December 3, 2010
Ahead in the Count
Home Sweet Home Advantage
by Matt Swartz
When I wrote my five-part series on home-field advantage in 2009, I noticed that it had been steady at about 54 percent for over half a century. It was 53.9 percent in the 1950s, 54.0 percent in the ‘60s, 53.8 percent in the ‘70s, 54.1 percent in the ’80s, 53.5 percent in the ‘90s, and 54.2 percent in the 2000s. However, in the last three years, we have seen home teams win 55.5 percent of the 7,288 games played, a very statistically significant difference. Does this suggest that a large change has actually taken place, or is it just a coincidence? If a change has taken place, what is causing it?
On one hand, there was only about a 1 percent chance that the league-wide home-field advantage of the last three years would be so far from the historical 53.9 percent of the last 60 years by sheer randomness. On the other hand, I clearly have cherry picked the last three years—I don’t plan on writing an article every year examining the previous three and declaring that it was 54 percent again—and perhaps the odds of getting any three-year period with such an extreme number may not be so small. However, if we expand the period to 2007-10, we still see a statistically significant difference in home-field advantage at the 2 percent level, and if we expand the period to 2006-10, we also see a statistically significant difference at the 2 percent level. Even the 54.68 percent home-field advantage from 2003-10 is statistically significantly different at the 5 percent level than the 53.97 percent home-field advantage of the last 60 years. The point is that I could have cherry picked a lot of starting and stopping points and still seen something so extreme.
The below table lists the league-wide home-field advantage since 1900:
Year
|
HFA
|
Year
|
HFA
|
Year
|
HFA
|
Year
|
HFA
|
1900
|
58.1%
|
1930
|
57.1%
|
1960
|
54.8%
|
1990
|
53.7%
|
1901
|
56.2%
|
1931
|
58.2%
|
1961
|
55.1%
|
1991
|
53.8%
|
1902
|
57.8%
|
1932
|
55.4%
|
1962
|
53.6%
|
1992
|
55.2%
|
1903
|
56.3%
|
1933
|
55.8%
|
1963
|
55.2%
|
1993
|
53.8%
|
1904
|
54.0%
|
1934
|
54.8%
|
1964
|
52.6%
|
1994
|
51.7%
|
1905
|
55.3%
|
1935
|
54.7%
|
1965
|
53.6%
|
1995
|
53.2%
|
1906
|
54.2%
|
1936
|
55.2%
|
1966
|
53.4%
|
1996
|
54.1%
|
1907
|
54.4%
|
1937
|
54.3%
|
1967
|
56.3%
|
1997
|
53.5%
|
1908
|
53.9%
|
1938
|
53.8%
|
1968
|
51.1%
|
1998
|
53.8%
|
1909
|
53.8%
|
1939
|
53.7%
|
1969
|
54.9%
|
1999
|
52.1%
|
1910
|
56.0%
|
1940
|
52.9%
|
1970
|
54.0%
|
2000
|
54.0%
|
1911
|
52.7%
|
1941
|
53.9%
|
1971
|
52.0%
|
2001
|
52.4%
|
1912
|
52.2%
|
1942
|
54.6%
|
1972
|
52.9%
|
2002
|
54.2%
|
1913
|
51.0%
|
1943
|
55.2%
|
1973
|
53.0%
|
2003
|
55.0%
|
1914
|
55.2%
|
1944
|
54.9%
|
1974
|
53.4%
|
2004
|
53.5%
|
1915
|
55.4%
|
1945
|
56.7%
|
1975
|
54.0%
|
2005
|
53.7%
|
1916
|
55.7%
|
1946
|
55.2%
|
1976
|
52.4%
|
2006
|
54.6%
|
1917
|
50.6%
|
1947
|
54.0%
|
1977
|
54.4%
|
2007
|
54.2%
|
1918
|
56.5%
|
1948
|
50.9%
|
1978
|
57.3%
|
2008
|
55.6%
|
1919
|
55.1%
|
1949
|
56.0%
|
1979
|
54.0%
|
2009
|
54.9%
|
1920
|
53.3%
|
1950
|
54.7%
|
1980
|
54.2%
|
2010
|
55.9%
|
1921
|
54.3%
|
1951
|
52.6%
|
1981
|
52.1%
|
|
|
1922
|
55.2%
|
1952
|
55.0%
|
1982
|
53.8%
|
|
|
1923
|
50.9%
|
1953
|
52.6%
|
1983
|
54.2%
|
|
|
1924
|
53.7%
|
1954
|
53.1%
|
1984
|
52.9%
|
|
|
1925
|
56.0%
|
1955
|
56.2%
|
1985
|
55.0%
|
|
|
1926
|
56.5%
|
1956
|
53.6%
|
1986
|
54.7%
|
|
|
1927
|
56.1%
|
1957
|
52.5%
|
1987
|
54.8%
|
|
|
1928
|
52.1%
|
1958
|
54.9%
|
1988
|
53.8%
|
|
|
1929
|
54.5%
|
1959
|
54.1%
|
1989
|
55.0%
|
|
|
You can start to notice how different 2008-10 look compared to other years from this table, but since the year-to-year fluctuations are very large even within one year, let’s look at the table again in three-year bursts. This will give a more clear sense of how abnormal the last three years are.
