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August 27, 2012 Baseball TherapyOne-Run Winners: Good or Lucky?
A few weeks ago, the topic for the BP Lineup Card was "Unanswered questions for the second half." I noted that at the time, the Cardinals were several games behind both the Pirates and the Reds in the NL Central standings, despite the fact that they had a better Pythagorean record than either. In theory, the Cardinals should have been atop the NL Central. As my father is fond of pointing out, everything works in theory. The question that I posed was whether Pythagorean records were really a "true" gauge of a team's quality. It's a topic that has never been fully resolved. Are differences between actual record and Pythaogrean records a matter of luck, or do they reflect some underlying property of a team? Both logic and previous research tell us that there's a really easy way to outperform your Pythagorean record: win a lot of one-run games. In one-run wins, the Pythagorean calculations see only that a team scored one more run than its opponent. The standings see that it won the game. So, are one-run wins a skill? The Orioles have a negative run-differential overall this season, but are an astounding 23-6 in one-run games so far this year, and as a result, are in the playoff hunt. Are they extremely lucky, or are they just gritty like that and "know how to win" the close ones? There are a lot of theories on the issue: teams with good bullpens (or good closers) can protect close leads. Teams with good starters can overcome a bad offensive day. Teams with crafty managers can win because the manager can expertly push all the buttons. Then again, no one ever takes the contrary position. A team with a bunch of one-run wins might belie a bullpen or a manager who can bungle a five-run lead into a one-run lead, barely hanging on to fly the W flag over the stadium. After studying the issue, I can boil down the recipe for winning one-run games to three words: wear white pants. Want to know how I got there? Warning! Gory Mathematical Details Ahead! In fact, while home teams win roughly 53-54 percent of all games, they won 61 percent of all one-run games from 1993-2011. Games won by the visiting team are decided by one run about 23 percent of the time, but home teams collect 31 percent of their wins by a single tally. Overall, 28.2 percent of all games are decided by one run. The thing about a walk-off is that, by definition, the ninth inning (and game) ends before three outs are made. Suppose for a moment that we made the home team keep going until three were out. Indeed, a home team that protects a one-run lead in the top of the ninth leaves a whole bottom of the ninth on the table. If the home team took its turn as it was supposed to, it might score a few more runs... and suddenly, it's no longer a one-run game. There are a few other interesting things about one-run games that might be instructive. First off, they are generally lower scoring than other types of games, with one-run games featuring an average of eight runs between the two teams vs. 10 for games decided by other margins. Then again, a good way to make sure a game is not a one-run game is for one team to score 12 all by itself. I restricted the non-one-run-game sample to games decided by either two or three runs. These games featured, on average, 8.6 runs, and the difference was still significant. Not only that, but games decided by one run tended to be closer-played games, even after the first inning. In a game that is eventually decided by one run, the average deficit between the two teams after the first inning is .72 runs. In all other games, it's one run even. Restricting the non-one-run sample to games that end with a two- or three-run win (.82 runs, for the curious), the difference is still significant. One-run games tend to be low scoring and more closely played, even from the outset. A good starting pitcher might be helpful there. But hold on: about 30 percent of one-run games are shootouts featuring at least 11 runs, and 10 percent feature 15 runs or more. An offense that can keep up with the Adam Jones-es would be helpful in these games, because the pitching staff isn't having such a good day. What about the theory that a good closer is the key? Let's take a look at what games that are eventually decided by one run look like headed into the ninth.
