 0.91 BOS 324 -3.86 0.88 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2001 ANA 268 3.81 1.19 TEX 305 4.24 1.12 2001 PIT 299 3.61 1.17 PHI 294 3.97 1.11 2001 MIL 269 2.41 1.13 CHA 260 3.08 1.10 2001 CHA 283 2.70 1.13 OAK 275 2.58 1.08 2001 FLO 311 2.40 1.12 NYA 287 1.76 1.07 2001 SDN 255 -3.07 0.83 NYN 297 -8.34 0.70 2001 NYA 282 -3.82 0.83 PIT 255 -4.43 0.82 2001 TEX 252 -1.33 0.92 CLE 287 -5.20 0.86 2001 NYN 259 -1.16 0.93 SFN 281 -4.68 0.87 2001 LAN 274 -0.99 0.94 BOS 249 -3.03 0.90 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2002 SFN 295 2.77 1.14 OAK 273 2.36 1.11 2002 TEX 271 2.61 1.13 DET 251 3.27 1.10 2002 COL 287 2.38 1.12 MON 246 2.47 1.10 2002 SLN 296 2.45 1.11 MIN 271 2.79 1.09 2002 NYN 324 2.60 1.10 CLE 228 1.75 1.07 2002 OAK 247 -3.38 0.80 MIL 241 -4.92 0.81 2002 PHI 323 -4.40 0.80 SDN 254 -3.91 0.85 2002 HOU 268 -2.49 0.86 NYN 233 -3.02 0.85 2002 NYA 270 -2.79 0.86 SLN 302 -3.13 0.91 2002 CLE 292 -2.45 0.87 CHA 307 -3.35 0.91 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2003 ANA 300 4.62 1.21 DET 253 4.90 1.20 2003 SLN 325 2.96 1.13 BOS 318 5.07 1.13 2003 MIL 297 2.45 1.11 CIN 242 2.24 1.13 2003 FLO 313 2.81 1.11 NYN 240 3.29 1.13 2003 NYN 322 2.14 1.09 MIN 280 2.88 1.10 2003 BOS 260 -4.72 0.77 LAN 241 -2.85 0.87 2003 NYA 282 -2.80 0.84 SDN 292 -3.84 0.87 2003 TBA 296 -3.59 0.84 BAL 288 -2.97 0.89 2003 CLE 274 -2.84 0.87 CHA 264 -2.68 0.90 2003 OAK 289 -2.49 0.89 PIT 264 -2.47 0.90 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2004 ANA 325 5.08 1.20 ATL 228 4.52 1.18 2004 SDN 315 3.39 1.15 CHA 270 4.21 1.17 2004 CHA 270 2.59 1.13 MIL 223 3.28 1.15 2004 PIT 330 2.56 1.12 PIT 230 3.39 1.15 2004 SLN 319 2.59 1.11 SLN 282 4.46 1.13 2004 BOS 255 -4.67 0.74 MON 236 -5.13 0.81 2004 OAK 269 -3.88 0.79 CIN 227 -3.01 0.85 2004 CHN 307 -3.19 0.86 KCA 280 -3.82 0.85 2004 NYN 320 -2.19 0.91 LAN 243 -2.93 0.87 2004 CLE 326 -2.08 0.92 ARI 240 -2.65 0.90 As mentioned previously, you can see even from these partial lists that some teams seem to do well in ground advancement year after year, while others do poorly. For example, the Angels are among the leaders in four of the five seasons, and actually led in three of those (2001, 2004-2005). Meanwhile, Cleveland is among the bottom teams in four of the five seasons. Could this be the result of coaching or a team philosophy? Well, there is anecdotal evidence anyway that for the Angels the latter might indeed by the case. To get a better handle on the influence of individual coaches, however, we would need data on just which first and third base coaches were employed by what teams over what span of time. We'd also want to expand the scenarios we look at, to not only include advancing on outs but also doing so on hits as well, as taking into consideration events such as pickoffs, which a base coach might influence. Although I have nothing to report on that score yet, there is work under way with a fellow SABR member to collect the requisite data and begin to analyze it. Stay tuned. Finally, because I know someone will ask if I don't, here are the top and bottom teams over the course of the last six seasons. Note that almost all of the Mets -8.72 EqAAR came in 2001 when they recorded the lowest total at -8.34 by virtue of getting thrown out 12 times and being credited with negative runs in 76 of their 297 opportunities.
Ground Advancement Air Advancement Team GA Opps EqGAR GA Rate Team AA Opps EqAAR AA Rate ANA 1810 25.33 1.18 SLN 1681 7.88 1.05 SLN 1882 13.67 1.10 DET 1617 7.80 1.04 PIT 1825 12.02 1.09 TOR 1647 8.41 1.04 SFN 1819 9.36 1.08 ATL 1569 6.59 1.04 MON 1704 10.32 1.08 TEX 1766 5.78 1.04 NYA 1659 -16.25 0.85 NYN 1531 -8.72 0.93 BOS 1598 -15.78 0.87 PIT 1567 -9.18 0.94 OAK 1584 -14.21 0.87 MON 1222 -7.64 0.94 CLE 1768 -10.18 0.92 ANA 1813 -11.41 0.94 LAN 1839 -8.82 0.93 PHI 1657 -7.01 0.95
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