Year
|
HFA
|
Year
|
HFA
|
Year
|
HFA
|
Year
|
HFA
|
1900-02
|
57.2%
|
1930-32
|
56.9%
|
1960-62
|
54.5%
|
1990-92
|
54.2%
|
1901-03
|
56.8%
|
1931-33
|
56.5%
|
1961-63
|
54.6%
|
1991-93
|
54.2%
|
1902-04
|
56.0%
|
1932-34
|
55.3%
|
1962-64
|
53.8%
|
1992-94
|
53.7%
|
1903-05
|
55.2%
|
1933-35
|
55.1%
|
1963-65
|
53.8%
|
1993-95
|
53.0%
|
1904-06
|
54.5%
|
1934-36
|
54.9%
|
1964-66
|
53.2%
|
1994-96
|
53.1%
|
1905-07
|
54.7%
|
1935-37
|
54.7%
|
1965-67
|
54.4%
|
1995-97
|
53.6%
|
1906-08
|
54.2%
|
1936-38
|
54.4%
|
1966-68
|
53.6%
|
1996-98
|
53.8%
|
1907-09
|
54.0%
|
1937-39
|
53.9%
|
1967-69
|
54.1%
|
1997-99
|
53.1%
|
1908-10
|
54.6%
|
1938-40
|
53.5%
|
1968-70
|
53.5%
|
1998-2000
|
53.3%
|
1909-11
|
54.2%
|
1939-41
|
53.5%
|
1969-71
|
53.6%
|
1999-2001
|
52.8%
|
1910-12
|
53.6%
|
1940-42
|
53.8%
|
1970-72
|
53.0%
|
2000-02
|
53.6%
|
1911-13
|
52.0%
|
1941-43
|
54.6%
|
1971-73
|
52.6%
|
2001-03
|
53.9%
|
1912-14
|
52.8%
|
1942-44
|
54.9%
|
1972-74
|
53.1%
|
2002-04
|
54.2%
|
1913-15
|
53.9%
|
1943-45
|
55.6%
|
1973-75
|
53.5%
|
2003-05
|
54.1%
|
1914-16
|
55.5%
|
1944-46
|
55.6%
|
1974-76
|
53.3%
|
2004-06
|
54.0%
|
1915-17
|
53.9%
|
1945-47
|
55.3%
|
1975-77
|
53.6%
|
2005-07
|
54.2%
|
1916-18
|
54.1%
|
1946-48
|
53.4%
|
1976-78
|
54.8%
|
2006-08
|
54.8%
|
1917-19
|
53.9%
|
1947-49
|
53.6%
|
1977-79
|
55.2%
|
2007-09
|
54.9%
|
1918-20
|
54.8%
|
1948-50
|
53.9%
|
1978-80
|
55.2%
|
2008-10
|
55.5%
|
1919-21
|
54.2%
|
1949-51
|
54.4%
|
1979-81
|
53.6%
|
|
|
1920-22
|
54.2%
|
1950-52
|
54.1%
|
1980-82
|
53.5%
|
|
|
1921-23
|
53.5%
|
1951-53
|
53.4%
|
1981-83
|
53.5%
|
|
|
1922-24
|
53.3%
|
1952-54
|
53.6%
|
1982-84
|
53.6%
|
|
|
1923-25
|
53.6%
|
1953-55
|
54.0%
|
1983-85
|
54.0%
|
|
|
1924-26
|
55.4%
|
1954-56
|
54.3%
|
1984-86
|
54.2%
|
|
|
1925-27
|
56.2%
|
1955-57
|
54.1%
|
1985-87
|
54.9%
|
|
|
1926-28
|
54.9%
|
1956-58
|
53.7%
|
1986-88
|
54.4%
|
|
|
1927-29
|
54.2%
|
1957-59
|
53.8%
|
1987-89
|
54.5%
|
|
|
1928-30
|
54.6%
|
1958-60
|
54.6%
|
1988-90
|
54.2%
|
|
|
1929-31
|
56.6%
|
1959-61
|
54.7%
|
1989-91
|
54.1%
|
|
|
The important takeaway is that even though we see some pretty large fluctuations prior to World War II, there is a very steady home-field advantage in recent years that has barely moved until recently when it flirted with jumping in 2006 and then really took a big stride forward in 2008, and no three-year period since 1944-46 has had a home-field advantage this large, so the results seem to suggest something may be happening.
In last year’s articles, I also discovered that the magnitude of home-field advantage seemed to be very similar across teams, with year-to-year fluctuations in teams with big or small home-field advantages disappearing as quickly as they came (though the Rockies seemed to be one team that repeatedly had larger home-field advantages than other teams). However, if there has been a sudden league-wide change in home-field advantage, it may not have affected all teams equally, so I gathered the home-field advantage for all 30 teams over the 2008-10 period. But keep in mind that the margin of error for any one team is about +/- 9 percent, and that it is likely that one or two teams will be beyond that. In other words, one of these teams is more than 9 percent above or below their true home-field advantage capabilities.