The thing about all these numbers is that you can make a case that strengths in certain areas of the roster would lead to success in one-run games. It's hard to argue that roster talent would be inconsequential to winning one-run games, but it's harder still to say that a general manager would get the most bang for his buck by focusing on X. For a moment, I want to focus on the 25 percent of one-run games that go into the ninth tied. In some sense, from this point onward, the fundamental characteristic of the game has changed. From this point onward, the game is a series of one-inning sudden-death games. Prior to this, if the opponents scored in the fifth inning, you could make it up in the seventh. But no more. From a sampling perspective, we've gone from a nine-inning sample of team quality on that day to a one-inning sample. Smaller sample sizes mean more variance: anything can happen in extra innings. More than that, we're talking about a handful of plate appearances. Even a good reliever can have a bad day. I once found that Pythagorean residuals—that is, how much a team over- or under-performs its Pythagorean record—are correlated with the team's overall winning percentage, although only moderately. Teams that win 100 games have somewhat of a tendency to out-perform their Pythagorean records, while 60-win teams tend to under-perform, but there are plenty of counter-examples. At the time, I wasn't sure what that was about. I'd hazard a guess now that what we're seeing is that teams that have good players are more likely to win games in general. These are players that you would want on the field in a close game where the game hangs in the balance. So, there probably is an advantage to having them that shows in the residuals. The problem is that as the game reaches its autumn, the element of randomness creeps in all the more. In extra innings, all you need is one good (lucky?) swing of the bat. Good players are more likely to take that swing, but even bad teams score runs now and again. But let's do one more test. Let's look at how reliable performance in one-run games is. I'll use the KR-21 formula that I introduced a few weeks ago. For my sample, I'll look at all games between 1993-2011 that were decided by one run or more. For each franchise, I took a five-year block of games (1993-1997, 1998-2002, 2003-2007, 2008-2011... yes, I know that last one is only a four-year window) and treated them all as big long seasons. This was to increase the number of one-run games that I could look at: since real teams play only about 40 one-run games in a single season, I needed more data to work with. There are plenty of problems with this analysis strategy, but the idea is that even over the course of a few years, a team maintains a lot of the same players (usually). It's not perfect, but it's about the best we have available. I looked at the reliability of a team's record in a single one-run game, then in two one-run games, then three, all the way up to 100. The KR-21 reliability settled in around .30 when I got all the way to 100 one-run games. At 40 games, which is roughly the number that most teams play over the course of a season, reliability was a paltry .17. This suggests that the one-run records of most teams are not stable. If we gave the Orioles another 29 one-run games, they are not likely to go 23-6 again. Sorry, Orioles fans, those orange uniforms are probably going to turn back into pumpkins. The Conclusion If your goal today is to win a game by one run, may I suggest the most predictable way of all to ensure that it happens: wear white pants.
Russell A. Carleton is an author of Baseball Prospectus. Follow @pizzacutter4
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I think you backed off in your analysis. There's no doubt that one-run games can hinge on a bloop single or swinging bunt, and that weak teams are as likely to get that kind of hit as are stronger teams. But weak teams have an inferior lineup to stronger teams, and almost always have a weaker bullpen. A team with a strong bullpen should prevail more often. Isn't that what the Orioles have been doing? Not only have Jim Johnson, Pedro Strop and Troy Patton been extraordinarily effective, but the rest of the members of the bullpen have also been effective most of the time. All of them, not just three of them. They've won their last 12 extra inning games, games which stretch the resources of any bullpen (and probably reward the deepest 'pen). The Orioles haven't won very often with nine-inning last at-bat heroics (like Oakland, for example), but have won in the 12th, 13th, 15th, 17th after not scoring (most of the time) in the earlier extra innings. It's the bullpen that stymied the other team... How often has the Oriole bullpen shut down their opponents in the 7th, 8th and (not "or") 9th? Doesn't that throw the model off?
I recommend Sam Miller's article on the subject (from today). Bullpen performance is beset by all sorts of small sample size problems and luck.
It's true that the Orioles have played a lot of extra inning games, which are best won by good bullpen performance. To put it less charitably, the Orioles have been fortunate to be in a bunch of the type of one-run games that have called for a good bullpen and fortunate that their relievers all seem to have four-leaf clovers in their back pockets this year.
The model only sees games that end in one-run. Suppose that the O's go into the 7th inning leading by one, and pitch 3 shutout innings. The game ends with a one-run O's win. Conclusion: Good bullpen performance, but why didn't the offense make it a 3 run game?
I agree. The Orioles do not have the best offense. The bullpen has been (most of) the story this year.
I would actually expect a team with a heterogenous bullpen, rather than a uniformly good bullpen, to outperform its pythag. Most managers use their two or three best relievers to protect slim leads, or to keep the other team's lead small. They use the rest of the bullpen to eat innings when the the score isn't so close.
So a relief core that's top-heavy -- two or three great relievers and three or four terrible ones -- would seem to play tough in close games; get landslided if the other team had an big early lead (negative effect on overall run diff); and cough up big leads, turning them into smaller ones (negative effect on overall run diff). Landslide victories would be rare, landslide losses would be occasional, and great relief arms would contribute to a higher W% in close games.
A team with 2 or 3 good relievers wouldn't be able to hang around in a 19 inning game, unless the other team's pen is just as bad. Perhaps they are lucky enough to be involved in games that don't call for that. Perhaps not.