Team
|
Stadium
|
Year Built
|
HFA 2008-10
|
Pirates
|
PNC Park
|
2001
|
21.3%
|
Tigers
|
Comerica Park
|
2000
|
18.7%
|
Rockies
|
Coors Field
|
1995
|
17.7%
|
Twins
|
Target Field
|
2010
|
16.8%
|
Rays
|
Tropicana Field
|
1998
|
16.0%
|
Red Sox
|
Fenway Park
|
1912
|
15.2%
|
Mets
|
Citi Field
|
2009
|
14.0%
|
Diamondbacks
|
Chase Field
|
1998
|
12.8%
|
Astros
|
Minute Maid Park
|
2000
|
12.6%
|
Nationals
|
Nationals Park
|
2008
|
12.1%
|
Blue Jays
|
Rogers Centre
|
1989
|
12.0%
|
Mariners
|
Safeco Field
|
1999
|
11.9%
|
Braves
|
Turner Field
|
1996
|
11.9%
|
Athletics
|
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum
|
1966
|
11.8%
|
Orioles
|
Oriole Park at Camden Yards
|
1992
|
11.7%
|
White Sox
|
U.S. Cellular Field
|
1991
|
11.3%
|
Dodgers
|
Dodger Stadium
|
1962
|
11.1%
|
Yankees
|
Yankee Stadium
|
2009
|
11.1%
|
Cardinals
|
Busch Stadium
|
2006
|
10.3%
|
Giants
|
AT&T Park
|
2000
|
9.9%
|
Rangers
|
Rangers Ballpark in Arlington
|
1994
|
9.1%
|
Reds
|
Great American Ball Park
|
2003
|
8.6%
|
Indians
|
Progressive Field
|
1994
|
8.6%
|
Cubs
|
Wrigley Field
|
1914
|
7.0%
|
Padres
|
PETCO Park
|
2004
|
6.6%
|
Royals
|
Kauffman Stadium
|
1973
|
4.5%
|
Brewers
|
Miller Park
|
2001
|
4.5%
|
Phillies
|
Citizens Bank Park
|
2004
|
3.5%
|
Angels
|
Angel Stadium of Anaheim
|
1966
|
2.9%
|
Marlins
|
Sun Life Stadium
|
1993
|
2.7%
|
Home-field advantage for the average team has historically been about 8.0 percent (54%-46%), but 23 of 30 teams have larger home-field advantages than that in the last three years.
Although determining individual home-field advantages is a fool’s errand in most circumstances, there has been research showing that domed stadiums may show small home-field advantage trends than others. Additionally, I found that one particularly pronounced source of home-field advantage emerged in the number of extra-base hits that go for triples instead of doubles. I believe that this was because outfielders are better at playing the bounces in their own stadium, so road teams do not hit as many triples.
One of the major trends in ballparks came in 1992 when the Orioles built Camden Yards. This quirky stadium became a template for many other new “mallpark” stadiums built since then, each with their own idiosyncrasies. Since we know that quirks can cause extra home-field advantage, perhaps teams are beginning to exploit this more in recent years. While this may be a feeble theory, it is worth noting that the correlation between having a stadium built since Camden Yards was built has a .19 correlation with home-field advantage over the last three years. The older stadiums such as Wrigley Field, Angel Stadium, and Kauffman Stadium all are home to teams among the bottom six in home-field advantage, while the only one in the top 10 is that decidedly quirky Fenway Park. It is difficult to say for sure that this is the cause, but if this is more than a fluke, my best guess is that teams are learning to take advantage of their quirky stadiums.
Even with this possible evidence, I am still skeptical that a change has taken place. While it is certainly possible that home-field advantage means more than it used to in baseball, I would still expect it to sit at about 54 percent in 2011, simply because there is such a historical precedent for flukes in league wide home-field advantage balancing out.
What do you think? Is this a real change? If so, what else could be causing it?
Matt Swartz is an author of Baseball Prospectus.
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On the one hand, if you remove Fenway from the equation (which certainly qualifies as "quirky", which is what we're looking for in stadiums built since Camden) the correlation jumps to 0.26, but on the other hand there are only 7 data points that qualify as "Not built since Camden" which might be too small to mean anything. For example, Having the word "Stadium" in the name of your stadium has 6 qualifying data points and a strong negative correlation of 0.42, but I'm pretty sure the fact is irrelevant.
Also FWIW, the three sets of data starting at 1976 and ending at 1978 show a similar variance as 2006-2008 (heck, they're even right next to each other in the table), but jumps back down to a more expected level in 1979, so at the very least, this kind of shift (for this amount of time anyway) isn't unprecedented.
Yeah 1978-80 at 55.2% was as close as it got, but no three year period had 55.5%, so it's slightly unprecedented. And it is significantly different from the 1950-2010 average at the 99% confidence level. It's just that it still could be a coincidence, and I think that's still the most likely explanation. I think after 2011 and 2012, we'll have a better sense of this.
Yeah, I agree that it's not a very relevant correlation given the sample size. I only thought to look at it because of what I learned about the ratio of triples/doubles for home teams, and how stadium quirks would seem to exacerbate those type of difficulties on the road.